The effect of fiscal decentralization on local public welfare: A nonlinear study with heterogeneous considerations effects

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1 38 p 9 f ΩdIOffl3y&7 Vol.38, No W 9 Φ Systems Engineering Theory & Practice Sept., 2018 doi: / (2018) ?hρ(flr: F812 zν"46: A me 2vtxΛΠ~'rZG yemflvgmr#) 0--, &, oωr (z '`ρd ` ffl)`p,»π ) b U ~ΛfiflΦ* cksψjff. ts±: ~ΛfiflΦ*iZ}a"xXvgν, nqw,ma"ts±: ~ΛfiflΦ*}ΞY^iZ. nqbvqj5=rw(2, I"/ts±:n ~ΛfiflΦ*F7} HffiU. ψ2q4: ts±:n~λfiflφ*x U ffiu. ;μ, fy >ff3mE#N+,!]@tfib. ψ2q4: uy±:nfiflffikßz<? Sx U ffiu, nfifle.p= S fiflßzχo S%sx U ffiu; K ujsl}±: vp, t4/ψ2arfl}; uy±:[h$l4w}~9gx^. TMnQa"G1nψ2 t s±: ~ΛfiflΦ*ΞY^[h}_Ca"ld }8 ^. ±μp 5=rw; ts±:; ~ΛfiflΦ*; ±OEο The effect of fiscal decentralization on local public welfare: A nonlinear study with heterogeneous considerations effects LIU Liangliang, HE Jun, BI Gongbing (School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei , China) Abstract Local public welfare is mainly provided by the governments. Studies that examine the impact of fiscal decentralization on local public welfare show conflicting results. This paper thus focuses on the nonlinear effect of fiscal decentralization on local public welfare. The paper first analyzes the dynamic relationship between fiscal decentralization and local public welfare level through using the endogenous growth theory. Results show that fiscal decentralization and local public welfare display an inverse U- shaped relationship. Then, we explore this question empirically with a panel set over the periods in China. Results show that: expenditure decentralization has an inverse U-shaped relationship with public transportation infrastructure service, but has no inverse U-shaped relationship with public health service and public basic education service; these results are robust by using different indicators for decentralization; expenditure decentralization effect has obvious regional heterogeneity. Hopefully, the perspective and conclusion of nonlinear effect of fiscal decentralization on local public welfare in this paper will be particularly illuminating for academic research. 1 XQ Keywords endogenous growth; fiscal decentralization; local public welfare; quantile regression ffik xψ$v, 5& οffl#5~χ&3uμßffi= g' [1]. OT5& οffl#5fflfl&3, ffi fflr5&' &;xcb)fh w ff CL. ffi>g ffip%ξ_#"6d_#n4e0, >gu 7 30: lc fl: )χχ (1988 ), O, p, ΦfiWGΠ, +/Gfρ, Gfψ#: }a`$(±, dlliu@mail.ustc.edu.cn; a2b ffi: xt (1965 ), O, p, Φfi±NΠ, 5H=, +/, Gfψ#: Rρ»G, hejun@ustc.edu.cn; ρk) (1966 ), O, p, Φfi qπ, H=, +/ρs!, +/, Gfψ#: ffs, bigb@ustc.edu.cn. ffih.: h(x zc V ( , ) Foundation item: National Natural Science Foundation of China ( , ) h?w[ 6: )χχ, xt, ρk). 6'(}ffl ψqs2μyiχ v%ρ:v`::yxffi [J]. ffejp 4z '8, 2018, 38(9): Y?W[ 6: Liu L L, He J, Bi G B. The effect of fiscal decentralization on local public welfare: A nonlinear study with heterogeneous considerations effects[j]. Systems Engineering Theory & Practice, 2018, 38(9):

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3 9 f )χχ, : 6'(}ffl ψqs2μyiχ v%ρ:v`::yxffi 2269 ffifflfl&3, '%pρfl&3 F&3y~χ&3. 5&' Fbμ±Zp~χ9&3 (Fy~χ&3) 5& *Uο5&Z*Uxß/. νω, Ωiffffiρfl&3*U H, Fy~χ&3*U ff, L;5&' FbA ff. ;G4xU@LLΩfflQ-: Ω=max + 0 u (c)e ρt dt (1a) u (c) = c1 σ 1 (1b) 1 σ s.t. y = k α f β s γ l ω, (1c) g = τy, k =(1 τ) y c. νyu6"^g4xffl3λ., U@UNB u5&' y~χpr1 xffl3g4. 0G4+ν_# >cffi fl&3, '%p~χ&3y>k&3. 5&' Fbμ±Zp~χ&35&*Uο5&Z*Uxß /. Ωiffffi>K&3 H, ~χ&3*u ff, L;5&' FbA ff. 9, 0G4H)4mu>g. 0G4xU@LLΩfflQ-: Ω=max + 0 (1d) (1e) u (c)e ρt dt (1a ) u (c) = c1 σ 1 (1b ) 1 σ s.t. y = Ak α f β s γ, (1c ) g = τy, (1d ) k =(1 τ) y c (δ + n) k. (1e ) ßIχfiBG4, ^ :x<χ2νyafflfl&35pp fl&3, ΩχO (1c ) Q-. χo (1a ) #- ffi1 οfπ, g> ρ #-%0_ /. χo (1b ) #-)moc, g> c 2ΞsKΞ$&, σ #-+»d flωc, q σ>0. χo (1c ) #-ßBoC, g> A 2!?Z1/, k 2Ξs 9Uν, f 2Ξs>K&35 &*U, s 2Ξs~χ&35&*UVff α, β u γ 2n9ΩCq α + β + γ =1. χo (1d ) #-&3 N ±B, g> g 2Ξs5&Z*Uq g = f + s. χo (1e ) #- 9Uνx TμfiχO, g> τ 2 `H/, δ u n '%#-UνfigyΞ F/. Y QA, h#9$&flxq; Z2NB T^nΠ Z. νy±znb /x Hamiltonian oc: H = u(c)+λ [(1 τ) y c (δ + n) k]. (1) ffi+ (1) >, λ 2 Hamiltonian NV, c 2~7χfl, k 2PTχfl. p^nπxnk^;, w: H c = c σ λ =0, H k = λ [ (1 τ) Aαk α 1 f β s γ δ n ] = ρλ λ. Yw+ (1d ) y (2), ^Avwsy-b x_# F/p: ( g c = 1 ( ) β ( ) γ ) (1 τ) ατ 1 α 1 f α α s α A α ρ δ n. (3) σ g g p+ (1d ) (1e ) u (3), w c ( σ ) k = α 1 g c + 1 α α (δ + n)+ ρ α. (4) tq c =(c/k)k =(c/k)k 0 e gct (k 0 p *Uνcfl), }@A^+u+ (4) hff + u(c 0 t )e ρt dt, vw" _#> ffi1 Fb. pupr1 2 ffi1 xcl]k2', ~χpr1 ppr1 x]k2', ο ffi1 xßcp θ 1 (0 <θ 1 < 1), ~χpr1 οpr1 xßcp θ 2 (0 <θ 2 < 1), ^Avw~χPR1 Fbp: PS = θk1 σ 0 1 σ [ ( σ ) α 1 g c + 1 α α (δ + n)+ ρ ] 1 σ [ρ g c (1 σ)] 1 [ρ (1 σ)] 1. (5) α (2)

4 2270 ff e J P 4z ' 8 38 p ffi+ (5) >, 0<θ= θ 1 θ 2 < 1. u^, νyu_u@u5&' s/g amu~χpr1 Fb PS x5ßλ.. pu+ (5) Ip6fi, νya`kc/guxχß[fl5&' y~χpr1 Fbx Ω. 8ff Barro [24] u'eul*v [25] xfe, νya x8cω# 1 Q-. k 1 o:oaffff 9D A k 0 δ n ρ σ α β γ τ θ g 1 M U5&' y~χpr1 Fbx Ω. pg 1,, 5&' y~χpr1 FbMq U 4 Ω. OT5&' ΩxY?, ~χ&3jqh x5&whω, )gqsοy?~χpr1 Fb; ^ j, ~χidffipr/λxn&;vffid)~χ&3fffprba/λ, az"pr1 Fbx ff., OT5&' u~χpr/λndx ), ~χpr/λxffi&)mffifflb, ~χ&3x5οz2qο, ~ χ&3ffiψqοxuπffft)/h?x~χ, ~χpr1 AffifflB ; 1 ld 1^sw Ξ}& 5&' ffi~χpr1 x$ß9hffi)fs T ΛOT5&' FbxχΠ, ~χpr1?zn χxko. a^, ^G4P3p~@uμx u5&' hffi~χpr1 x&(feyn"ffl3rl. J fflff, νy`$ß9xeωuμ, ffi5&' y~χpr1 x ΩZ7&('Π. 4 χtpψ 4.1,I4u νyffiffl3pi X, ρω}g&&, 'Π>g+5&' &;x_99. V~χPR1 (PS ) pa χfl, 5&' (FD) ffg _ψpwχfl, *effn+hffi~χpr1 xχflap~7χfl (X ) RbZ fffleχo, o[x%flg4p: PS i,t = α 0 + β 1 FD i,t + β 2 FD i,t FD i,t + g>, i #-fl), t #-V); α 0,β 1,β 2,γ k #-G4xfleΩC; ε it 2Λ ψ. 4.2 j(n`]9!$_ 5 γ k X i,t,k + ε i,t. (6) aχfl (PS): ~χpr1 HL2&38[PD ν;l YNxff /Λ [26], p&3hlynx νpr/λ (Pψ G} C`) UK"~χPR1 xcl]k2' p^πνyazx1!n="pψ G}yC`fflB2>, o[ffiψprpψwß/λ (HPS) PR XG}/Λ (EPS) uprc` Xν# /Λ (TPS). _E qfe [27 29], χfflψ νpr/λ1!'%m=lξjqxpψ uc =lf>% BßjqxGψCuP-AΩxV#-. Wχfl (FD): _E qfe [30 32], νya *U' 1! FD1 yflc~wx5&' Fb, *m9 ff' FD2 1!ap <93I1!, a S25&' ffi_#χflxhffiefp}2`k5&*u. k=1

5 9 f )χχ, : 6'(}ffl ψqs2μyiχ v%ρ:v`::yxffi 2271 J&# [33]. *Uy9ff' 1!=Nχß_E Wu u Heerink [32] x=nχß, '%movξs NQ~χ 5&*U (9ff) yovξs NQ (~χ + >K) 5&*U (9ff) -ß#-. ~7χflxρw (X ): _E Wu u Heerink [32] xfe, νy`ka _# F/ (GRP CGDP ) _# μμfb (PCGDP) yffiju#fb (OPEN) fflbχfl ~7w _#μμx±χbffi~χpr1 x hffi, g>_#μμfbmcfl6ξs GDP #-; ffiju#fbmcfl6zu 9XZ ο GDP xßc #-. b%, νy~7&3> y*qffi~χpr1 xhffi, Az"&3*UdG (GS) y_#@ν*u dg (ECE), g>&3*udgmcfl65&z*uο GDP xßc#-; νy)m V 31 flxbffclz7&(3i. &(QmClsffΠuΛ>gd%V6Ξ Λ> g5&v6ξvffg'cl P/xVΩCl. Z7Cl'Πl, QqxClsZ7ffiCΠ[ffl, fficπ[ ffl~xcl (L.) -YΨXwtb >$, q-<χχflxxψ, _#YZE fρΩ Fl+ (6), νy; Ue5&' (*U' ) ffi~χpr1 (PRPψwß/Λ PR XG}/ Λ PRC` Xν#/Λ) x$ß9hffiffg_99. ~, m9ff' 1!3I&(Pi2- <. ^ ~, m'ucfleue5&' &;x _#K>x_ /AK R νy; `k Pesaran [34] YUx CD 3I (MBff 3I) [flχfl2-cffimbff. 3IPi#E, Cχfl >$ffg@'>$scffi IxMBff. NhBffClkuF3I, Ω ADF 3I IPS 3I z, sffimb-ff tπffl42q)x [35]. a^, νy7m hbffclkuf3i, fi CIPS 3I. ; 3I2 Pesaran [36] YUxNBffiMBff oq <9xkuF3Iχß. o[x3ipiω# 2 Q-. k 2 ß+F Lfiq=»Sffff ψffi CD 4J CIPS 4J?% OLA(?%?% OLA(?% L. HPS *** *** ** L. EPS *** 8.840*** * L. TPS *** *** *** L. FD *** *** * L. FD1*L. FD *** *** * L. FD *** *** ** L. FD2*L. FD *** *** ** L. GRP CGDP *** 7.730*** ** L. PCGDP *** 7.730*** ** L. OP EN *** *** ** L. GS *** *** *** L. ECE *** *** *** M: CD 4J,οq.dfflNCfi], CIPS 4J,οdffllvG; CIPS 4Jy(T0: , zhfifflgy J:Gcq 10% 5% 1%; $?Qj3< 2 Ly CD v CIPS 4JQj; * ** *** (&$.ffl 10% 5% 1% ygc J. `# 2 VvU, ffiuqqχflx >$, CIPS 3IsJ> +ν, #Eχ+>$ &-b ; CIPS3Iskr +ν, a^ V±pCχflΨ2NKk#kO. p^,, VZN1ffiχfl Z7,#3I iffiφ R puνy)mx2bffcl, ; ;L(%fleχO7mx2Z±)fG4 (FE) Φ2O»)fG4 (RE). 3IPiΩ# 3 Q-. Hausman 3IPi#EG4 (1) ug4 (2) 7mZ±)fG4Z7X%, G 4 (3) 7mO»)fG4Z7X%. F 3IPi#EG4 (1) 5G4 (3) xfleχo2 Ix. G4 (1) 5

6 2272 ff e J P 4z ' 8 38 p G4 (3) '%#-VPRPψwß/Λ PR XG}/ΛffPRC` Xν#/Λpaχflx3IPi. G4 (4) 5G4 (6) '%#-yg4 (1) 5G4 (3) ffifxqß93ipi. p" (3IPix y9, νy)m Kao-ADF,#3I, 3IPi#Efle:@Fb/ffi 1%x I Fbffl-cffikuF, S@2b >$. p^,, 3]fleχO (G4 (1) 5G4 (3)) ffifxcb_#χfl scffijb,# Ω, qcffife ±xsy Ω. 3IPiΩ# 3 Q-. k 3 jfflψffff H5 (1) H5 (2) H5 (3) H5 (4) H5 (5) H5 (6) Xψffi FE FE RE GMM GMM GMM L. FD *** *** (0.747) (0.957) (3.306) (0.283) ( 0.341) (2.768) L. FD1*L. FD *** *** ( 0.562) ( 0.942) ( 3.113) ( 0.136) (0.268) ( 2.614) L. GRP CGDP 0.126** ** 0.111* * (2.525) (1.250) (2.452) (1.753) (0.605) (1.753) L. PCGDP *** *** (0.421) (2.929) ( 0.414) ( 0.340) (3.313) ( 0.132) L. OP EN 0.079*** *** 0.069*** *** ( 5.630) ( 1.561) ( 6.968) ( 4.065) ( 1.360) ( 5.531) L. GS 0.189* ** 0.261** * (1.681) (1.492) (2.217) (1.972) (1.626) (1.845) L. ECE 0.141** 0.169*** 0.476*** *** 0.468** ( 2.309) ( 2.998) ( 2.823) ( 1.619) ( 2.682) ( 2.238) L. HPS( 1) 0.101* (1.895) L. EPS( 1) (1.383) L. TPS( 1) 0.094** ( 2.327) Adjusted R Hausman 4J *** *** F 4J *** 8.259*** *** -$4J *** *** *** Sargan/p AR(2)/p a? M: * ** *** (&$.ffl 10% 5% 1% ygc J; ΩrRq t 0. FlX%Pi (G4 (3)), ffi~7w X±_#μμaLu&3> y*qal~, *U' xn_ψ y _ψωc'%p%u:, *qffii?x I9Fb I, IE*U' yprc` Xν#/ΛM Ixq U 4 Ω. χ#effin±flnq, PRC` Xν#/ΛFbOT*U' OΩ ff ff, o* U' OΩHk %, PRC` Xν#/ΛFbOT*U' OΩ ff fflb. ffig4 (1) ug4 (2) xflepi>, ^b*u' xn_ψy _ψωc'%p%y:, mffid% - I, IE*U' y PRPψwß/ΛuPR XG}/Λs-M Ixq U 4 Ω. g a S2&= ffw!fl)w~χ &3p"aZν~w_# F, Hs"uμμqKu< fu axc` Xν#/Λ, 1 XG}yP ψμμ, ` ο7"5&' &;ffipψwßu XG}χBxq)μΨ. Z H-, 5&' yprc` Xν#/ΛMq U 4 Ω. >gn. QT&=ρ u_#' Π& =ρ )w~χ&3p"&= ff k xqv~χ_#x FMΩ. ffl9x~χ&3ffi`k5&*uμο Z7PRC` Xν#@ν, V< fu a, eßbll, ` pν~w_# F] ffq a, χ~t 2qKui PRC` Xν#μμxq ^;. χ32q U 4yß ffkfixr5, }@Φfi<L

7 9 f )χχ, : 6'(}ffl ψqs2μyiχ v%ρ:v`::yxffi 2273 Yt, OTPRC` Xν#/Λx ), PRC` Xν#ffi u, gffi&)mffi 5, QV, PRC` Xν#/ΛYNFbAffifflB. ^j, `w _#μμx±χbal VvU, _# F/ffiPR/ΛYNoq%"hffi, #EPR/ ΛμμZ[ 4f"_#μμx;L. ffiju#fbffipr/λynoq:"hffi, a S2ffiju#F bxy?ffijboω a)~χ&3h) LSgff?9 x_#ψk [37]. h&3> y*qal H, &3*UdGffiPR/ΛYNoq%"hffi, #E~χ&3ffiJBOΩ ffipr/λμμx*q. _#@ν *UffiPR/ΛYNoq:"hffi, #E~χ&3ffiJBOΩ ffipr/λμμx>. p"rqwχflqß9gffxx%]@, νydu"@' GMM xflepi. b%, PR/ΛYNy_ # Fχfl Scffifi"ai, ` MffigffX%]@. u^, ;, νya5&' χfl _#μμfb χflvff_# F/χflapfle>xQßχfl; ~, Fl Jia z [38] xfe, νyaqßχflx;~ K ap@'χoxioχfl. 3IPiΩ# 3 Q-. Sargan 3I#EJ>Ioχfl2q)x +ν. AR(2) 3 I#EJ> K-Wff x+ν. GMM X%2q)x. X%Pi -, *U' yprc` Xν#/ΛM Ixq U 4 Ω, yprpψwß/λupr XG}/Λs-M Ixq U 4 Ω. χ yg4 (1) 5G4 (3) xflepiffn6,.w}@x e AνK R νy m9ff' 1! h*u' 1!, Ue RflePix <9. o[piω# 4 Q-. Hausman 3IPi#EG4 (7) 5G4 (9) 7mZ±)fG4Z7X%. F 3I#EC]fles2 Ix. G4 (7) ug4 (8) '%#-9ff' ffiprpψwß/λupr XG}/ΛflePi. G4 (9) ug4 (10) #-9ff' ffiprc` Xν#/ΛhffixflePi. G4 (7) 5G4 (9) xflepi#e5&' (9ff' ) yprc` Xν#/ΛM Ixq U 4 Ω, myprpψwß/λfbupr XG}/ΛFbs-cffi Ixq U 4 Ω. b%, /wlyx2 G4 (3) 2 uo»)fg4xflepi. p""2)fg4a U xx%]@, νy mo»)fg 4Z7"fl_X% (G4 (10)). Pi#E, 9ff' yprc` Xν#/ΛΦ M Ixq U 4 Ω. p ^ 9, RflePi2 <x. Xψffi L. FD2 L. FD2*L. FD2 L. GRP CGDP L. PCGDP L. OP EN L. GS k 4 H5 (7) FE (1.292) ( 1.106) 0.092* (1.651) 0.307*** (5.707) 0.068*** ( 4.197) 0.103*** (3.436) BοL»Sffff H5 (8) FE (1.394) ( 1.113) ( 1.089) 0.153*** (8.214) ( 1.333) 0.068*** (3.763) H5 (9) FE *** (12.240) 2.474*** ( ) (0.261) 1.038*** (8.553) ( 1.501) 1.213*** (17.976) H5 (10) RE *** (10.602) 1.829*** ( ) (0.240) 0.392*** (6.356) ( 1.195) 0.960*** (18.365) L. ECE * 0.333** ( 1.556) ( 1.844) ( 2.291) ( 1.443) Adjusted R Hausman 4J *** *** *** F 4J *** 8.773*** *** *** -$4J *** *** *** a? M: * ** *** (&$.ffl 10% 5% 1% ygc J; ΩrRq t 0.

8 2274 ff e J P 4z ' 8 38 p z<9ffiφ R p"zn1ue5&' &;x _#K>x_9fif, νy mbff'ucfle*az" BIoh #9x'uΛ ( ) Z7'ΠIE. 'ucflen1ffiu: N, SW,SPR/ΛFb '/xs2xψ, og2pr/λμμfb Scffi`] s]xt6;, SWH)R ~ Λ'/x Xψ, ` VwtH)~BxPi. 6u RflePix I9, νyazprc` Xν#/ΛFba paχfl 'Π5&' )fx~w_99. 'ucflepiω# 5 Q-. Xψffi L. FD1 L. FD1*L. FD1 L. GRP CGDP L. PCGDP L. OP EN L. GS H5 (11) tau = *** (3.951) *** ( 3.865) 0.409*** (2.832) (0.993) 0.405*** ( 4.579) 0.405** (2.019) k 5 H5 (12) tau = 0.25 =:fflψffff **** (3.928) *** ( 3.799) 0.294* (1.699) (0.802) 0.361*** ( 5.711) 0.582*** (3.310) H5 (13) tau = *** (4.228) *** ( 4.102) (0.731) (0.610) 0.235*** ( 4.124) 0.667*** (2.734) H5 (14) tau = (1.516) ( 1.371) (0.021) ( 1.462) 0.188*** ( 3.456) 0.535* (1.666) H5 (15) tau = (0.043) (0.003) (0.586) ( 1.397) 0.157*** ( 4.622) 0.543** (2.359) * L. ECE ( 0.938) ( 1.601) ( 0.519) ( 1.661) ( 0.528) Adjusted R a? M: * ** *** (&$.ffl 10% 5% 1% ygc J; ΩrRq t 0. FlX%Pi, p'uλ 0.1 t'uλ 0.5, *U' xn_ψy _ψωc'% Ip%y:, IE* U' yprc`ν#/λm Ixq U 4 Ω, #E*U' ffi> PRC` Xν#/ΛμμFb x~wcffi$ß9hffi. ffi'uλ 0.75 u 0.9, *U' xn_ψy _ψωcffid% - I. p^ 9, 5&' FbxχΠYffi> PRC` Xν#/ΛμμFbx~wit Ixam, ffiprc ` Xν#μμFbUffffi<~x~w-oq Ixam [39]. 5 fi* νy; ffi Davoodi u Zou [23] xffl3g4 X, 'Π5&' ffi~χpr1 xhffi, `k Hamilton ocßwt"5&' y~χpr1 x +R, `kffi +Rxvrμ "5&' y~χpr1 Mq U 4 Ω. ~, p"i(ffl3piffi&&_#>x4m9, νy m>g Vfl&BffC lz7&(3i, Pi#E, *U' yprc` Xν#/ΛM Ixq U 4 Ω, yprpψwß/λ upr XG}/Λs-M Ixq U 4 Ω. O~, m9ff' 1!ffi RfleZ7 <93I, 3I Pi#E RflePi2 <x. ^~, νy m'ucfleue"5&' )fx _#K>x_9fif, Pi#E, ffiprc` X&#μμ> x~w, *U' oq$ß9hffi, ffiprc` X&# Xμ μi?x~w, *U' A-fliam. u&(pi, νyyuωffl&;@]: N, pu5&' yprc` Xν#/ΛM Ixq U 4 Ω, fr'±(t5&' ffiprc` Xν#/ΛYNxE =)f, -flk 5&' [7, ffi' yρ -0etNBby, VPR/ΛszΠpK!YNn9xPR1., pu5&' yprpψ wß/λupr XG}/Λs-M Ixq U 4 Ω, fr'±(t5&' yprpψwß/λup R XG}/ΛYNscffi- I Ω, >K&3fer~χ&3A5&UΠffftPψ G}zPR/Λ.

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