Types of γάρ clause in Aristotle: Why γάρ is never for. Michael Pakaluk (Draft notes, October 2003)

1 Types of γάρ clause in Aristotle: Why γάρ is never for. Michael Pakaluk (Draft notes, October 2003) It s a non-translation to render γάρ as for, and it s usually a non-translation to render it as since or because. The reason is that γάρ is Aristotle s primary connective for exhibiting the inferential and justificatory relationships among his remarks. These vary remarkably in character; that they do so is evident in Greek, from the context; and therefore a suitable translation ought to make this evident as well. Note that in contrast for, in English, has no refined usage, in the sense that there are no definite species of use. It rather indefinitely indicates a causal, logical, or confirmatory relationship; to use for to render γάρ is safe, but inaccurate; it is to use a term that introduces a genus of possible relationships in place of some definite species within that genus. (It is as if one used household animal to render both ox and dog in Aristotle.) Not all of these relationships have been catalogued by Denniston, who typically is more interested in rhetorical or literary connection than logical. All of Aristotle s uses fall in a single grammatical category causal. We might notice, to put aside, a simple linking or introducing function of γάρ, where it functions very much like a semi-colon, allowing one sentence to be the sort that the sentence immediately preceding can point to, e.g. 1.6.1097b30-31, ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον. In such cases either a semicolon or since will render γάρ adequately. In Aristotle, γάρ used in the causal sense gives a reason for something that comes earlier. We might display this as follows: X γάρ Y where Y gives the reason for X. It is evident that this manner of giving reasons after the fact is going to compress, into a single syntactical form, all manner of different ways in which the support for an assertion might be presented, if the reason were given first. Uses of γάρ may in fact be suitably classified depending upon variations in the X and in the Y, since the things for which one might want to give a reason differ drastically in kind, and the sorts of items that one can count as supplying a reason can differ drastically as well. Thus, we can classify uses of γάρ depending upon how X varies; how Y varies; and also (although these are of lesser importance), whether there are variations, too, in how γάρ looks back, in giving a reason.

2 Call Y above the ground passage; X what is grounded ; and the link itself the grounding Then the following uses may be distinguished. (I use examples all taken from NE.) I. Variations in what is grounded. II. Variations in the ground. III. Variations in the grounding. I. Variations in what is grounded. (1) The inclusion of a clause in a definition. 3.7.1115b17-24 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος κατ ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Here the γάρ clause gives the reason for a clause in a definition. The definition specifies that a courageous person has to act with a certain motive, in whatever he does, viz. for the sake of the noble. Aristotle gives an argument for including this clause, and a good translation should signal this, otherwise the γάρ seems unattached: So then, a courageous man is someone who: 1. holds his ground against the things that he should; 2. and does so for the sake of which he should; 3. while having the feelings of fear that he should, when he should; 4. and who similarly also has the feelings of confidence that he should, when he should. In support: (as regards 1., 3., and 4.) A courageous man is someone whose emotional responses match the relevant circumstances and who acts as reason would dictate. (as regards 2.) Also, the goal of any actualization is something that corresponds to the trait. And courage is noble and admirable to a courageous man. Hence his goal, too, is like that. (Why do we add this last condition? Because each thing is defined by its goal. Thus, it s for the sake of its nobility and admirability that a courageous man holds his ground and does everything he does from courage.) 3.10.1117b24-26 ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν ἧττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας The γάρ clause explains why only pleasures are mentioned in the definition, not pains. (2) A ranking.

3 3.8.1116a16-17 Εστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν. (3) The ascription of a motive. 3.8.1116a29-33 τάξαι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταὐτό χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, κτλ. (4) An appearance. 3.6.111b3-12 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾠήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὁποῖα ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα (5) The expansion of a list. 3.8.1116b26-30 ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ομηρος σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ καὶ μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε καὶ δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥῖνας μένος καὶ ἔζεσεν αἷμα πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. (6) An explanation. 3.8.1116b31-33 τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ [ἢ ἐν ἕλει] ᾖ, οὐ προσέρχονται. II. Variations in the ground. III. Variations in the grounding. 1. γάρ as introducing a passage, not a sentence, that gives an argument in support of a claim. It s misleading to render it for, because the resulting translation can give

4 the impression that the supporting consideration is found in the single sentence. (Rendering to be preferred: Here s the reason.., Here s why... ) 1.13.1102b14-25 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι τοὐναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον. (Clearly, the argument stretches for several lines. Likewise the second underlined instance introduces a sub-argument within sub-argument.) 2. γάρ as found in passages having this structure: i. X ii. διὸ Y (or ὅθεν or διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν) iii. γὰρ Z In these cases γάρ plays the role of supplying a reason more explicitly, which the διό clause points to. It exhibits what connects i. and ii. (It s really that i. and iii. imply ii.) Thus it might appropriately be rendered by changing the order of the sentences, which is how we should speak. (In English, there is no device for indicating that a later sentence is a premise for an earlier argument.) Alternatively, we might use some heavy-handed device such as...since it would follow from what we just said that.... Exx. 1.3.1094b28-1095a4 1. καθ ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἁπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. 2. διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος 3. ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων 1.4.1095b3-7 1. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. 2. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. 3. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι 1.5.1096a5-9 1. ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. 2. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι

5 3. δι αὑτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα Sometimes the second clause is a ὅθεν rather than διό clause: 1.7.1098a23-26 καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον. Sometimes the second clause is a διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν rather than a διό clause: 1.9.1109b32-1110a3 εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν εὔδαιμον λέγομεν οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν οὔπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα 3. γάρ has the force of confirming or reinforcing what was just said. (Thus it may be rendered surely ). 1.6.1096b18-19 καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. 4. γάρ reinforces by supplying an additional reason or argument, almost as an after thought. (Thus: An additional reason:..., or Further support:... ) 1.13.1102a33-b12 τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον (ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη), πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν. 5. γάρ as supplying the motivation for a question, the reason why something is perplexing. (Thus it may be rendered, After all,..., or We wonder about this because... )

6 1.6.1096b26-27 ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. 1.7.1097a14-15 Πάλιν δ ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνη. 1.7.1097b33-34 τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰγ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. 1.12.1101b13 Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. (Here we fill out the supposition behind the explanation: if something is not a potentiality, and it s something good, then it s either praised or honored. Thus: It has to be one or the other, because it s clearly not a potentiality. ) 6. γάρ as providing the grounds for an assumption, i.e. for why it is reasonable to make a certain assumption. (Thus it may be rendered: This is reasonable to assume, since... or as is reasonable, since... ) 1.7.1097b6-8 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμϐαίνειν τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. 7. γάρ (occuring within the scope of a term for believing, thinking, or claiming, such as οἴομαι) as giving a rational reconstruction of someone s grounds for thinking something. In this usage it functions similarly to ὡς + participle. (Thus it might be rendered: His reason for thinking X was that Y. Note that, if we render it for, then it may be unclear whether the content that follows for falls within or outside the scope of the verb of thinking.) 1101b27-31 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὔδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν μηνύειν ᾤετο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τἆλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. Eudoxus argument: Only God and the Good are such that all other goods are referred to them and thus they are better than all other goods. Because they have this status, we do not praise them. But we do not praise pleasure, either. Hence, pleasure has the same status. But pleasure is not God. Thus, pleasure is the Good.

7 (Notice, by the way, the importance of word order here: it s that τοιοῦτον and πρὸς ταῦτα come first which gives them the sense of only, required by the argument.) 8. γάρ as providing the explanation for appearances. (Thus it may be rendered: The reason this is observed is that... ; or The explanation for these phenomena is that... ) 1.12.1101b21-27 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους [μακαρίζομεν]. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. 9. γάρ as providing the reason why a tentative suggestion is plausible. (Thus it is to be rendered: This is plausible because... or It s reasonable to think this because... ) 1.6.1096b28-30 ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. 10. γάρ as indicating that what is said confirms what was just said; i.e. it introduces something that serves as a sign of the correctness of what what just said. (Thus it is to be rendered: To wit..., or (heavy handedly) That this is true is shown by the fact that... ) 1.7.1098a10-12...καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔγον κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν, σουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ. 11. γάρ as providing the inductive evidence for a general claim. To be rendered: The evidence for this is... 1.12.1101b12-18 φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρός τι πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. (Notice that here Ar. is clearly intending to make an induction as regards good traits, of soul and of body.) 2.1.1104a14-18

8 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁρῶμεν τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σῴζει 12. γάρ as introducing an explanation that is contained not in a single sentence, but in an entire passage or list, in which case it might be rendered something like Here s why we claim this or The reason is as follows:. 1.8.1098b22ff τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. κτλ. 13. γάρ as reaching back, beyond an intervening series of points or arguments, in order to hook onto an earlier assertion. Its function is simply to be hook something later onto something earlier (not unlike γάρ used in dialogue, to indicate a continuous line of thought by one speaker when he s been interrupted by another). In that case it might either go untranslated, if some imposed system of numbering is used to keep track of the points, or be rendered as something like, And to add something else.... This is a causal or confirmatory role of γάρ only derivatively: the causal function of γάρ is exploited by the writer to make the reader search for the connection between the present passage and what came earlier. 1.8. 1099a17-18 πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν 14. γάρ as reaching back before a digression or parenthetical remark, to signal that the sentence continues a line of thought begun early, again, not unlike a similar function in dialogue. (It can occur in this function with μέν.) In this usage, it s better rended, So then..., or, heavy-handedly, To resume where we left off... ) 1.12.1101b31-34 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. 15. γάρ as providing the general grounds for an argument or claim, which then gets filled in by what comes latter. (Thus it might better be placed first and rendered: On the grounds that... we argue that... ; or else We maintain this... working on the general principle that..., or..., and we reach this conclusion on the general grounds that... ) 2.2.1104a11-19

9 πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁρῶμεν τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σῴζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. (Note the second γάρ is of type 11. above.) 16. γάρ as introducing a claim which shows that an apparent counterexample to a general rule, really is not a counter example. To see that the counterexample is only apparent, therefore tends to confirm the rule. (Consider rule X; apparent counterexample Y. To say that Y is in fact an instance of X, in the following way... is to tend to confirm X, since this takes away reasons for wanting to deny X.) In these cases, one should ideally expand and supply the implicit counter argument. 3.3.1112b24-28 μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἄν τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. What is actually going on is this: i. Define doable (by me) as that which can come to pass through my own efforts. ii. Objection: what my friends can accomplish at my request is doable by me (clearly), but that s not covered by this definition. iii. Reply: what my friends do at my request is indeed by my own efforts, in the sense that the origin of my friends actions is in me. How this should be rendered is as follows: Something is doable if it can come to pass through our own efforts. What we do through our friends is not a counterexample [or: This includes what we do through our friends or even This explains why we count what we do through our friends as things that are doable by us. ]: such things are through our own efforts, in the sense that their origin is within us. 17. γάρ supplies the reason for a premise in an adumbrated argument. The argument is sketched first briefly. Then a crucial premise is supported, with a γάρ clause. 3.8.1116b23-30 καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν φέρουσιν ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ομηρος σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ

10 καὶ μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε καὶ δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥῖνας μένος καὶ ἔζεσεν αἷμα πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. (The short argument is in bold. The premise supported by GAR is underlined.) 18, γάρ provides the reason for the usage of a term, or variation in application of a term, i.e. why the term is applied to some members of a class but not all. Here the argument is that we say that someone is self indulgent, because of his fondness for pleasures of certain sorts associated with smell, because it s usual for truly self-indulgent persons to be fond of pleasures of that sort. 3.10.1118a9-16 οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὀσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων ἢ ὄψων χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμημάτων. ἴδοι d' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις\ χαίρειν ἀκολάστου τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα.