中国科技论文在线. ( radio spectrum l icences) John son, , (tac it collusion)

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1 V ol. 27 N o. 4 A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s Feb. 25, ( ),,, (, ) : PAB ;, ; ; ; ; ;, : ; ; ; : F , ( radio spectrum l icences) [1 ] [2 ] : ; ( ), ; 1 : ; : ( ), (FERC) (PAB pay-a s-bid), 111, John son, [3 ],,,,, [ 3 ],,, [ 4 ],,,, (tac it collusion), 转载

2 , 27 (4) Rothkopf,,,, [ 5 ],, Pool,, ( ) W olfram [6 ], ( ),,,,, 112 PAB PAB,,,, FERC PX ISO, PAB, V zquez PAB [7 ] PAB, [ 7 ],,,,, PAB, Kahn C ram ton PAB, PAB [8 ],,,, PAB,,, PAB,, [ 8 ], PAB,,,,, [ 9 ],, PAB, PAB, M ount,, W ilson W ilson (iterative bidding) [10 ] (activity rules) [11 13 ], (p rice discovery),, 3 1, 1 : ; ( g(mw h) ),, ; 1

3 ( ),,, [ 14 ], 212 E lm agh raby ( horizontal auction),, t,, t ( h) k ( MW ) [15 ] (vertical auction),,,, E lm agh raby, [ 15 ],,,, E lm agh raby O ren [ 16 ],,,,,,,, [ 17 ],,,,,, 213, (auction design) (m echanism design) ( agent, ), (incentive),,,, (incentive compatible) Hobbs V ickery2c larke2grove [18 ], ( ),, Silva [19 ],,, [ 19 ] : 1 ; 2 Fah riolu [20 ], [ 20 ], M cguire,, [21 ] 19

4 , 27 (4),,, [ 21 ] Groves,,,, ( ),, (EE I) [22 ] ; ( ) ; ; ; ; 3,,, 311 [ 23 ], PAB,,, [ 24 ],,,, (revelation p rincip le) [ 25 ] PAB,,, PAB, [ 26 ] PAB, PAB, 312 Shebl D ek rajangpetch Shebl [27, 28 ] [ 27 ],,, [ 28 ], Shebl [29 ],,, [ ],,,,,, [30 ] :

5 , [31 ], [32 ] [33 ],,,, [34 ] 4 ( ),, [35 ],, Pow erw eb [36 ] Bow er [37 ], [ 37 ],,,,,,,, Zimm erm an Pow erw eb [38 ] [ 38 ] 3, ( last accep ted offer) 1 (first rejected offer) V ick rey,, O tero2n ovas,, [39 ] W ilson [10 13 ] [ 39 ], Contreras, [40 ] [ 40 ],,, N icolaisen [41 ],,, [ 41 ] PAB,, PAB PAB, PAB 21

6 , 27 (4),,, 5 6 ; 5 : (TO ) ( ISO ) (A S) (PX ) (SC),,, 4 : (Pool PX ) ( ) ( ) [22 ] a1,, b1 80% 20% 10% [42 ],, ;,,, c1 4 : (A GC ) ( rep lacem ent reserve), PAB, ;, ; ; ; ; ;, 1 M ca fee R P, M cm illan J. Selling Spectrum R ightṡ Journal of Econom ic Perspectives, 1994, 8 (3) : Green R J, N ew bery D M. Competition in the B ritish E lectricity Spot M arkeṫ Journal of Political Econom y, 1992, 100 ( 5 ) : Johnson R B, O ren S S, Svoboda A J. Equity and Efficiency of U nit Comm itm ent in Competitive Electricity M arketṡ Policy, 1997, 6 (1) : 9 19 U tilities 4 Rothkopf M H. Daily Repetition: A N eglected Factor in A nalyzing E lectricity A uctionṡ 70 5 Von der Fehr N, Harbord D. The E lectricity Journal, 1999, 12 (3) : 60 SpotM arket Competition in the U K Electricity Industry. The Econom ic Journal, 1993, 103 (418) : W olfram C D. Strategic B idding in a M ulti2unit A uction: A n Emp irical A nalysis of B ids to Supp ly Electricity in England and W aleṡ In: NBER W orking Paper Cam bridge: N ational Bureau of Econom ic Research. w pdf, V zquez C, R ivier M, P rez2a rriaga I J. A re Not a Solution for California, http: ggpaperṡ nbeṙ orggpapersg If Pay2as2bid A uctions then W hy Not a Reliability M arket? The E lectricity Journal, 2001, 14 (4) : Kahn A E, Cram ton P C, Porter R H. U niform P ricing or Pay2as2 bid Pricing: A D ilemm a for California and Beyond. Journal, 2001, 14 (6) : M ount T. The Electricity M arket Pow er and P rice Volatility in Restructured M arkets for E lectricity. In: IEEE P roceedings of the 32nd International Conference on System Scienceṡ Haw aii: 1999

7 ( ) Griffes P H. A Report to the California Pow er Exchange: Iterative B idding in the PX M arkeṫ W ilson R. A ctivity Rules for a Pow er Exchange. http: ggwww. m arket2design. com gfilesgw ilson2activity2rules2for2a2pow er2 exchange. pdf, W ilson R. A ctivity Rules for the Pow er Exchange Phase 3: Experim ental Testing. http: ggwww. m arket2design. com gfilesg w ilson2activity2rules2for2a2pow er2exchange2experim entṡ pdf, W ilson R. A ctivity Rules for an Iterated Double A uction. http: gg faculty2gsb. stanford. edugw ilsonge542gclassfilesgw ilson iterative% 20auction. pdf 14,,, ( Geng J ian, W ang Xifan, Chen Haoyong, et al). ( Iterative Competitive B idding M echanism in Generation M arket). (A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s), 2002, 26 (9) : E lm aghraby W J. M ulti2unit A uctions w ith Comp lem entarities: Issues of Efficiency in Electricity A uctionṡ In: Pow er W orking Paper, PW P2053ṙ Berkeley: U niversity of California. http: gg www. ucei. berkeley. eduguceigpdfgpwp053ṙ pdf, E lm aghraby W, O ren S S. The Efficiency of M ulti2unit E lectricity A uctionṡ The Energy Journal, 1999, 20 (4) : (W ang Xifan). (B lock B idding M odelbased Pow er M arket). (P roceedings of the CSEE), 2001, 21 (12) : Hobbs B F, Rothkopf M H, Hyde L C, et al. Evaluation of a T ruthful Revelation A uction in the Context of Energy M arkets w ith Nonconcave Benefitṡ Journal of Regulatory Econom ics, 2000, 18 (1) : Silva C, W ollenberg B F, Zheng C Z. App lication of M echanism Design to Electric Pow er M arketṡ IEEE T rans on Pow er System s, 2001, 16 (4) : Fahriolu M, A lvarado F L. Designing Incentive Compatible Contracts for Effective Dem and M anagem enṫ IEEE T rans on Pow er System s, 2000, 15 (4) : M cguire B. Pow er A uctions and Intertemporal P roduction Costs: Dealing w ith U nit Comm itm enṫ In: Pow er W orking Paper, PW P2054. Berkeley: U niversity of California. http: ggwww. ucei. berkeley. eduguceigpdfgpwp054. pdf, Edison E lectric Institute. Pow er M arket A uction Design: Rules and L essons in M arket2based Control for the N ew Electricity Industry , (Yan M aosong, L i Xiaogang). ( Simp le and Easy E lectricity V alue Equivalent M ethod for Pool Purchase P ricing). (A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s), 1999, 23 (2) : (W ang Xifan). ( Study on Fram ework of B idding System M odel for Pow er M arket in China). (E lectric Pow er), 2000, 33 (11) : ,, ( Yu E rkeng, Zhou J ingyang, Zhang Xuesong). (B iddingm odel and B idding P rincip le for Pow er M arkets). (A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s), 2001, 25 (1) : ,,, (Duan Gang, W ang Xinfeng, Bai W ei, et al). (Supp ress P rice Sp ikes by Hybridizing System 2m arginal2 p rice A uction and Pay2as2B id A uction ). (A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s), 2002, 26 (9) : Dekrajangpetch S, Shebl G B. A uction Imp lem entation P roblem s U sing L agrangian Relaxation. IEEE T rans on Pow er System s, 1999, 14 (1) : Dekrajangpetch S, Shebl G B. Interior2point L inear Programm ing A lgorithm for A uction M ethodṡ Pow er System s, 2000, 15 (2) : IEEE T rans on 29 Shebl G B. ComputationalA uction M echanism s for Restructured Pow er Industry Operation. Boston: Kluw er A cadem ic Publishers, ,, ( Yu E rkeng, Zhou J ingyang, W u Yusheng). ( ) ( Generation B idding A lgorithm Tutorials: Part O ne The M erit2order M ethod). (A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s), 2001, 25 (4) : ,,, (Yu E rkeng, Zhou J ingyang, W u Yusheng, et al). ( ) ( Generation B idding A lgorithm Tutorials: Part Two The Equal B idding P rice M ethod). (A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s), 2001, 25 (5) : ,,, (W u Yusheng, W ang Gongtao, Zhou J ingyang, et al). ( ) ( Generation B idding A lgorithm Tutorials: Part Three The Dynam ic P rogramm ing M ethod). (A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s), 2001, 25 (6) : ,,, ( Zhou J ingyang, W u Yusheng, W ang Gongtao, et al). ( ) ( Generation B idding A lgorithm Tutorials: Part Four The N etwork F low P rogramm ing M ethod ). (A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s), 2001, 25 (7) : ,,, (W ang Gongtao, Yu E rkeng, Zhou J ingyang, et al). ( ) (Generation B idding A lgorithm Tutorials: Part F ive The L inear P rogramm ing M ethod). (A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s), 2001, 25 (8) : ,,, (Chen Haoyong, W ang Xiuli, W ang Xifan, et al). : ( ) (A uction Theory and Its App lication in E lectricity M arket A uction Design: Part O ne A uction Theory and Its Experim ental Research). (A utom ation of E lectric Pow er System s), 2003, 27 (3) : Pow erw eb U ser s M anual V ersion Pow er System s Engineering Research Center ( PSERC ). Cornell U niversity, 2001 ( 32 continued on page 32)

8 , 27 (4) REV IEW OF OVERSEAS TYP ICAL LOSS ALLOCATION M ETHOD S L iu Z ihong 1 ΨCheng H aozhong 1 ΨL iu X iaod ong 1 ΨZ hou J ian 2 ΨY ang L ibing 2 ΨZ hao J unjun 2 ΨL i Gang 2 ; 1. Shanghai J iaotong U niversityκshanghai ΚCh inaγ ; 2. East Ch ina E lectric Pow er Group CorporationΚShanghai ΚCh inaγ AbstractΠT he im portance of transm ission loss treatm ent is exp licated in the papeṙ M any fundam ental factors specific to decisions affecting the allocation of transm ission losses are identifiedκw h ich any such decision would need to take into accounṫ Based on basic p rincip les of loss allocationκdifferent m ethods of loss allocation and their traits are analyzed and com pared. It is suggested that average loss allocation m ethod be adop ted at the distribution level in Ch ina considering the com p lexity of the distribution networkκ w h ile the m arginal loss allocation m ethod be app lied to the transm ission network. T he countryw ide transm ission network could be divided into several regionṡ R eal2tim e regulated m arginal nodal loss allocation m ethod and m arginal zonal loss allocation m ethod could be respectively used to allocate inter2regional loss and intra2regional losṡ Key wordsπpow er system sμpow er m arketμloss allocation ( 23 continued from page 23) 37 Bow er J, Bunn D. Experim ental A nalysis of the Efficiency of U niform 2p rice V ersusd iscrim inatory A uctions in the England and W ales Electricity M arkeṫ Journal of Econom ic Dynam ics & Control, 2001, 25 (3) : Zimm erm an R D, Bernard J C, Thom as R J, et al. Energy A uctions and M arket Pow er: A n Experim ental Exam ination. In: P roceedings of the 32nd International Conference on System Scienceṡ Haw aii: O tero2novas I, M eseguer C, Batlle C, et al. A Sim ulation M odel for a Competitive Generation M arkeṫ IEEE T rans on Pow er System s, 2000, 15 (1) : Contreras J, Candiles O, de la Fuente J I, et al. A uction Design in Day2ahead Electricity M arketṡ IEEE T rans on Pow er System s, 2001, 16 (3) : N icolaisen J, Petrov V, Tesfatsion L. M arket Pow er and Efficiency in a Computational E lectricity M arket w ith D iscrim inatory Double2auction Pricing. IEEE T rans on Evolutionary Computation, 2001, 5 (5) : W ilson R. A rchitecture of Pow er M arketṡ In: Research Paper No Stanford U niversity: 2001 (1975 ),,,, E2m ail: ail. xjtu. edu. cn (1961 ),,,, (1936 ),,,, AUCTION THEORY AND ITS APPL ICATION IN EL ECTR IC ITY M ARKET AUCTION D ESIGN Part Two Appl ica tion of Auction Theory in Electr ic ity M arket Auction D esign Chen H aoy ong ΨW ang X iuliψw ang X if anψgeng J ian ;X i an J iaotong U niversityκx i an ΚCh inaγ AbstractΠ T he app lication of auction theory in electricity m arket auction design is focused on in th is papeṙ uniform p rice auction and pay2as2bid auction based on auction theory are introduced. T he analyses of Two new auction institutionsκ nam ely iterative bidding and block bidding are p roposed. T he m ethods of designing incentive com patible auctions are show n. Since the app lication of auction theory in electricity m arket auction design has not attracted enough attention in Ch inaκthere are som e other m ethods used. auction m echanism ṡ T he paper also introduces these m ethodsκ along w ith the com putational algorithm s to im p lem ent the theoretical Som e basic issues of electricity m arket arch itecture are outlined at the end. Because of the com p lexity of electricity m arket auctionκ not only the introduction of auction theory to electricity m arket auction design can lay a theoretical groundwork for the im p lem entation of electricity transactionκbut also the em ergence of energy auction brings new challenges for classic auction theory. This p roject is supported by a Key P roject of the N ationaln atural Science Foundation of Ch ina ;N o Γ. Key wordsπelectricity m arketμauction theoryμauction designμgam e theory