Research on Managerial Power and Atypical Executive Compensation Behavior. WANG Qing - gang 1 HU Ya - jun 2

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1 A F A Research on Managerial Power and Atypical Executive Compensation Behavior WANG Qing - gang 1 HU Ya - jun 2 1. School of Accounting Zhongnan University of Economics and Law Wuhan China 2. Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science and Technology Development Company Changsha China Abstract Executive compensation is generally determined by the company performance. If corporate earning is below the industry average and its executive compensation is higher than the industry average we identify this as atypical executive compensation. Using the data of Chinese listed company from 2003 to 2009 we studied the relationship between atypical executive compensation and managerial power. We found that there is significant positive correlation between atypical executive compensation and managerial power. In other words the more power managers have the more seriously they can set their own compensation in companies while in companies that CEO seated as chairman simultaneously have dispersed shareholding pattern and lower first shareholder proportion. The research results should be concerned by investors creditors state - owned assets supervision and administration institutions and the securities regulatory authorities etc. Key words managerial power executive compensation atypical executive compensation

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4 Probit H1 Pr Excess = β 0 + β 1 Power + β 2 Ni + β 3 Lev + pervisorsize + β 9 Soe + 28 β iind i + 34 β jyear j i = 10 j = 29 CS- MAR Excess http / /company. p5w. net STATA10. 0 SPSS A Ni Ni 8245 Excess = 1 Excess = 0 Power % % β 4 Size + β 5 Committee + β 6 Indd + β 7 Boardsize + β 8 Su

5 Excess Ni lnpay Excess = 1 Excess = 0 Dual Dual = 1 Dual = 0 D_ownership 1 Power = 1 Power = 0 Lshare power11 power1 = Dual + D_ownership Ni Lev / Size Committee Committee = 1 Committee = 0 Indd Boardsize SupervisorSize Soe Soe = 1 Soe = 0 Indi i Indi = 1 Indi = 0 Yearj j Yearj = 1 Yearj = 0 Jackson Excess Hermalin 2005 Lnpay Ni E E E + 11 Dual Raheja D_ownership Power Lshare Lev Size Committee Indd Boardsize supervisorsize Soe

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8 Harvey Shrieves % 1% 2 Core % 3 4 1% 6 6 Variables Dual ** D_ownership *** Power *** Lshare *** Ni *** *** *** *** Lev ** ** ** ** Size Committee Indd Boardsize *** *** *** *** supervisorsize *** *** *** *** Soe ** ** * Constant ** *** *** ** Chi Prob > Chi Pseudo R N *** ** * ROA Excess = 1 Excess = A 173

9 J CRYSTAL G. In Search Of Excess The Over - compensation of the American ExecutivesM. New York Norton BEBCHUK L FRIED J. Pay Without Performance The 1. Unfulfilled Promise of Executive CompensationM. MA Harvard University Press OTTEN J A HEUGENS P. The Managerial Power Theory of Executive Pay A Cross National Test and ExtensionR. Academy Of Management Best Paper Proceedings ERIKSSON T. The Managerial Power Impact on Compensation - some Further Evidence J. Corporate Ownership & Con- 2. trol DUFFHUES P KABIR R. Is the Pay - performance Relationship Always Positive Evidence from the Netherlands J. Journal of Multinational Financial Management CHENG S INDJEJIKIAN R. Managerial Influence and CEO Performance IncentivesJ. International Review of Law and Economics DOW J RAPOSO C. CEO Compensation Change and Corporate Strategy J. Journal of Finance MURPHY K J. Explaining Executive Compensation Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of OptionsJ. The 4. University of Chicago Law Review J J R CHENG S. Managerial Entrenchment and Loss - shielding in Executive CompensationR. University of Michigan Working Paper JACKSON S B LOPEZ T J. REITENGA A L. Accounting Fundamentals and CEO Bonus CompensationJ. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy J

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