USES OF NEGATIVE ADJECTIVES BY PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS

USES OF NEGATIVE ADJECTIVES BY PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS Alberto Bernabé. Universidad Complutense, Madrid (albernab@filol.ucm.es) Introduction 1. Aim My aim is to analyze the negative adjectives as a procedure of definition among the pre-socratics. The use of negative adjectives, composed with ἀ(ν)-, expressing a wish or an absence, is not an innovation introduced by the pre-socratics. It is a wellknown fact that epic and lyric poets turn frequently to these adjectives but it is also clear that pre-socratic philosophers use them in new contexts and with new aims. The treatment of this question in depth could be too long; therefore I will keep it in a sketch format only. We are confronted with the problem of incomplete information that in most instances is second-hand; this information is not entirely reliable because the author could have translated the original expressions in his secondary source. Hence, I will limit my study to the literary fragments and only in exceptional cases will I turn to secondary sources. It is important to state that I will not include the word ἀληθής into my analysis, a common expression that etymologically is a negative adjective; however, I strongly doubt that this word, from a synchronic point of view, was perceived as such. Its antonym is ψευδής, not an adjective with the root ληθ-. 2. Factors to Be Considered In this study, I will analyze: 2.1. Whether the compounds were created prior to the era of the pre-socratics or whether they were created by them. In the former case, two situations are possible: a) The adjective has the usual meaning and it is used in a similar context. At this point, it is of utmost interest to examine whether the philosopher, in spite of everything, introduces some element that distinguishes the adjective from its habitual uses. b) The adjective has a new meaning and/or it is used in a different context. In this case, it is vital to specify the difference in usage. 2.2. To what kind of semantic field the word on which the negative adjective is formed belongs. 2.3. Whether the compound word expresses a positive or a negative valuation.

2.4. With what kind of a noun it is used (referring to the context of a divine, natural, or a human world). 3. The adjectives that are used in the same sense and in similar contexts as those of the non-philosophical style. 1 3.1. Adjectives Applied to the Sphere of the Non-Divine. A few expressions assign a traditional quality to the gods immortality. They are constructed around an idea that refers to death. Their meaning is positive, given the fact that death is considered to be an undesirable fact (3.1.1-2). Another adjective formed on the root that implies tiredness is applied to the daimons (3.1.3). 3.1.1. ἀθάνατος 'immortal' is a quality given to the gods that frequently appears in epic poems. Also Parmenides uses the word applied to Heliads in fr. B 1.24 ὦ κοῦρ ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος ἡνιόχοισιν 'Young man, you who come to me in the company of immortal charioteers'. The use of this word has the intention of giving a sacred overtone to the text and conferring a guarantee of truth to the philosopher's message. Empedocles uses the noun ἀθάνατοι in its plural form and the substantive the immortals in the same sense as the epic poets, i.e. to refer to the gods, in fr. 133.1 Wright (B 147.1) 1 ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι, αὐτοτράπεζοι 'with other immortals they share hearth and table'. 3.1.2.The word ἄμβροτος 'immortal' as a qualifying adjective of a divinity appears in Emp. fr. 3.1. Wright (B 131.1) ἄμβροτε Μοῦσα 'immortal Muse', and is used in the same way in traditional epic (θεός Il. 20.358, etc.). In fr. 102.4f. Wright (B112.4f. D.K.) the adjective applies to θεός. However, the claim of the philosopher stating that it is himself who converted into a god among men is not traditional at all: ἐγὼ δ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός / πολεῦμαι 'I tell you I travel up and down as an immortal god, mortal no longer'. 3.1.3. In reference to the daimons, we may find the adjective ἀτειρής in Empedolces fr. 133.2 W. (B 147.2). Homer uses this adjective in various contexts, assigning it different meanings: 'solid, unbreakable' referring to materials (χαλκός Il. 5.292), 'strong, steadfast' alluding to the heart of a combatant (κραδίη Il. 3.60), 1 Some of them are used in other contexts which have a new meaning and they will be studied again in the corresponding parts. 2

'untiring' related to persons (warriors in Il. 15.697) or to abstracts (μένος Od. 11.70, φωνή Il. 13.45). The philosopher exploits the same word in other contexts. 2 3.2. Different adjectives refer to nouns of the sphere of nature. We can divide them into several groups: those indicating that they are not measurable (3.2.1-2) but rather constructed from nouns that indicate a limit or an ability to count. A different group is made of adjectives that show no links to human weaknesses as they are derived from nouns that express tiredness (3.2.3-4), fear (3.2.5), or reproach (3.2.6). The adjectives refer to the sphere of the visible, emphasizing distinct senses that are either invisible (3.2.7), or applied to their destructive forces that make something invisible or disappear (3.2.8). A special case defines our world through the lens of a negative quality, i.e. the negation of to please (τέρπω 3.2.9). In any case, the subject matter here is to highlight the force, the power of nature that contains ambiguous aspects positive as well as negative ones. 3.2.1. In fr. 33.1 Wright (B 39.1), Empedocles states ἀπείρονα γῆς τε βάθη καὶ δαψιλὸς αἰθήρ 'depths of earth and far-reaching air are without limits', thus using the adjective in the same sense as Homer and Hesiod in the formula ἀπείρονα γαῖαν (por ej. Il. 7.446, Od. 1.98, Hes. Th. 187) 3. 3.2.2. Empedocles also writes the word ἄσπετος with the valuations with which it appears in epic works. This refers on one hand to a magnitude in the sense of 'unspeakable' 'immense', in fr. 11 Wright (B 16) ἄσπετος αἰών 'endless time' (cf. αἰθήρ Il. 8.558, the sea Od. 5. 101). On the other hand stands its reference to that which is 'countless', worded in fr. 15.10 W. (B 23) θνητῶν, ὅσσα γε δῆλα γεγάκασιν ἄσπετα, πηγήν, 'there is another source for the countless perishables that are seen' (cf. goats and sheep in Il. 11.245). 3.2.3. Besides the case that I mentioned regarding the sphere of the divine, 4 Empedocles takes advantage of the word ἀτειρής to allude to the natural world, thus talking about 'untiring eyes', ὄμματ ἔπηξεν ἀτειρέα en fr. 85 Wright (B 86), 'unfailing 2 cf. 3.2.3. 3 Xenoph. also contradicts B 28 τὸ κάτω δ εἰς ἄπειρον ἰκνεῖται, cf. infra. 4 Cf. 3.1.3 where the Homeric usage is recycled and one example by Empedocles is offered in which a reference to daimons is made.. 3

beams of light', ἀτειρέσιν ἀκτίνεσσιν in fr. 88.6 Wright (B 84.6 D-K.), or 'inextinguisable flame' φ[λογ]μὸς ἀτειρής in d 11. 5 3.2.4. In the epic works, ἀκάματος 'tireless' makes reference above all to fire (Il. 5.4, Od. 20.123, Hes. Th. 566), but also makes mention of hands (Hes. Th. 747) or feet (Hes. Th. 824) can be found in this respect, including in a periphrasis with μένος (πυρὸς μένος Hes. Th. 563); Empedocles integrates this word with a twist similar to this latter one, ἀκαμάτων ἀνέμων μένος 'the force of tireless winds' (fr. 101.3 W. [B 111.3]). The word is linked with παύσεις, which indicates that a reference of absolute impossibility is not at stake here. 3.2.5. The word ἀτάρβητος 'fearless' comes up in the work written by Empedocles in the sense of describing the sun's face in fr. 36 Wright (B 44) ἀνταυγεῖ πρὸς Ὄλυμπον ἀταρβήτοισι προσώποις 'he shines back to Olympus with fearless face'. Given the fact that the Sun appears personified the usage of the word has the same meaning as its traditional version, such as Il.3.63 (describing the νόος of a hero) or Hes. Sc.110 referring to Heracles. 3.2.6. The adjective ἀμεμφής does not appear in the epic works, but it can be encountered in choral lyric poetry (Pi. O. 6.46, B. 14.114) and in the works of Aeschylus (A. Pers. 168), having the same meaning 'blameless', 'perfect' in Emp. fr. 47.13 Wright (B 35.13) in which it describes φιλότητος. 6 3.2.7. Parmenides B 9.3 points out that πᾶν πλέον ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ φάεος καὶ νυκτὸς ἀφάντου everything is at once full of light and dark/invisible night'. The expression carries at the same time the sense of being 'dark', thus meaning it cannot be seen (like in Alc.298.26 θύελλαι) and is invisible (like in A.Ag. 1006 ἕρμα). 3.2.8. Emp. fr. 77.2 Wright (B 109.2) takes the word ἀίδηλον 'destructive' referring to fire (πῦρ) in a completely traditional sense since already Homer Il. 2.455, 9.436, has made a reference to πῦρ. The way that Parmenides Β 10.2-3 incorporates the terms ἔργ ἀίδηλα sun's 'invisible works' puzzles readers to this day. He most likely 7 associates the word with the meaning that Homer had given it before, making unseen, annihilating, destructive' refer to Athena Il.5.880, to Ares Il.5.897, and, above all, to fire itself πῦρ Il. 2.455, 5 Fr. 143 from the edition by Diels-Kranz presents the following sequence ταμόντ <ἐν> ἀτειρέι χαλκῶι, where we can find a construct identical to that in Il. 5.292, but Wright prefers reading ταμὼν ταναήκει χαλκῶι. 6 The same sense has the adverb ἀμεμφέως 'irreproachably' Emp. fr. 47.9 Wright (B 35.9 7 J. Pérez de Tudela, in A. Bernabé, J. Pérez de Tudela, N. Cordero, Parménides. Fragmentos y tradición textual, Madrid 2007, ad loc. 4

9.436. Yet, it may also refer to the solar influences that are not evident, including those that may be 'hidden, secret' (as ἔργ ἀίδηλα in Hesiod fr.60.2, cf. Op. 756). 3.2.9. Emped. fr. 113 W. (B 121) uses the word ἀτερπέα χῶρον 'joyless place', in a way identical to Homer s Od. 11.94 νέκυας καὶ ἀτερπέα χῶρον (in dat. en Od. 7.279 ἀτερπέϊ χώρωι). However, he applies intertextualizing technique since in the Odyssey the same word, in the mouth of Tiresias, makes a reference to Hades whereas Empedocles invokes our world in his poem. The same image is reinforced in verse 4 of the same fragment: Ἄτης ἀν λειμῶνα κατὰ σκότος ἠλάσκουσιν 'they wander in darkness over the field of Ate', in which two terms of infernal imagery λειμῶνα y κατὰ σκότος 8 are used. This apparently simple literary quote conceals a whole scale of meanings. 3.3. We can divide the adjectives that reflect on the human world into several categories: a) Those that refer to persons having negative qualities since they deny positive values such as intelligence and good sense (3.3.1-2) within the archaic literary trope that condemns human ignorance. b) Those that refer to negative human actions because the negative particle adds to the nominal roots that express ideals of traditional themes, such as justice (δίκη), legitimacy (θέμις), respect (αἰδώς), usefulness (χρεών), or termination (τέλος) (3.3.3-8). c) An adjective formed on the root σκοπός 'mark, aim' that refers to human senses which impairs the ability to be accurate (3.3.9). d) This category is made up by the metaphor of that which is twisted to express a positive valuation of indications or proofs offered by the philosopher (3.3.10). And finally e) the adjective that simply expresses one stage of life, a category of age (3.3.11). 3.3.1. Democritus uses on numerous occasions (B 197, 199-202, 202-206) the term ἀνοήμων 'without understanding', always in plural, in order to define a type of individual. The use is the same as in various fragments by Homer (Od. 2.270, 278 17.273). 3.3.2. Alcaeus (67.2 Voigt) integrates the word ἀσύννετος void of understanding, witless.' Interestingly, Heraclitus makes use of the term in a very similar way in the sense of 'uncomprehending,' having it in its genitive form in fr. 1 Marc. (B 1 D.-K-) ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι 'man always proves to be uncomprehending', or in its absolute form in fr. 2 Marc. (B 34) ἀξύνετοι 'people who remain 8 λειμών: Gold tablets, OF 487.6 and 493, Pind. fr. 129.3 Maehler, Pherecr. fr. 114 Kassel-Austin, Aritoph. Ran. 449, Diod. 1.95.6 Synes.Hymn, 3.394ff. Cf. Bernabé-Jiménez 174; σκότος; Gold tablets, OF 474.9, 475.11, etc. 5

uncomprehending.' In different fragments, Democritus intertextualizes οἱ ἀξύνετοι 'the witless' in the sense of a characteristic group of humans (Democr. B 54, 58, 98, 113, 291). 3.3.3. ἄδικος 'unjust' qualifies things in Hes. Op.334 (ἔργα). Heraclitus uses the word in the same sense in fr. 91 Marc. (B 102) τῶι μὲν θεῶι καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν ἃ δὲ δίκαια 'to god all things are fair and just, but men have supposed some things unjust and some just'. Democr. B 261 uses the word as a neuter in order to assess the possibility of not punishing the unjust (ἀδικουμένοισι). 3.3.4. Homer incorporates the adjective ἀθεμίστιoς 'lawless, godless', in reference to persons Od.18.141 and in the neuter plural as a direct object of a verb related to knowledge (ἤιδη, εἰδώς) to describe the perverse ideas of Cyclops (Od. 9. 189) or of the suitors (Od. 20.287). Xenoph. B 12.1, in turn, claims that Homer and Hesiod ὡς πλεῖστ ἐφθέγξαντο θεῶν ἀθεμίστια ἔργα 'attributed to the gods all things which are disreputable and worthy of blame.' However, this usage may suggest that he intended to attribute the same faults to the greatest epic poets which Homer censors in paradigmatically impious beings. 3.3.5. Democr. B 191 internalizes ἀνήκεστος 'incurable, desperate' in the same sense as Hom. Il. 5.394 (ἄλγος), Hes.Th. 612 (κακόν), etc., while making a reference to actions prohibited by law (ὧν νόμοι κολύουσιν). 3.3.6. ἀναιδής in Homer means 'shameless' (for example, Agamemnon, Il.1.158, Penelope's suitors, Od. 1.124, etc., and of things λᾶας said of Sisyphus' stone, Od. 11.598). Heraclitus Fr. 50 (B 15) uses the term in a similar way εἰ μὴ γὰρ Διονύσωι πομπὴν ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ὕμνεον ἆισμα αἰδοίοισιν, ἀναιδέστατα εἴργαστ ἄν 'if they fail to make the procession to Dionysus and if they sing the hymn to deeds of shamefulness, they would be proceeding most irreverently'. 3.3.7 Hesiod documents ἀχρεῖος 'useless', referring to people (ἀνήρ Op. 297), whereas Democritus B 78 uses it in the neuter form linked with infinitive οὐκ ἀχρεῖον 'it is not useless', as in reference to xρήματα πορίζειν. 3.3.8. Democritus B 81, like Homer (Od. 17.546 θάνατος), includes ἀτελής meaning 'not brought to an end', but he refers to the tasks (πρήξιας) that are not finished due to continuous vacillations (τὸ ἀεὶ μέλλειν). 6

3.3.9. Parmenides uses in B 7.4 νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα 'to cast a wandering eye', alluding to the way a majority of mortals see things. He takes further the sense that Homer gave to the expression, who at the same time views Achilles as a person who fails to act this way (Il. 24.157) οὔτε γάρ ἐστ ἄφρων οὔτ ἄσκοπος οὔτ ἀλιτήμων, since as a hero who he is cannot be characterized by the features found in a common human being. 3.3.10. ἀψευδής 'unerring, truthful' appears in Hes. Th. 233 referring to Nereus, Archilochus 298.1, yet West reads it in reference to Zeus. Empedocles takes it to refer to proofs that, in a way, appear personified: a(ii) 29 ἐκ τῶν ἀψευδῆ κόμισαι φρενὶ δείγματα μ[ύθων] 'from these accounts convey to your mind unerring proofs'. 3.3.11. Democr. B 9 ἡμεῖς δὲ τῶι μὲν ἐόντι οὐδὲν ἀτρεκὲς συνίεμεν 'we, in fact, do not know anything truthful' thus continues a Homeric usage of the term ἀτρεκές, which in Homer is documented only as an adverb, in its forms ἀτρεκές y ἀτρεκέως, and is at all times linked to verbs of saying (ἀγορευέμεν Il. 2.10, κατάλεξον Od. 1.169). In etymological terms it means not twisted (constructed on *τρέκος cf. lat. torqueo), following a cognitive metaphor that aligns the straight with what is real and pairs the twisted with what is false. It seems that in Greek the word is not recognized as a negative adjective. 3.3.12. Heraclit. fr. 69 Marc. (B 117) y fr. 105 (B 121) interweaves the word ἄνηβος using its sense as 'unfledged boy.' 3.4. All we have seen in this section draws an apparently traditional picture, marking a clear line of separation between the immortal gods and mortal humans, the latter being ignorant, endowed with imprecise senses and not very clear opinions, who, at the same time, act in indecorous, unjust, and impractical ways. This image compared to a mighty, almost threatening nature is utterly striking. Yet this impression is highly misleading. Empodocles stands in the position of a god and thus he is ἄμβροτος himself. Nature is not powerful in comparison to him because he dominates it as in fr. 33.1 W. (B 39.1) and when he uses the traditional adjective ἀπείρονα in order to refer to the earth and the ether in order to refuse straightforwardly the fact that they are exclusively endowed with these characteristics (cf. 33.2-3 B 39.2-3): ὡς διὰ πολλῶν δὴ γλώσσας ἐλθόντα ματαίως 7

ἐκκέχυται στομάτων ὀλίγον τοῦ παντὸς ἰδόντων. as has come foolishly from the tongue of the mouths of many who have seen but a little of the whole. Therefore, the earth is not ἀπείρονα to him. Simultaneously, he declares himself able to control the ἀκαμάτων ἀνέμων. ἀψευδής is his word. Empedocles thus portrays himself with the solemnity of a maître de la verité and with powers of a magician. On the other hand, in fr. 113 W. (B 121) he creates a valuation space between this world and the afterworld using the word ἀτερπέα χῶρον in a form that frontally collides with the traditional one. As for human ignorance, he does not believe he is influenced by it since he excludes himself from the group of the ἀξύνετοι. Democritus recognizes erroneous behavior in the ἀξύνετοι or ἀνοήμονες as one who is able to advise on proper manners (i.e. revealing himself as ξυνετός and νοήμων) in the same way in which works that are unfinished finished are a result of vacillation can supposedly be corrected. However, he admits that human behavior is not perfect. The archaic value scale is also a matter to be questioned. Heraclitus does not write ἄδικα in fr. 91 Marc. (B 102) because the existence of unjust things is something that men consider to be erroneous (ὑπειλήφασιν). The traditional use of ἀναιδής serves Heraclitus as a basis for word games with a definite purpose. Singing a hymn to shamefulness is supposedly what is embarrassing but Heraclitus confirms the contrary. In his view, the most embarrassing thing is not to do so. The reasons do not make the case. 9 Regarding the term ἀθεμίστιος, Xenophanes uses it to refer to Homer with the intention to show that the poet himself falls into the trap of making the mistake that he had previously criticized. Democritus takes ἀχρεῖas a negative expression. Men cast a glance ἄσκοπον which is typical of them but Parmenides dissociates himself from these practices since he speaks through the mouth of a goddess. Only Democritus use of ἀτρεκές, preceded by an adverb of negation, comes closer to the archaic concept of human ignorance even though the philosopher attenuates this lack of knowledge when he recognizes that we are at least familiar with the changes that are produced by the influences of some bodies on others. 4. Adjectives that are used in a context or assigned a new sense or created by philosophers: classification of uses. 9 Cf. Bernabé, Expresiones polares 8

The analysis of the rest of adjectives that are used in a context or are given a new meaning or are inventions of philosophers displays that all of them can be a part of one of the following assumptions: a) The negative adjective refers to physical realities or abstracts and defines them as realities alien to normal beings (5). In many cases it means that it is impossible to fulfil the negated idea because of its prefix. b) The negative adjective refers to human beings or their abilities and insists in human limitations (6). c) The negative adjective refers to realities which are not accessible to (the perception, comprehension, hope of) human beings (7). d) The negative adjective is used to reject common opinions or refers to things which are contrary to those which can be expected (8). e) Formed from informative and indicative verbs, the adjective can be connected with inexpressible realities (9). f) The negative adjective is simply used as a classificatory term by opposition to its contrary (10). In these cases, the usual idea is that the usage of one thing is permitted but not of the other, or that it classifies orders in opposition to things. 5. The negative adjective refers to physical realities or abstracts and defines them as realities alien to normal beings. 5.1. The adjective has a new meaning and/or is used in a different context We can find four different types of use: a) The terms that in epic define the gods according to their positive qualities by referring to the negation of death and old age and by which philosophers refer to the realities that in some way replace the gods (5.1.1-3); b) The definitions of what it is (in some cases of τὸ ἄπειρον), all of them positive, as long as they negate in terms of impossibility the characteristics typical of natural beings that limit them, such as movement, change, limits, the possibility of being affected or being violable as well as liable to imbalance (5.1.4-11); c) The definitions of what it is not as formed from expressions of comprehension or from language which indicate that something is unconceivable or inexpressible (5.1.12-13) or adjectives that negate the possibility of some of the characteristics that are prohibited from what actually is or cannot happen, or from destruction (5.1.14-16); d) the adjectives that refer to the aspects of the universe in moments of creation or natural elements in a cosmogony that negate different ideas, such as to be trampled, to be habitual, mixed or to be visible (5.1.18-20). 9

5.1.1. Some negative adjectives were used in relation to divinity and they refer to the identity of new physical realities or abstract ideas with divine beings. The best example is ἀθάνατος 'immortal' which on numerous occasions in Homer is associated with divinity as opposed to human beings that are βροτοί 'mortal'. Anaximander uses the same adjective (B 3) to refer to τὸ ἄπειρον. I am under the impression that he means to identify in certain ways the features of his new principle with those typical of divinity (cf. 5.1.3). We are not surprised at Theophrastus' response in which he accuses Anaximander of using terms typical of poetry. 10 A similar idea, but one which incorporates a contrary meaning, is conceived by Heraclitus fr. 26 Marc. (B 50) when he attributes to τὸ πᾶν the condition of ἀθάνατον. In this respect, we have to quote also Empedocles fr. 47.14 Wright (B 35.14) αἶψα δὲ θνήτ ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ εἶναι 'immediately what were formerly accustomed to be immortal became mortal', where the philosopher makes reference to eternal elements that perishable beings configure. And this form of origin is strikingly visible in the work by Diógenes of Apollonia (fr. 5 Laks 7) καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν (el aire divino) τοῦτο καὶ ἀίδιον καὶ ἀθάνατον σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν γίνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπολείπει. Consequently, Porphyr. V. Pyth. 19 delivers information on Pythagoras in which he: ἀθάνατον εἶναι φησι τὴν ψυχήν 'confirms that the soul is immortal'. If it is true that Pythagoras, like Plato in Phaedrus and in some Orphic fragments, 11 states it with such an emphasis, in spite of the fact that Homer talks about some possibility of a soul s existence after the death, defining the soul as immortal is a different concept to that which Homer describes as a mere survival. It means to identify the soul with the divine. I will not engage with the complex interpretation of fr. 47 Marc. (B 62) by Heraclitus, ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι 12, where, whatever the interpretation, the philosopher preaches immortality (a divine attribute) of mortal beings. Hence, we may see that applying an adjective that previously referred to the gods as a cosmic principle (a reality that is presumed to be physical) and to the soul (presumed to be a 10 Simplic. in Phys. 24.13 (12 A 9) ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων. 11 Pl. Phaedr. 245c ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος, Vett. Val. 317.19 Pingree (OF 425-426) ψυχὴ δ ἀθάνατος πάντων, τὰ δὲ σώματα θνητά, ψυχὴ δ ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρως ἐκ Διός ἐστιν, cf. A. Bernabé, L'âme après la mort : modèles orphiques et transposition platonicienne, en J. F. Pradeau (ed.), Études platoniciennes IV, Les puissances de l'âme selon Platon, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2007, 25-44. 12 Bernabé, Expresiones polares. 10

human reality) represents a new definition of both realities placing them in the world of the divine. 5.1.2. A similar example can be found in Un Emp. fr. 14.4 Wright (B 21.4) where ἄμβροτα refers to something not very clear ὅσσ εἴδει τε καὶ ἀργέτι δεύεται αὐγῆι 'heavenly bodies (?) bathed in heat and shining light'. In any case, the philosopher applies the adjective, which Homer used in relation to the gods, to physical realities. 5.1.3. In epic works, ἀθάνατος frequently appears accompanied with or substituted by ἀγήρως 'ageless, undecaying', also in the position contrary to that of men who are subdued by their old age. Anaximandrus (B 2), in concordance with the intention that I highlighted in 5.1.1, uses also ἀγήρως to make a reference to τὸ ἄπειρον. 5.1.4. In Hesiod, ἀκίνητος is linked with sacred things that should not be moved (Op. 750) and Bacchylides uses it for elements that we wish would remain without change because of the divine decision (B. 5.200). In other words, we are concerned with something 'unmoved,' which in no way means that it is impossible to move it. In Parmenides writings, the word acquires the meaning of being immobile because it is impossible to move (B 8.6, 8.26, 8.38, cf. Xenoph. A 36). Empedocles uses ἀκίνητοι in the sense of 'unaltered' in frr. 8.13 y 16.12 Wright (B 17.13 y 26.12) to describe it as detached from change, whatever the subject is, the roots, the air, etc. 5.1.5. ἀτρεμής in Semon. 7.37 West refers to a woman who is like the sea πολλάκις μὲν ἀτρεμὴς ἕστηκα 'many times remains tranquil'. The presence of πολλάκις indicates that the adjective does not express impossibility, and in fact it is is also said that πολλάκις δὲ μαίνεται 'many times she goes crazy'. Parmenides, in turn, applies ἀτρεμής 'unshaken' to the heart of truth (B 1.29) and to what it is in (B 8.4), indicating the impossibility of being moved. 5.1.6.Homer uses ἄναρχος in the sense of 'without chief' (Il. 2.703). Parmenides Β 8.27, on the other hand, transforms the meaning into 'without beginning' but, contrary to the situation described by Homer, which is incidental, in this case we are confronted again with impossibility. B 8.27-28 ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος τῆλε μάλ ἐπλάχθησαν, ἀπῶσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής 13. 13 Imitated by Ocell.1.3. 11

5.1.7.Homer writes ἀτέλεστος 'without issue or effect' about things that have not been fulfilled, for example, a work πόνος Il. 4.26 (Hera complains that her efforts are going to be vain in the war), Telemachus journey (ὁδός Od. 2.273), a prophecy about Poseidon (Od. 8.571) or words (ἐμὸν ἔπος h.cer. 323). In all these cases, the subject matter is things that cannot be fulfilled because they are impossible. In turn, when Parmenides used the term to describe what is in B 8.4 he wants to point out that the being has not only not finished, but that it cannot have an end according to the discussion of the whole fragment. 5.1.8. The term ἄσυλον is commonly used for things or beings that have not suffered violence (E.Med. 728) or in which the violation by imperatives of an ethical or religious nature is impossible (in accordance with the most frequent usage of the word asylum in modern languages), e.g.. γῆν E.Med. 387, the Sanctuary of Asclepius in Cos (IKos 18.6, etc.). In B 8.48, Parmenides uses it in the sense of 'inviolable', thus referring to what it is, expressing impossibility. 5.1.9. In the works of Homer and Hesiod, the word ἀπείρων refers to vast spaces, such as the earth (Il. 7.446, Od. 1.98, Hes. Th. 187) or the sea (Il. 1.350, Od. 4.510, Hes.Th. 678) to highlight the fact not so much that it is impossible to measure them but rather that they are not susceptible to be measured by humans, or that they are not accessible to this procedure. Immense can be understood as when you say that a palace or an estate are immense even though they can of course be measured. It is a negative compound word formed from πεῖρα. Although the criticism still discusses 14 the original meaning of πεῖρα we may feel free to assign it the attributes of a 'limit or boundary' so that τὸ ἄπειρον should be translated as 'the indefinite in its primary usage. The first person to use it in a philosophical sense, in a substantivated form, is Anaximander. The usage of this substantivated negative term arises from a state of incapability. Anaximandrus considered that the original material from which the world is composed is not any of the existing ones, but a wholly different one, though he was not precise about which one it would be. 14 R. B. ONIANS, The origins of European thought, about the body, the mind, the soul, the world, time and fate, Cambridge: University Press, 1951, pp. 310ss; M. VAN DER VALK, Researches on the Text and Scholio of the Iliad, Leiden: Brill, 1964, II p. 97; A. T. L. BERGREN, The Etymology and Usage of pei'rar in early Greek Poetry, New York: American Philological Association, 1975; W. NOTHDURFT, Noch einmal pei'rar /peivrata bei Homer, Glotta 56 (1978) 25-40; F. CASADESÚS, «Algunas consideraciones sobre el concepto to; a[peiron en Anaximandro», I Congreso Iberoamericano de Filolofía, Cáceres-UCM Madrid, 21-26 de septiembre de 1998; en prensa; V. DOMÍNGUEZ, El ápeiron de Anaximandro y el Papiro de Derveni, en A. BERNABÉ-F. CASADESÚS (eds.), Orphica. Estudios sobre Orfeo y el orfismo, Oviedo, in print. 12

If the material from which the world and all other things proceed should be, on the one hand, a unique one an unquestionable assumption of the early pre-socratics it should also lack internal differentiations that would allow us to tell between the compositions inside (because if this is not the case, it would not be only one substance but rather a composite of more than one). This clearly indicates that it is something indefinite in which there is no πείρατα or limits. Since the philosopher cannot define in what that something consists, he turns to the substantivation of the adjective so that it can be designated. This something indefinite thus may be named the Indefinite. Also Xenohanes (Xenoph. B 28) uses it in the substantivated form to refer to the concept of the earth according to which the earth has a limit (πεῖρας) in its outer or superficial part whereas in its lower part it is directed toward the unlimited (ἐς ἄπειρον). Empedocles offers a striking usage of the concept in fr. 22.3-4 (B 28.1-2): ἀλλ ὅ γε πάντοθεν ἶσος <ἑοῖ> καὶ πάμπαν ἀπείρων Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίηι περιηγέι γαίων But he is equal to himself in every direction, without any beginning or end, a rounded sphere, rejoicing in encircling stillness. Wright points out in his ad hoc commentary that the sphere has no spatial starting or stopping point... There is also the implication that there are no internal frontiers dividing one element from another. Melissus uses this adjective when referring to something that is infinite or seems to have sense of being infinite, lacking limits, in accordance with the reasoning offered in B 1; it also has the quality of impossibility. ὅτε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐγένετο, ἔστι τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ τελευτήν, ἀλλ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν.... οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνυστόν, ὅ τι μὴ πᾶν ἔστι. Since, then, it did not come to be, but is, it always was and always will be, and it has neither beginning nor end but is unlimited... for what is not entire cannot be always. Such limits are not uniquely temporal. Therefore, Melissus fires against Parmenides, contradicting him in B 2 by means of an accusative related to τὸ μέγεθος meaning that which it is neither has nor can have special limits (B 3 ἀλλ ὥσπερ ἔστιν ἀεί, οὕτω καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἄπειρον ἀεὶ χρὴ εἶναι, 'but as it is always, so too it must always be unlimited in magnitude'). For that reason and also in order to obtain more 13

clarity, he deconstructs the value of ἄπειρον accompanying it with ἀίδιος that is not negative, but rather carries the meaning eternal in relation to time, thus leaving ἄπειρον to designate spatial infinity in B 4 ἀρχήν τε καὶ τέλος ἔχον οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀίδιον οὔτε ἄπειρόν ἐστιν 'nothing that has both beginning and end is either eternal or unlimited'; cf. B 7. Anaxagoras embraces the form related to ἄπειρος in diverse uses. B1 ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα καὶ γὰρ τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν.... πάντα γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθὴρ κατεῖχεν, ἀμφότερα ἄπειρα ἐόντα ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς σύμπασι καὶ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει. all things were together, infinite in regard to plenitude and smallness; for the small too was infinite.... for air and ether pervaded all things, both being infinite 15. B 2 καὶ γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀποκρίνονται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιέχοντος, καὶ τό γε περιέχον ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ πλῆθος and air and ether separate out the vault of the surrounding matter; and moreover the surrounding matter is infinite in plenitude 16. B 4 (4b Sider) καὶ γῆς πολλῆς ἐνεούσης καὶ σπερμάτων ἀπείρων πλῆθος οὐδὲν ἐοικότων ἀλλήλοις. there being both much earth within and seeds infinite in plenitude in no way like anything else. B 12 τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄπειρον while other things have a share of everything, Nous is infinite 17. Zenon as well finds the adjective useful for his paradoxes on large and small or on multiplicity: B 1 μικρὰ μὲν ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μεγάλα δὲ ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι So small as not to have magnitude, so large as to be unlimited B 3 εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστίν ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερα μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνων ἕτερα μεταξύ. καὶ οὕτως ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστί 15 Cf. Sider 76 16 Cf. Sider 81 17 Sider 129-130. 14

If there are many things, the things that are are unlimited; for there are always others between the things that are, and again others between those, and thus the things that are are unlimited. 5.1.10. The adjective ἀτελεύτητος, is especially atypical and thus difficult to classify. At first, its history is parallel to that of other examples scrutinized in this section, i.e. a common use that acquires a new sense referring to a new entity that is defined as an entity detached from other beings. Homer takes this adjective when he alludes to something that was not fulfilled (ἔργον in Il. 4.174, and some threats in Il.527). Parmenides adds a new dimension to this word when he gives it a meaning that has no end and he uses it to refer to what it is. We may expect him to express impossibility what cannot have an end and it would serve us to define it in the same type of reference as the other instances. However, what Parmenides states (B 8.32) is οὕνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι 'it is not permitted for what is to be infinite', thus declaring that the being is complete. He could have directly confirmed the complete character of the being but it looks like he debates with himself about one of the characteristics of the being which, once postulated, turns out to be illogical within the framework of his thought. He explains it in the following verse: ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές ἐὸν δ ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο 'for it is in need of nothing; while, if it were infinite, it would stand in need of everything', a reasoning that, subsequently, could be applied in order to negate each and every one of the negative adjectives that Parmenides uses. Only one prejudice on the perfection of the limited could have interfered in this interesting mental process that can be deduced from the analysis of the terms. The fact is that when negated it cannot mean impossibility of having limits but rather only the definition of the possible state of not having them. 5.1.11. ἀτάλαντος means in epic works 'equal in weight, like' (derived from the use that does not unbalance ) and is used in comparisons (e.g. Ἄρηϊ Il. 2.627, Hes. fr. 25.16). Empedocles, in contrast, takes the adjective in absolute uses, without any reference to a second term in the dative, referring to Νεῖκος, in other words, to a cosmic entity. He, in addition, accompanies it with ἁπάντηι, having a sense of 'equal in every way, matched in every direction'. Wright 18 enlightens the word in the following terms: 18 Wright 170 15

It is not that Strife is materially equal in weight to each of all the roots but that its power can stretch evenly and comprehensively over them all 19. 5.1.12. ἀνόητος appears once in the Hymn to Hermes 80 in the sense 'not thought of' in order to make a reference to some humongous sandals. In B 8.17 by Parmenides, we find the word in relation to the direction of what it is not, the term gains a meaning of impossibility, it is unthinkable'. 20 5.1.13. Moreover, Homer uses ἀνώνυμος referring to what does not have a name, and thus in Od. 8.552 he says that there is no mortal who would not have a name because the parents give a name to every one. In B 8.17 by Parmenides referring to the direction of what it is not, both terms acquire a sense of impossibility unnameable. The idea of logical impossibility is reinforced in the context (B 8.16-17): ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη, τὴν μὲν ἐᾶν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθής ἔστιν ὁδός) Thus, rather than not thinking or naming the direction of what it is not, leaving open the possibility of doing it, it is vital to maintain them as unthinkable or unnameable because they are not true. 5.1.14. ἀμήχανος in Homer s texts means 'without resources' applied to persons (Od.19.363) and 'irresistible' to things (ἀμήχανα ἔργα Il. 8.130). Empedocles in 9.1 (12.1), like Pindar in O. 7.25, etc. uses the neuter as an expression of impossibility, but in order to refer to the impossibility of something being born of what it is not ( ἔκ τε γὰρ οὐδάμ ἐόντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι) 21. 5.1.15. In Homer s works, ἄπυστος has two meanings, one passive 'not heard of' (Od. 1.242) when talking about Odysseus who is leaving ἄιστος, ἄπυστος without being seen or heard and 'without hearing or learning' (Zeus Od. 5.127, in a negative expression). In B 8.21 by Parmenides stands 'that is not to be heard of', referring to passing away: τὼς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ ἄπυστος ὄλεθρος. The verse echoes the characteristics of a being like ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον from B 8.4. Consequently, if what it is is ἀνώλεθρον, the concept of ὄλεθρος results in being impossible. 19 Arat. copies the use of ἀτάλαντον... γαῖαν. Arat.22 20 De la divinidad Dion. Areop.M. 3.141A. It has a different meaning in 11.l.3. 21 Parmenides B 6.5 documents the noun as ἀμηχανίη. 16

Emped. fr. 9.2 Wright (B 12.2), in turn, uses ἄπυστον meaning 'that is not to be heard of' in order to refer to the fact that what it is could perish (ἐὸν ἐξαπολέσθαι) and he links it with another negative adjective, ἀνήνυστον (cf. 5.1.16), which appears to be a Parmenidean echo more than anything else. 5.1.16. The adjective ἀνήνυστον, a compound of ἀνύω 'accomplish', is often used in epic works (Od. 16.111) in the sense of not accomplished referring to an ἔργον. The suitors who would like to marry Penelope insist that it is not accomplished. It does not express impossibility but only the fact that the expressed reality was, in fact, not produced. In contrast, in Emp. fr. 9.2 Wright (B 12.2, cf. 5.1.15) it means 'that which cannot be fulfilled'. 5.1.17. Emp. a(ii)13 refers in the following terms to a moment of the cosmic cycle: [δὴ τό]τε μὲν γὰρ γαῖ [ἀβ]ά τη θέει ἠέλ [ιος τε] (-ου τε Janko) the earth runs not yet trampled by anyone because the beings who walk on the earth were not born yet. 22 The usage of the term is different from the more habitual uses of this word in lyrical poems or in theatre where it means 'inaccesible, where you cannot go or that which cannot be crossed 23. 5.1.18. ἀήθης is not a Homeric term but it appears in Aeschylus Suppl. 567 to refer to an unusual ὄψις. Empedocles (fr. 25.8 Wright [B 22.8]) apparently uses it in the sense of the θνητά: πάντηι συγγίνεσθαι ἀήθεα καὶ μάλα λυγρά Νείκεος ἐννεσίηισιν, but such are... quite inexperienced in union and grieving deeply at their generation in strife. 5.1.19. Homer writes ἄκρητος when he talks about wine which means 'unmixed, without water' (Od. 24.73) or about some libations (σπονδαί) made of pure wine (Il.2.431). Parmenides B 12.1 talks about πυρὸς ἀκρήτοιο unmixed fire to make a metaphoric reference to a cosmic fire which is not like any other fire. It does not express impossibility. 5.1.20. Homer uses ἄφαντος as 'made invisible', talking about dead warriors (Il. 6.60) or about a stock that disappears (Il. 20.203). Contrarily, Alcaeus 298.26 uses it in the sense of 'dark' (of a θύελλα). Parmenides B 9.3 has it in both senses to refer to the 22 Martin-Primavesi 135 gives it the meaning 'impassable' but he has to add then before. I do not believe it expresses a transitory impossibility but rather a statement of a fact. 23 Cf. DGE s. v. 17

night being a principle of darkness, thus standing contrary to the light and, in this sense, he simultaneously overlaps dark and invisible: πᾶν πλέον ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ φάεος καὶ νυκτὸς ἀφάντου 'everything is full at once of light and dark/invisible night'. 5.1.21. We can observe in the analyzed data of this section that the philosophers proceed with a gradual substitution of superhuman beings that are transformed from traditional gods to cosmic phenomena and, in the case of Parmenides, to a complex theory of what it is. They not only link these new superhuman realities with traditional adjectives that mark their differences in regard to human beings like those that refer to not being subdued by death and aging but also add new information that is aligned with the previous one like those who neither are born nor affected by the processes of movement of change. Moreover, the fact that they are limitless (unlike Melissus, Parmenides disregards this theory) gradually becomes more visible. Thus, we may speculate on the negated realities (i.e. birth, death, movement) in the idea that they are not, a reason for which they are connected with adjectives that indicate that they cannot be enunciated nor conceived, nor can it be the contrary of the idea of to be, thus resulting in not being. On a sub-level, the philosophers describe different stages of the cosmic process that gives birth to realities likewise detached from the quotidian that are classified as such also because of the usage of the negative adjectives. Heraclitus introduces a profound distortion into this picture since he claims that defining these realities with negative adjectives or with positive ones is an indifferent issue, a conclusion based on the criteria I studied in a different section. 24 5.2. New adjectives The uses of the new constructs that the philosophers conceived and which refer to physical realities or abstracts and define them as realities alien to normal beings are framed in two sections: a) a group of adjectives that indicates positive qualities is applied to what it is, which concerns what is not born, what does not die and cannot be divided (5.2.1-5); b) other adjectives refer to beings or materials in distinct phases of the cosmic cycle that are different from the present ones (5.2.6-7). 5.2.1. We can find in the same fragment by Heraclitus a different pair of new terms, γενητὸν ἀγένητον 'created-uncreated', constructed from γίγνομαι which, at the same time, refer to all divinities. ἀγένητος would have a great success as a 24 Bernabé Expresiones polares. 18

philosophical term since we found it in relation to what is in Parm. B 8.3 in a very refined usage, simultaneously designating what it is, it is uncreated but also that it could not be so, as an impossibility, that which unlooses from the rest of the line of reasoning. Empedocles B 7 uses the same term to define the roots (that we anachronistically denominate elements ). The term ἀγένητος is later recurrent in philosophy, i.e. it comes up in Plato s Phdr.525d, etc. or Aristotle s Metaph. 997b 7, etc. 5.2.2. ἀνώλεθρος, 'indestructible' seems to be Anaximander s creation (B 3) in the sense of τὸ ἄπειρον, followed by Parmenides who applies it to what it is (B 8.3). The latter has a great success since it is interwoven into the works by Plato, Aristotle, or Proclus (Inst. 187). 25 It is an adjective with a thematic formation based on the noun ὄλεθρος 'destruction, death', which is a Homeric construct (Il. 11.174, Od. 4.489, etc.). ἀνώλεθρος is a synonym of ἄθάνατος but it does not have the religious connotations of the previous one. Insisting not on death but rather on destruction is more acceptable for physical realities that are not related to humans, nor human spirits. Parmenides and other philosophers 26 recycle this concept in their works. Parmenides not only indicates that one does not destroy what is but he also states that which is cannot be destroyed. 5.2.3. ἄπαυστος 'never ending' appears documented for the first time in Parmenides B 8.27-28, in the sense of to be whereas Aeschylus has it in relation to αἰών. 5.2.4. ἀδιαίρετος 'indivisible' expressing impossibility and referring to all divinity seems to be a construct of Heraclitus fr. 26 Marc. (B 50), even though Marcovich claims that the fragment is not by Heraclitus. I strongly agree with Mouraviev who argues the contrary. Heraclitus seems to have created at the same time also its antonym διαιρετός, which reappears in B 8.22 by Parmenides as an equally negative expression οὐδὲ διαιρετόν meaning what it is. Melissus perhaps uses ἀδιαίρετος to describe what it is even though it is inscribed in a part that is not literal (B 10) αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀδιαίρετον τὸ ὂν δείκνυσιν. Aristotle, like other philosophers, borrows the term later in Metaph. 1052a 21, and others. 5.2.5. Sophocles documents the adjective ἄτομος in S.Tr. 200 as 'not cut' (λειμών), but Leucippus and/or Democritus, probably for the first time, used it in the 25 Pl. Phd. 88b, Lg. 904a, etc. Arist. Ph. 203b 14, Mu.396a 31, etc., Proclo, Inst. 187. 26 Parm. B 8.3, Pl.Phd.88b, Lg.904a, Arist.Ph.203b 4. 19

sense of 'that cannot be cut, indivisible', although, unfortunately, direct testimony is very rare. The word seems to have been used as an adjective, in agreement with ἀρχή (D. L. 9.30, Simpl. in Cael.242.19), with σῶμα (Simpl. Phys. 36, 2) or with ἰδέα (Plu. adv. Col. 1110F). It was also used as a feminine noun (Simpl. Phys. 28, 8 27 ) or as a neuter in fr. B 125 where it seems to be literal: νόμωι χροιή, νόμωι γλυκύ, νόμωι πικρόν, ἐτεῆι δ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν. 5.2.6. ἄμικτος 'unmixed' does not come up in epic works. When reading Empedocles fr. 47.8 Wright (B 35.8), we will come across πολλὰ δ ἄμικτ ἔστηκε 'many (mortal things) stayed unmixed'. It does not imply impossibility but rather a situation of a fact in a phase of a cosmic cycle. Aeschylus A. 321 uses the same word but he dresses it with a different meaning that will not blend or harmonize', in a sense of a criterion (βοή). 5.2.7. Empedocles fr. 98 Wright (B 27a) uses the hapax ἀναίσιμος 'unseemly': οὐ στάσις οὐδέ τε δῆρις ἀναίσιμος ἐν μελέεσσιν 'no discord or unseemly warring in the limbs'. Although he refers to a δῆρις 'warring', the context seems to indicate a description of Sphere, the extreme result of the action of Love. In a way, Empedocles seems to have chosen an adjective that in its negative form is more in harmony with the spherical form of Sphere. 5.2.8. The conclusions of the results of this section are very similar to those offered in the previous section. The new realities are not subdued by death, birth, and division. Again, we are confronted with an anomaly within the Heraclitian perspective. Heraclitus combines in fr. 26 Marc. (B 50) positive and negative adjectives: Ἡ.... φησιν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν διαιρετὸν ἀδιαίρετον, γενητὸν ἀγένητον, θνητὸν ἀθάνατον. 6. The negative adjective refers to human beings or their abilities and insists on human limitations. In this case, the adjectives that refer to human beings or to their abilities have a negative sense and are constructed around the topics related to the sphere of knowledge and capability to distinguish or learn. Two of them have a new meaning and/or are used in a different context (6.1-2), and one is new (6.3). 6.1. In Homer we can find the word ἄκριτος meaning 'undistinguished, common' in relation to a grave (τύμβος Il. 7.337) or 'countless' (ἄχεα Il. 3.412, νείκεα 27 Cf. the Index of Diels-Kranz. 20