2011 10 1. 430073 2. 410013 2003-2009 A F230. 9 A 1002-9753 2011 10-0166 - 09 Research on Managerial Power and Atypical Executive Compensation Behavior WANG Qing - gang 1 HU Ya - jun 2 1. School of Accounting Zhongnan University of Economics and Law Wuhan 430073 China 2. Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science and Technology Development Company Changsha 410013 China Abstract Executive compensation is generally determined by the company performance. If corporate earning is below the industry average and its executive compensation is higher than the industry average we identify this as atypical executive compensation. Using the data of Chinese listed company from 2003 to 2009 we studied the relationship between atypical executive compensation and managerial power. We found that there is significant positive correlation between atypical executive compensation and managerial power. In other words the more power managers have the more seriously they can set their own compensation in companies while in companies that CEO seated as chairman simultaneously have dispersed shareholding pattern and lower first shareholder proportion. The research results should be concerned by investors creditors state - owned assets supervision and administration institutions and the securities regulatory authorities etc. Key words managerial power executive compensation atypical executive compensation 2008 200 21 3. 902 2011-08 - 10 2011-09 - 18 1970-166
1860 1 600070 2008 97. 76% 1 1991 Crystal 84. 41% 000005 2008 86. 43% 86. 85% 2008 2 2004 Bebchuk Fried 1597 3 Otten 2008 17 2001-2004 2008 451 1394 31. 48% 23. 95% 2 4 2009 7 Financial Services Com- 5 mittee 6 2009 4 7 2009 9 8 Murphy 2002 90 9 2005 2003-2009 A 10 11 20 80 3 1 1 2009 10 27 2 2008 3 newmops. tse. com. tw 2009-11 - 25 167
2011 10 2 100 3 3 200 4 Murghy 1985 Giorgio 2008 Jackson 2008 2009 14 18-19 20-21 22-24 20 80 12 13 25 14 26 15 116-17 2010 27 2010 Bebchuk Fried 2004 168
1 2009 12 Probit H1 Pr Excess = β 0 + β 1 Power + β 2 Ni + β 3 Lev + pervisorsize + β 9 Soe + 28 β iind i + 34 β jyear j i = 10 j = 29 CS- MAR Excess http / /company. p5w. net STATA10. 0 SPSS 16. 0 2003-2009 A 15 25 1 2 2 Ni 3 4 5 6 Ni 8245 Excess = 1 Excess = 0 Power 1 1 28 1 29 1 2003-2009 29 30 11 30% 29 4 1 30 30 1 4 4 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 11 28 325 362 315 369 444 413 555 2783 674 732 708 793 862 835 858 5462 999 1094 1023 1162 1306 1248 1413 8245 32. 53 33. 09 30. 79 31. 76 34. 00 33. 09 39. 28 33. 75 % β 4 Size + β 5 Committee + β 6 Indd + β 7 Boardsize + β 8 Su- 25 1 25 1 2001 2009 2 169
2011 10 2 Excess Ni lnpay Excess = 1 Excess = 0 Dual Dual = 1 Dual = 0 D_ownership 1 Power = 1 Power = 0 Lshare power11 power1 = Dual + D_ownership Ni Lev / Size Committee Committee = 1 Committee = 0 Indd Boardsize SupervisorSize Soe Soe = 1 Soe = 0 Indi i Indi = 1 Indi = 0 Yearj j Yearj = 1 Yearj = 0 Jackson 2008 3 3 2010 13. 322 3 2000 21 2009 Excess 8245 0. 338 Hermalin 2005 Lnpay 8245 13. 322 0. 473 0. 848 0. 000 9. 602 1. 000 17. 065 Ni 8245 3. 19E + 08 2. 90E + 09 33262. 94 1. 43E + 11 Dual Raheja 8245 0. 142 0. 349 0. 000 1. 000 2005 32 2009 15 2 D_ownership 8245 0. 266 0. 442 0. 000 1. 000 Power1 8245 0. 408 0. 579 0. 000 2. 000 Lshare 8245 38. 945 15. 884 4. 490 86. 420 Lev 8245 0. 503 0. 374 0. 008 12. 238 Size 8245 21. 422 1. 143 14. 937 28. 003 Committee 8245 0. 724 0. 447 0. 000 1. 000 Indd 8245 0. 352 0. 051 0. 071 0. 714 Boardsize 8245 9. 451 2. 037 2. 000 19. 000 supervisorsize 8245 4. 080 1. 402 0. 000 13. 000 Soe 8245 0. 651 0. 477 0. 000 1. 000 1 2008 2008 170
0. 848 2004 2005 2008 9. 602 2007 17. 065 2009 2009 2006 2007 2009 13. 681 1998 10. 619 2000 2 1 14. 2% Ni 319000000 2900000000 26. 6% 2003 33262. 94 2007 143000000000 T 4 5 4 T t - Lnpay 13. 058 13. 838-0. 780-43. 8415 *** Ni 4. 28e + 08 1. 05e + 08 3. 23e + 08 4. 7829 *** Dual 0. 135 0. 155-0. 020-2. 4520 ** D_ownership 0. 247 0. 303-0. 056-5. 4420 *** Power1 0. 383 0. 458-0. 076-5. 6335 *** Lshare 39. 778 37. 310 2. 468 6. 6895 *** 171
2011 10 172
2003-2009 Harvey Shrieves 2001 33 6 1 5% 1% 2 Core 1999 34 1% 3 4 1% 6 6 Variables 1 2 3 4 Dual + 0. 087 ** D_ownership + 0. 183 *** Power1 + 0. 142 *** Lshare - - 0. 004 *** Ni - - 0. 001 *** - 0. 001 *** - 0. 001 *** - 0. 001 *** Lev - 0. 087 ** - 0. 090 ** - 0. 0890 ** - 0. 095 ** Size + - 0. 009 0. 004 0. 004-0. 002 Committee + 0. 034 0. 031 0. 035 0. 027 Indd 0. 353 0. 325 0. 308 0. 363 Boardsize 0. 059 *** 0. 055 *** 0. 057 *** 0. 056 *** supervisorsize - - 0. 031 *** - 0. 031 *** - 0. 030 *** - 0. 032 *** Soe + 0. 044 0. 073 ** 0. 075 ** 0. 065* Constant - 0. 992 ** - 1. 244 *** - 1. 282 *** - 0. 898 ** Chi2 34 496. 040 520. 350 520. 870 508. 840 Prob > Chi2 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 Pseudo R2 0. 047 0. 049 0. 049 0. 048 N 8245 8245 8245 8245 *** 0. 01 ** 0. 05 * 0. 1 1. ROA Excess = 1 Excess = 0 2. 3. 2003-2009 A 173
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