2011 7 * 2002 2005 Wlson 1999 Gordon 1983 Keen and Marchand 1997 Besley and Case 1995 Case et al. 1993 Fglo et al. 1999 Saavedra2000 Revell2003 Backer2005 Borck et al. 2006 Lundberg2006 20081995 2005 1995 2005 2008 20091999 2005 2002 2005 Kelejan & Prucha1998 1999 GS2SLS * 100875 yheng@ bnu. edu. cn 70773010 06&ZD014 55
- leader-follower 1 2 L and Zhou 2005 2007 Besley & Case1995 max η Pr[ Ωη η - > ε ] η η - ε 0 θ 2 Ωη η - = β 0 + β 1 η + β 2 η - 3 PrΩη η - > ε = Φ β 0 + β 1 η + β 2 η - 2 θ ( ) Φ β 1 > 0 < 0 β 2 F K L P P - = [ γp ξ + 1 - s P ξ α ] ξ K β L 1 - α - β K L L P P - 0 < ξ < 1 0 < α < 1 0 < β < 1 1 /2 < γ < 1 0 < φs< 1 s - s/ s > 0lm s= γlm s= 1 s s 0 s + f kp p - = γp ξ + 1 - s p ξ α ξ [ - ] k β - 1 2 3 1 2 Qan & Roland1998 56 3 probt
2011 7 r = β γp ξ + 1 - s p ξ - α ξ k β -1 w uc g c g 4 uc g = c1 - σ - 1 1 - σ + ψg. 5 ψ' > 0 T 1 k 0 dk dt = w + r k - c - T SL T = g + p max { c k } c 1 - σ - 1 = 0 [ ] Subject to dk dt 1 - σ + ψg e - ρt dt = w + r k - c - 1 L g + p 6 ρ > 0 6 η = c c = r - ρ σ = β [ γp ξ + 1 - s p ξ α ] ξ k β -1 - σ p p - 2 7 p - = p - p 27 3 + dp - [ [ ] ] ξ - β 1 γp ξ -1 dp 1 - s p - p 1 + β 2 γ[ p - p ] - ρ dp ξ -1 - [ ] dp + 1 - φs p ξ -1 8 dp - dp = - β 1 γ - β 2 1 - s β 1 1 - s + β 2 γ 1 s - β 1 γ > β 2 1 - s dp - dp 7 = 0 8 9 p < 0 1 2 7 3 7 k p k 57
β 2 = 0 dp < 0 dp 1 - β 2 s β 2 = 0 2 s γ 1 - s > - β 1 > β 2 1 - s dp - γ dp > 0 s dp > 0 dp - β 2 s s Revell 2005 SAR SEM Y = ρwy + Xβ + u u = λwu + ε 10 11 Y X W n n ε Eε= 0 varε= σ 2 u u 11 W 10 WY ρ w { j = 1 j = 0 1 10 WY ρ 12 58 1
2011 7 { = 0 = 1 j WY 2 ρ 1 1984 1100 55. 4% 4272 1 1110 26. 0% = 1 j 14 { = 0 = 1 j 15 { = 0 1 13 OLS Anseln 1988 Arraz et al. 2008 Arraz et al. Kelejan & Prucha 1999 2001 2004 Generalzed spatal Two-stage least squares GS2SLS Kelejan and Prucha 1998 GS2SLS Y H X WX 10 GMM λ ^λ Kelejan & Prucha1999 Cochrane-Orcutt Y * * = Y - ^λwy X = X - ^λwx 10 2 1 1 2 GDP 59
2004 333 1 2002 2003 2005 2 Revell 2005 Backer 2005Borck 2006 GDP GDP 3 GDP 14 15 4 1 2 GS2SLS Moran I 5 λ ρ 1 ρ 60 1 2 3 4 5 11 11 12 14 10 13 13 11 17 9 11 17 17 13 14 20 14 2 21 9 16 7 10 14 8 5 14 333 1213 14 15 1213 1 55. 4% 100% 55. 4% 1 26% 100% 26% Moran I
2011 7 1 0. 28 2 ρ 1 0. 34 1 2 1 GS2SLS t t t ρ - 0. 08-0. 87-0. 28 ** - 2. 79 GDP 0 1. 25 0 1. 73-0. 55-0. 39-2. 69-1. 85 0. 03 0. 75 0. 05 0. 97-124. 01-1. 63-152. 28-1. 84-5885. 75 *** - 3. 96-5529. 69 *** - 3. 69-350. 18 *** - 3. 37-342. 35 *** - 3. 43 382. 1 *** 19. 11 393. 49 *** 19. 9 124. 05 1. 12 95. 39 0. 81-27. 16-0. 52-40. 32-0. 77 75. 56 1. 78 λ 0. 4 *** 38. 79 Moran I 6. 57 1. * 5% 1% 0. 1% 2. 333 2 3 2 GS2SLS GDP t t t ρ 0. 65 *** 4. 36 0. 34 ** 2. 75 GDP 0 0. 45 0 1. 31-0. 59-0. 44 0. 02 0. 02 0-0. 05 0. 01 0. 29 14. 66 0. 18-207. 99 ** - 2. 77-5478. 72 *** - 3. 77-3592. 96 ** - 2. 72-184. 35-1. 74-223. 29 * - 2. 40 423. 54 *** 19. 51 353. 57 *** 18. 13-161. 19-1. 29-9. 48-0. 05-30. 01-0. 59-37. 48-0. 72 32. 63 0. 12 λ - 0. 69 *** - 9. 26 ρ Moran I 7. 26 2 3 2 4 1 2 1 0 GDP 61
3 5 7-0. 30 ** ρ - 0. 29 ** - 0. 26 * 0. 48 *** 0. 48 *** 0. 60 *** - 3. 03-2. 90-2. 21 3. 75 3. 83 4. 55 Moran I 105. 62 ** 107. 80 ** 114. 94 *** 51. 8 53. 23 * 82. 02 * 3. 09 3. 13 3. 74 1. 90 1. 98 2. 52 27. 37 29. 3 55. 96-19. 57-15. 84 15. 43 0. 80 0. 85 1. 73-0. 79-0. 64 0. 54 λ 16. 69-7. 18 19. 97 7. 83 0. 63-0. 31 0. 98 0. 32-956. 5 *** - 1360. 8 *** - 5. 56-7. 41 ρ 86. 37 * 83. 4 * - 1. 03 288. 24 309. 98 69. 91 2. 04 1. 98-0. 07 0. 97 1. 05 0. 21 0. 41 *** 0. 41 *** 0. 81 *** - 0. 45 *** - 0. 47 *** - 0. 1 * λ 40. 36 39. 74 5. 57-6. 37-6. 74-1. 96 Moran I 7. 42 7. 51 8. 51 6. 29 6. 3 6. 52 1. 2. GDP 3. t 4 2002 2003 2005 2002 2003 2005 2002 2003 2005 ρ - 0. 15 ** 0. 39 *** - 0. 19 * 0. 41 *** - 0. 16 * 0. 37 ** - 2. 72 4. 40-2. 11 4. 06-2. 1 2. 90 4 λ 0. 51 *** - 0. 07 *** 0. 26 *** 0. 2 *** 0. 35 *** 0. 44 *** Moran I 17. 53-3. 96 26. 47 7. 40 25. 54 40. 31 λ Moran I 6. 82 6. 83 7. 73 7. 42 7. 34 7. 68 2002 2003 1. 2002 2003 2005 2005 2004 ρ λ 2. GDP ρ 2002 2005 62
2011 7 1 1994 2006 6 2009 2 2008 FDI 5 2008 1978 2006 11 2011 1 2007 7 AnselnL. 1988Spatal EconometrcsMethods and ModelsDordrechtKluwer Academc. BackerK. 2005 The Spllover Effects of State Spendng Journal of Publc EconomcsVol. 89529 544. BesleyT. and CaseA. 1995 Incumbent BehavorVote-SeekngTax-settngand Yardstck Competton Amercan Economc Revew Vol. 8525 45. BorckR. CalendoM. and StenerV. 2006 Fscal Competton and the Composton of Publc SpendngTheory and Evdence IZA workng paperno. 2428. CaseA. HnesJ. and RosenH. 1993 Budget Spllovers and Fscal Polcy InterdenpendenceEvdence from the States Journal of Publc EconomcsVol. 52285 307. FgloD. KolpnV. and Red W. 1999 Do States Play Welfare Games Journal of Urban EconomcsVol. 46437 454. GeysB. and Revell F. 2009 DecentralzatonCompetton and the Local Tax MxEvdence from Flanders Department of EconomcsUnversty of Torno. GordonR. H. 1983 An Optmal Taxaton Approach to Fscal Federalsm Quarterly Journal of EconomcsVol. 98567 586. L H. and Zou H. 1998 Income Inequalty Is not Harmful for GrowthTheory and Evdence Revew of Development Economcs Vol. 23 318 34. Keen M. and MarchandM. 1997 Fscal Competton and the Pattern of Publc Spendng Journal of Publc Economcs Vol. 66 33 53. KelejanH. and PruchaR. 1998 A Generalzed Spatal Two - stage Least Squares Procedure for Estmatng a Spatal Autoregressve Model wth Autoregressve Dsturbances Journal of Real Estate Fnance and Economcs Vol. 1799 121. KelejanH. and PruchaR. 1999 A Generalzed Moments Estmator for the Autoregressve Parameter n a Spatal Model Internatonal Economc RevewVol. 40509 533. KelejanH. and PruchaR. 2001 On the Asymptotc Dstrbuton of the Moran I Test Statstc wth Applcatnos Journal of EconometrcsVol. 104219 257. KelejanH. and PruchaR. 2004 Estmaton of Systems of Spatally Interrelated Cross Sectonal Equatons Journal of EconometrcsVol. 11827 50. LundbergJ. 2006 Spatal Interacton Model of Spllovers from Locally Provded Publc Servces Regonal StudesVol. 40 631 644. RevellF. 2003 Reacton or InteractonSpatal Process Identfcaton n Mult-tered Government Structures Journal of Urban 1 2011 63
Economcs Vol. 5329 53. RevellJ. 2005 On Spatal Publc Fnance Emprcs Internatonal Tax and Publc FnanceVol. 12475 492. SaavedraL. 2000 A Model of Welfare Competton wth Evdence from AFDC Journal of Urban EconomcsVol. 47248 279. WlsonJ. D. 1999 Theores of Tax Competton Natonal Tax JournalVol. 52269 304. On the Interactons of Local Publc Infrastructure Expendture n Chna Yn Heng and Xu Yanchao School of Economcs and Busness AdmnstratonBejng Normal Unversty AbstractThs paper dscusses theoretcally and emprcally channels through whch local publc nfrastructure expendture nteracton n Chna. On one handlocal governments have the ncentve to expand nfrastructure nvestment to pump up GDP growth rateon the other handthe postve externalty of nfrastructure nvestment wll gve adjacent areas the urge to take free rde resultng n downfall of nfrastructure nvestment n these areas. Two dfferent types of adjacency matrx are choosed to dentfy nteractons. Usng Chnese prefecture areas data from 2002 to 2005the results show that areas wthn the same provnce exhbt postve correlaton n publc nfrastructure expendturewhle adjacent areas geographcally exhbt negatve correlaton. Key WordsYardstck CompettonSplloverSpatal EconometrcsExternaltes JEL ClassfcatonC51H23H5 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 檵 41 The Drvng Force of Chna Economc Growth and Transformaton Prospect An Analyss from Fnal Demand Perspectve Lu Ruxang and An Tonglang Nanjng Audt UnverstyNanjng Unversty AbstractInvestgatng the drvng force of Chna economc growth from fnal demand perspectve can provde new deas for the transformaton of Chna economc development pattern. Wth the systematc analyss of the nput-output data ssued by NSBthe drvng force of Chna economc growth from 1987 to 2007 s researched on the bass of non-compettve nputoutput model. Result shows that 1The pullng effect nduced by fnal demand ncludng consumptonnvestment and exporthas been weaken. The current producton-nduced effect s manly n the ndustral sectorand quckly shfts from lght to heavy ndustry. 2 The structure of Chna economc dependency between 1987 and 2007 has changed fundamentally from domestc dependent to export-orented. 3 Fnal demand s the man drvng force of Chna economc growthbut fnal demand structure has changed durng ths perod. In addtonths paper provdes suggestons for Chna economc transformaton and also expands the concluson of Lau et al. Key WordsFnal DemandEconomc GrowthInput-outputInduced and Dependency Structure JEL ClassfcatonO11C67 64