Game analysis of four interest group s coalition in Chinese regulated real estate market

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1 : (008) a,, a, b, c ( a,b,c, 7009 ;, 700) :,,. : ; ;.. : ; ; ; : C9 ;C939 ;F3 ;F83 : A Game analysis of four interest group s coalition in Chinese regulated real estate market HUAI Jianjun,,LIU Xinmei,LEI Hongmei,ZHANG Fan (Xi an Jiaotong University,Xi an 7009,China ;Northwest A&F University, Yangling 700,China) Abstract : To answer how central government resolve the question that interest group coalitions have induced rising price of housing in Chinese regulated real estate market, based on the cooperative game method, we investigate the conditions of single, two and three and fourcoalition, the optimal coalition form and profit distribute vectors maintaining coalitions among local government,central government,land agents and international speculators. We find that : the conditions of regulated or anti regulation coalition are determined with the relationship between net profit from regulation and average net profit from market movement ; the optimal coalition form depends on the comparing the sum of four payoff from the same type of strategy with the sum of welfare waste from anti regulation ; individual profit distribute vectors for maintaining coalition are determined with individual payoff and welfare waste from anti regulation. Central government should build and maintain regulation coalition to overthrough anti regulation coalition. Key words : real estate market ;coalition ;cooperative game ;government regulation 0,,., ,005 8, [ ]., [ ],, ; [3, ].,,,,,.,, [5 ]. [6 ], :00700 : (707307) ;985 (070070) :(97 - ),,;(96 - ),,, China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. All rights reserved.

2 6 3 [7 ], [8 ]. () [9 ], [0 ].,. [ ]., [,3 ],. [,5 ] [6 ] [7 ] [8,9 ], [0, ],.,,;, ;. [ ][3 ],, ;, ;, ; ;. : () ( ) ( ),,,,3,. :c,dc, t, t (0 t, t ),p, p (0 p p ). b, b (0 b, b ), r (0 r ), A (0 A ). :,,,3,. A,, A,, ( t c - p, ( t + b ) ( c + dc) ). B,, B,,( t c - p, ( a + t ) ( c + dc) ). C,, C,,( rc, r( c + dc) ). D,, D,, ( Ac,A ( c + dc) ). i (,,3,) a u i, u ( u =,)., ;,, i q i, q i = Q.,, 6., I, S, IS S, V, MIN l, MAX r., MIN l MAX r,,, ; MIN l MAX r,. i, j, k, l =,,3,,, i j k l, i, j, k, l,.. ( ) China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. All rights reserved.

3 S IS ( ) {,3,} MIN l {} BCD BCD BCD BCD BCD BCD BCD BCD A a a - q a - q 3 a - q 3 - q a - q a - q - q a a - q - q 3 a - q - q 3 - q - q 3 - q - q A a - q a - q - q a a - q - q 3 - q - q 3 a a - q - q a - q - q - q - q - q - q a - q - q a - q 3 - q 3 - q - q - q - q 3 - q MAX r a - a + q,a V = a - q - q - q 3 - q - q 3 - q a - a + q,a - q - q - q 3 - q V = a - q - q - q 3 - q : v ({ i}) = a i - q j, if a i j = - a i + q i 0, ( i j k l ) a i - Q, if a i - a i + q i ; 0, ( i j k l ) a i - a i + q i a i i a i - q i. ( ). S IS ( ) {3,} MIN l {,} CD CD CD CD () AB a + a a + a - q a + a - q 3 a + a - q 3 - q a + a - q 3 - q AB a + a - q - q a + a - q - q - q a + a - q - q - q 3 a + a - Q a + a - Q MAX r a - a + q,a - a + q,, a + a - q 3 - q ; a - a + q,a - a + q,, a + a - Q : v ({ i, j}) = China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. All rights reserved. V = a + a - q 3 - q V = a + a - Q a i + a j - q k - q l, if a i - a i + q i 0, a j - a j + q j 0, ( i j k l ) a i + a j - Q, if a i - a i + q i ; 0, a j - a j + q j ; 0,( i j k l ), a ij - a ij + q ij a ij i j a ij - q ij. 3,, : v ({ i, j, k}) = a i + a j + a k - 3 q l,if a i - a i + 3 q i 0, a j - a j + 3 q j 0, a k - a k + 3 q k 0, ( i j k l ) a i + a j + a k - 3 Q,if a i - a i + 3 q i ; 0, a j - a j + 3 q j ; 0, a k - a k + 3 q k ; 0, ( i j k l ), a ijk - a ijk + 3 q ijk a ijk i j k a ijk - 3 q ijk. () (3)

4 6 33,V ( <) = 0, V ( I) = v ({ i, j, k, l}) = a i, if a i - a i + q i 0, ( i j k l ) a i - Q, if a i - a i + q i ; 0,( i j k l ), a i - a i + q i a i i a i - q i. V,() () : v ({ i}) = v ({ i, j}) = i, j = v ({ i, j, k}) = a i - 3 Q, Π a i - a i + q i 0 a i - Q, Π a i - a i + q i ; 0 3 a i - 6 Q, Π a i i, j = - a i + q i 0, a j - a j + q j 0 3 a i - Q, Π a i i, j = - a i + q i ; 0, a j - a j + q j ; 0,() (7) (8) (9) : 3 a i - 3 Q, Π a i - a i + 3 q i 0, a j - a j + 3 q j 0, a k - a k + 3 q k 0 3 a i - Q, Π a i - a i + 3 q i ; 0, a j - a j + 3 q j ; 0, a k - a k + 3 q k ; 0 v ( i, j, k) i, j = v ( i, j, k) V ( I) V ( I) v ( i, j) V ( I) i, j = v ( i, j, k) v ( i, j, k) V ( I) i, j = i, j = China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. All rights reserved. v ( i, j) v ( i) i, j = v ( i, j) V ( I) v ( i, j) v ( i), Π a i : 3 Q ; v ( i), Π 3 Q v ( i, j), Π a i ; v ( i, j, k) 3 v ( i), Π v ( i), Π a i 3 Q ; 3 Q ; a i Q ; a i ; Q ;, ;,. : ;.. 3 [ I,V ]n, x = ( x, x,, x n ), C() = { x : x X () ; V ( S) - x ( S) 0, S < I}. : n x i = V ( I), i s x i = V ( S). () : () (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

5 v ({ i}) = a i - q j j = x i ; (0) a i - Q x i v ({ i, j}) = a i + a j - q k - q l x + x ; () a i + a j - Q x + x v ({ i, j, k}) = v ({ i, j, k, l}) = a i + a j + a k - 3 q l x + x + x 3 ; () a i + a j + a k - 3 Q x + x + x 3 a i x + x + x 3 + x a i - Q x + x + x 3 + x (0) (3) i ( ) : 3 a i - j = a i - Q x i. (3) q j x i a i + 3 q i. () i [ V ] ( i N),. n ( N,V), i ( v),, i i [ V ] = S ( i S) ( S - )!( n - S )! [ V ( S) - V [ S \ { i} ] ], n! S., i ( v) : ( v) = ( v) = 3 ( v) = ( v) = a - Q + 6 q + 6 q 3 a + 6 a + 6 a a - a - Q - 6 q q - 3 a + 6 a + 6 a a - a 3 - Q + q 3 3 a a + 6 a + 6 a - a - 3 Q - q 3 - ; (5) 7 6 Q 3 q 6 q + q 3 a + 6 a + 6 a a - ; (6) 7 6 Q ; (7) 7 6 Q. (8) 7 6 Q,,,,.,.,,,., (), (), (3) () :, China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. All rights reserved.

6 6 35,,,,;., a i, a i - q i.,,p, p b, b ;, t, t, dc, c, r,a ; q i.,(8) (9) :,.,,,, ;,,,, ;,,,.,,,, ;,,,.,,,., a i ; 3 Q, :,.,,,,;,,,;, ;,,. 3 Q a i 3 Q, :,.,,; ;,,;,. a i : 3 Q, :,.,, ;,;,,,,;., a i ; Q,:,., ;,,, ;,. a i Q,:,., ;,,, China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. All rights reserved.

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