2012 3 34 3 Joumal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University Mar. 2012 Vol.34 No.3 1 2 1. 266000 2. 361005 F832.4 [ ] A [ ] 1007-9556 2012 03-0098-10 External Governance Circumstance and Creditor GovernanceEfficiency of Chinese Listed Companies WANG Zhen- jie 1, SHEN Wei- tao 2 1.College of Management, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266000; 2.School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China Abstract Using a simultaneous equations model this article analyzes the impact of external governance environment on creditor governance efficiency which provides further discussion of the reason for the systematic risk in banking markets and the agency problems of listed companies. There is overinvestment and expropriation behavior in Chinese listed companies which is induced by low creditor governance efficiency under government intervention. In the region with low government intervention, the creditor governance mechanism become more efficient in long term debt which is especially prominent in SOEs, but some listed companies makes use of short term debt to pursue overinvestment and expropriation in turn which poses a new challenge to creditor governance. Key Words creditor governance efficiency; external governance environment ; overinvestment; interest expropriation 50% 40% 2005 2003 2012-02-10 IPO 71172052 11YJC790197 201113022 1982-1963- 98
1 2004 1 993 2005 2 460 2008 8 156.95 3 5 494.45 Fama 1985 Myers 1989 James 1987 Jensen Meckling 1976 Myers 1977 Black 2. 2 1975 Sufi 2007 Tung 2009 Roberts Sufi 2009 2008 Nini 2009 32% 1. Billett 2007 Nini 2011 1. 10%~20% 1996~2008 99
CEO 2007 1 ÁÂÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÁÇÇÁÂÃÅÆÇÈÉÇ!"Å#$%ÇÇ 2.!" Faccio 2001 )* +,-./ # Boubakri Ghouma 2010 $%& $%( 1 1. La Porta 1998 Safavian Sharma 2007 2009 4 100
1 2 5 352 1 CCER Wind resset 5 stata10.0 2 2. 2007 1 I =α 1 +α 2 ATUN +α 3 ND +α 4 SD +α 5 Cash +α 6 APD + α 7 Age+α 8 TobinQ+α 9 LR+α 10 Z ND=β 1 +β 2 ATUN+β 3 AI+β 4 APD+β 5 PDVAR+β 6 U- nique+β 7 PPE+β 8 MB+β 9 LR+β 10 Z TUN =θ 1 AI +θ 2 ND +θ 3 SD +θ 4 Age +θ 5 Cash +θ 6 EM + θ 7 RPT+θ 8 LR+θ 9 Z McCabe 1979 ND ND ND Person 0.857 ND ND ND 3 4 3 Person 4 Q Age 2006 LR Z 2001~2006 A 90% 10% 0.0165 RPT EM 101
OLS Tun McCabe 1979 APD ND PDVAR PPE MB N 赞 D=β 1 +β 2 TUN+β 3 AI+β 4 APD+β 5 PDVAR+β 6 Unique Unique +β 7 PPE+β 8 MB+β 9 LR+β 10 Z+ε 1 1 TU 赞 N=θ 1 +θ 2 AI+θ 3 ND+θ 4 SD+θ 5 AGE+θ 6 Cash+θ 7 EM+ θ t 8 RPT+θ 9 LR+θ 10 Z+ε 2 t-1 I = restricted model unrestricted model + + AI - / restricted model b ND unrestricted model a ATUN - / SD ND H 0 :j 1 =k 1 =0 F / ND TUN TUN exclusion restrictions 2004 q 2 k ATUN 12 Size a: Tobin Q Tobin Q= TobinQ Q * + * I =α 1 +α 2 ATUN +α 3 ND +α 4 SD +α 5 Cash +α 6 APD + + / Lang 1991 α 7 AGE+α 8 TobinQ+α 9 LR+α 10 Z+α 11 TU 赞 N+α 12 N 赞 D+ε CF= Cash b: + / I =α 1 +α 2 ATUN +α 3 ND +α 4 SD +α 5 Cash +α 6 APD + Age t α 7 AGE+α 8 TobinQ+α 9 LR+α 10 Z+ε [ + / APD 2 OLS ] [ + / R 2 F R-square form of the F statis- PDVAR ] tics LR / 2 2 RPT = * R F = ur-r r /q = 0.1157-0.1021 /2 - - 1-R 2 1-0.1157 / 5352-11-1 ur - RPT * - =41.06>F 0.05 1.5340 =3.8432 F F 0.05 1 5340 F>F0.05 1 5340 ND ATUN EM 0 1% 6% 7% 1 ND TUN 0 I PPE + / Unique / Pearson - + MB / 0.5 0.7 Hausman 102
2 2 T Z T Mann- Whitney U 0.002 SD 0.496-0.476-0.01 3 0.041 ND 0.321-0.703 0.023-0.505 I 2.237 ** -4.693 *** -0.682 T 0.07 TUN 2.91 *** -1.911 ** 0.046 T 0.265 AI 2.09 ** -1.203 0.127 0.083 ATUN 3.257 *** -5.397 *** 0.06 *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 3 VS VS T Z T Z SD 0.004-0.016 0.496-0.476-0.004 0.014 0.642-1.132 ND 0.054 0.020 0.321-0.703-0.006 0.035 0.477-0.198 I - 0.485-0.664 2.237 ** - 1.911-0.575-0.751 2.029 ** - 3.922 *** TUN 0.074 0.053 2.91 *** - 4.693 0.056 0.020 2.158 ** - 1.45 AI 0.295 0.120 2.09 ** - 1.203 0.159 0.153 2.213 ** - 1.302 ATUN 0.087 0.067 3.257 *** - 5.397 0.067 0.030 2.356 *** - 4.567 *** *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 4 1b 2b 3b ATUN AI 2b AI 1% 1b ATUN AI ATUN AI 10% 3b 1 1 1a 4 1b 2SLS 1c 2a 2b 2c 3a 3b 3c I ND TUN I ND TUN I ND TUN ATUN -1.302 1.502-2.511 4.034-4.322 ** -1.476 *** ND 1.226 *** 0.104 *** 1.009 *** 0.049 *** 5.362 1.909* SD 0.026 0.032 0.116 0.022 0.204 0.166 TobinQ -0.413 *** -0.435 *** -0.044 Cash -1.053 0.343 ** 0.045 0.383 *** 0.778 1.141 ** 103
4 APD 3.208 *** -2.712 2.723 ** -4.764 * 1.611-0.099 Age -0.587 *** -0.025-0.756 *** -0.02-0.481-0.162 * LR 0.097-0.185 0.067 *** 0.188-0.640 ** 0.080 *** 0.241 0.090 ** 0.071 ** Z -0.206 * 0.133-0.061 *** -0.297 ** 0.576 ** -0.079 *** -0.334 * -0.083 ** -0.051 * AI 1.666 * -0.189 *** 2.875 *** -0.112 ** -0.17-0.397 ** PDVAR 1.759 1.649 2.154 *** Unique -0.003 ** 0.011-0.001 ** PPE -2.678 ** -4.608 *** -0.492 *** MB 0.128-0.236-0.009 RPT 3.73E-10-3.27E-11 0.002 EM 0.013 0.016 0.09 Const 1.440 *** 0.921 0.138 *** 1.896 *** 1.86 0.118 *** 0.714 0.420 *** 0.274 * RMSE 2.799 5.063 0.586 2.698 7.595 0.337 1.951 0.235 0.403 Chi2 61.450 75.610 92.550 69.650 96.650 104.920 31.010 24.850 27.030 P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002 *** Stata10.0 reg3 ** * 1% 5% 10% 5 4b 5b 6b 2 5b ATUN 10% AI 4b AI ATUN 6b ATUN 1% AI 2 4a 5 4b 2SLS 4c 5a 5b 5c 6a 6b 6c I ND TUN I ND TUN I ND TUN ATUN -6.362 *** -0.023-6.264 *** -0.129 * -13.544 *** -0.263 *** ND -0.36-0.328-0.272-1.044 *** -1.412-0.073 SD 0.675 *** 0.145 *** 0.713 *** 0.052 *** 1.455 ** 0.099 ** TobinQ 0.001 0.03 0.002 Cash 0.246 0.433 *** 0.125 0.563 *** 0.411 0.247 APD 0.125 0.186 ** 0.704 0.315 *** -2.578 ** -0.048 Age -0.168-0.052 * -0.118-0.024 ** -0.136-0.060 ** LR 0.042 0.004 0.018 ** 0.083 0.018 *** 0.044 *** 0.015-0.004 0.003 Z -0.039-0.003-0.018 *** -0.068-0.013 *** -0.034 *** 0.048 0.005 0.002 AI 0.032-0.379 *** 0.005-0.078 * -0.001-0.200 *** PDVAR 0.006-0.033 0.006 Unique 0.002 *** 0.001 * 0.002 *** PPE 0.036 0.118 *** -0.021 MB -0.033 *** -0.041 *** 0.025 RPT 0.00003 0.00005 0.019 EM -0.002 0.017 0.008 Const 0.005 0.02 0.165 *** -0.109-0.001 0.068 ** -0.078 0.007 0.130 ** RMSE 3.352 0.305 0.698 3.227 0.295 0.387 4.094 0.354 0.337 Chi2 572.280 88.660 266.660 574.100 105.630 953.120 64.130 24.460 34.530 P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 4 4 1a 2a 3a 1c 2c 3c 104
1a 1c ND 1% SD 3 ND 2a 2c 1% SD 7 ND SD 3a 3c 3 8 5 4a 5a 6a 4c 5c 6c 4a 4c 10% ND SD 1% 9 NDt SDt ND SD ND 4 SD ND 5a 5c 1% SD 1% ND SD 1% 6a 6c 4 1 6 2 Cleary 1999 105
3 GDP GDP GDP 1 2 3 4 5 CSMAR resset 6 Hovakimian A. G. Hovakimian G 2005 2 1 I I Richardson 2006 Richardson 2006 7 ROE EPS CROA TE CGS AT RT GMBI GMBP GOCF PMBI PCA 106
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