16 3 2013 3 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES IN CHINA Vol 16 No 3 Mar 2013 1 Nash 230026 Nash Nash F224 O224 A 1007-9807 2013 03-0068 - 05 0 Ho Zhang 10 20 1 2 11 3 Tversky Kahneman 4 Ho 5 Nash Kahneman 6 Cui 7 Nash Nash Pavlov 8 12 Loch Wu 9 1 2012-03 - 19 2012-12 - 03 71271199 70901067 20093402120012 1980 Email dsoft@ ustc edu cn
3 Nash 69 1 D > 0 u r u s π π r = 1 + r π r - r π r 1 + s π - π r - s π - π r f F u r u s π π r μ = E D F 0 = 0 F = 1 - F 2 u r u s = - 2 1 + w q π 2 r 1 + s < 0 r c u r u s π π r π * r u r u s π * r = 0 7 π { r π r = S q - wq Nash π s = w - c q 1 π * r π = π r + π s = S q - cq π * r = π r 8 q * 7 8 F q * = w 2 1 + r π r = π 2 + s + r q o 9 F q o = c 1 + s π 3 s = π 2 + s + r Nash 2 2 1 Nash Nash Nash Nash 2 2 π r π s u r = π r + r π r - π r r = > 0 s = 0 4 = 1 + r π r - r π r π r u s = π s + s π s - π s = 1 + s π s - s π s 5 r s r > 0 s > 0 π r π s π r +π s = π π r +π s = π u r Nash q = 1+ [ 2 2+ F q -w+ c] 11 2+ Nash max u r u s π r π s s t π r + π s = π u r u s > 0 6 5 u s π π r = 1 + s π - π r - s π - π r = 1 + 2 + π 10 1 u r 12 q * 2 u r < 0 q 2 u r q *
70 2013 3 F q * 2 + w = - c 2 2 = w + 2 t q * u r q * q q * t q * = - t q * < 0 q * w - c 12 14 15 q * q * q o 2 12 F q * > F q* F q o 2 + w = 2 1 + + 2-2 c 17 2 1 + q * < q * 13 c < F qo 3 12 q o < qo 18 1 3 12 17 F q * - F qo = 2 + w - c > 0 q * <qo 18 q* <qo <qo 3 2 3 2 D ~ N 1 000 100 2 q o 17 = 100 w = 60 c = 30 2 q * = 975 3 u 2 1 + 2-2 = F q - w - q 2 + 2 + c 16 q o = 1 052 2 u 66 523 < 0 q 2 1 q * 1 1 Table 1 The influence of retailer s fairness concerns on the suly chain q * π r q * π s q * π q* u r q * u q* 0 0 975 36 137 29 250 65 387 0 1 971 36 134 29 130 65 264 36 329 65 459 0 2 967 36 125 29 010 65 135 36 245 65 255 0 3 961 36 101 28 830 64 931 35 921 64 751 0 4 959 36 090 28 770 64 860 35 392 64 162 0 6 950 36 022 28 500 64 522 33 812 62 312 0 8 942 35 938 28 260 64 198 31 672 59 932 1 0 933 35 817 27 990 63 807 29 096 57 086 1 5 907 35 330 27 210 62 540 21 317 48 527 2 0 872 34 405 26 160 60 565 12 368 38 528 2 5 804 32 066 24 120 56 186 2 980 27 100
3 Nash 71 1 = 1 5 0 975 1 052 0 1 2 5 971 804 36 329 2 980 65 459 27 100 = 0 6 w c 1 1 ~ 4 1 Fig 1 The influence of wholesale-rice on the otimal decision w = 30 = c 2 2 3 4 = 0 6 q 0 Fig 2 The influence of retail rice on the otimal decision q o = 1 040 q * = 975 = 槡 2 3 = Fig 3 The influence of roduct cost on the retailer s otimal decision
72 2013 3 4 Fig 4 The influence of roduct cost on the suly s otimal decision 4 Nash 1 Fehr E Schmidt K M A theory of fairness cometition and cooeration J Quarterly Journal of Economics 1999 114 3 817-868 2 Rabin M 1281-1302 Incororating fairness into game theory and economics J American Economic Review 1993 83 5 3 Kumar N The ower of trust in manufacturer-retailer relationshis J Harvard Business Review 1996 74 6 92-106 4 Tversky A Kahneman D S251 - S248 Rational choice and the framing of decisions J Journal of Business 1986 59 4 5 Ho W J Fifty years of management science J Management Science 2004 50 1 1-7 6 Kahneman D Knetsch J L Thaler R Fairness cometition on rofit seeking Entitlements in the market J American E- conomics Review 1986 76 4 728-741 7 Cui T H Raju J S Zhang Z J Fairness and channel coordination J Management Science 2007 53 8 1303-1314 8 Pavlov V Katok E Fairness and coordination failures in suly chain contracts EB /OL PSU working aer 2009 htt / /www ersonal su edu /exk106 /fair_ost df 9 Loch C H Wu Y Z Social references and suly chain erformance An exerimental study J Management Science 2008 54 11 1835-1849 10 Ho T H Zhang J J Designing ricing contracts for boundedly rational customers Does the framing of the fixed fee matter J Management Science 2008 54 4 686-700 11 J 2010 13 11 41-48 Du Shaofu Du Chan Liang Liang et al Suly chain coordination considering fairness concerns J Journal of Management Sciences in China 2010 13 11 41-48 in Chinese 12 Cachon G P Suly Chain Coordination with Contracts M / / de Kok A G Graves S C Handbooks in Oerations Research and Management Science vol 11 Amsterdam Elsevier 2003 227-339 81
3 81 Quantity Journal 2007 41 579-589 33 J 2011 14 5 1-10 Sheng Zhaohan Zhang Wei Comutational exeriments in management science and research J Journal of Management Sciences in China 2011 14 5 1-10 in Chinese Exogenous covariate and non-ositive social influence romote grou olarization LI Zhen-eng 1 2 TANG Xi-jin 2 1 Deartment of Statistics School of Mathematics and Comuter Science Dali University Dali 671003 China 2 Institute of Systems Science Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100190 China Abstract Oinion dynamics is one of the imortant asects of crowd s behaviors Collective oinions evolve into different atterns consensus olarization or diversity under the cross-imact of a variety of factors such as mutual influence external intervention etc In this aer three tyes of social influences are discussed from the ersective of social identity and then we add triadic structure into Hofield network model Simulation results verify that exogenous covariate and non-ositive social influence are the main factors to grou olarization Furthermore we show that olarization is coexisting with local structure balance and discover the intrinsic connection between global network stable attern and local structure balance Key words social influence oinion olarization Hofield network social identity structure balance 檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿 72 Otimal decision-making for Nash bargaining fairness concerned newsvendor in two-level suly chain DU Shao-fu ZHU Jia-ang GAO Dong DU Chan School of Management University of Science and Technology of China Hefei 230026 China Abstract The aer establishes a fairness concern framework based on game theory of Nash bargaining and builds a utility system about fairness concerns On this basis it exands the newsboy model to behavior research Further it illustrates the alication of the model through numerical analysis and investigates the roerties of otimal decision of both the retailer and suly chain by a comarative static analysis Key words Nash bargaining game behavioral oerations fairness concerns newsvendor