Nash. Nash. Nash F224 O Hopp 5. Nash. Nash. Vol. 16 No. 3 Mar JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES IN CHINA

Transcript

1 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES IN CHINA Vol 16 No 3 Mar Nash Nash Nash F224 O224 A Ho Zhang Tversky Kahneman 4 Ho 5 Nash Kahneman 6 Cui 7 Nash Nash Pavlov 8 12 Loch Wu dsoft@ ustc edu cn

2 3 Nash 69 1 D > 0 u r u s π π r = 1 + r π r - r π r 1 + s π - π r - s π - π r f F u r u s π π r μ = E D F 0 = 0 F = 1 - F 2 u r u s = w q π 2 r 1 + s < 0 r c u r u s π π r π * r u r u s π * r = 0 7 π { r π r = S q - wq Nash π s = w - c q 1 π * r π = π r + π s = S q - cq π * r = π r 8 q * 7 8 F q * = w r π r = π 2 + s + r q o 9 F q o = c 1 + s π 3 s = π 2 + s + r Nash Nash Nash Nash Nash 2 2 π r π s u r = π r + r π r - π r r = > 0 s = 0 4 = 1 + r π r - r π r π r u s = π s + s π s - π s = 1 + s π s - s π s 5 r s r > 0 s > 0 π r π s π r +π s = π π r +π s = π u r Nash q = 1+ [ 2 2+ F q -w+ c] Nash max u r u s π r π s s t π r + π s = π u r u s > u s π π r = 1 + s π - π r - s π - π r = π 10 1 u r 12 q * 2 u r < 0 q 2 u r q *

3 F q * 2 + w = - c 2 2 = w + 2 t q * u r q * q q * t q * = - t q * < 0 q * w - c q * q * q o 2 12 F q * > F q* F q o 2 + w = c q * < q * 13 c < F qo 3 12 q o < qo F q * - F qo = 2 + w - c > 0 q * <qo 18 q* <qo <qo D ~ N q o 17 = 100 w = 60 c = 30 2 q * = u = F q - w - q c 16 q o = u < 0 q 2 1 q * 1 1 Table 1 The influence of retailer s fairness concerns on the suly chain q * π r q * π s q * π q* u r q * u q*

4 3 Nash 71 1 = = 0 6 w c 1 1 ~ 4 1 Fig 1 The influence of wholesale-rice on the otimal decision w = 30 = c = 0 6 q 0 Fig 2 The influence of retail rice on the otimal decision q o = q * = 975 = 槡 2 3 = Fig 3 The influence of roduct cost on the retailer s otimal decision

5 Fig 4 The influence of roduct cost on the suly s otimal decision 4 Nash 1 Fehr E Schmidt K M A theory of fairness cometition and cooeration J Quarterly Journal of Economics Rabin M Incororating fairness into game theory and economics J American Economic Review Kumar N The ower of trust in manufacturer-retailer relationshis J Harvard Business Review Tversky A Kahneman D S251 - S248 Rational choice and the framing of decisions J Journal of Business Ho W J Fifty years of management science J Management Science Kahneman D Knetsch J L Thaler R Fairness cometition on rofit seeking Entitlements in the market J American E- conomics Review Cui T H Raju J S Zhang Z J Fairness and channel coordination J Management Science Pavlov V Katok E Fairness and coordination failures in suly chain contracts EB /OL PSU working aer 2009 htt / /www ersonal su edu /exk106 /fair_ost df 9 Loch C H Wu Y Z Social references and suly chain erformance An exerimental study J Management Science Ho T H Zhang J J Designing ricing contracts for boundedly rational customers Does the framing of the fixed fee matter J Management Science J Du Shaofu Du Chan Liang Liang et al Suly chain coordination considering fairness concerns J Journal of Management Sciences in China in Chinese 12 Cachon G P Suly Chain Coordination with Contracts M / / de Kok A G Graves S C Handbooks in Oerations Research and Management Science vol 11 Amsterdam Elsevier

6 3 81 Quantity Journal J Sheng Zhaohan Zhang Wei Comutational exeriments in management science and research J Journal of Management Sciences in China in Chinese Exogenous covariate and non-ositive social influence romote grou olarization LI Zhen-eng 1 2 TANG Xi-jin 2 1 Deartment of Statistics School of Mathematics and Comuter Science Dali University Dali China 2 Institute of Systems Science Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing China Abstract Oinion dynamics is one of the imortant asects of crowd s behaviors Collective oinions evolve into different atterns consensus olarization or diversity under the cross-imact of a variety of factors such as mutual influence external intervention etc In this aer three tyes of social influences are discussed from the ersective of social identity and then we add triadic structure into Hofield network model Simulation results verify that exogenous covariate and non-ositive social influence are the main factors to grou olarization Furthermore we show that olarization is coexisting with local structure balance and discover the intrinsic connection between global network stable attern and local structure balance Key words social influence oinion olarization Hofield network social identity structure balance 檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿檿 72 Otimal decision-making for Nash bargaining fairness concerned newsvendor in two-level suly chain DU Shao-fu ZHU Jia-ang GAO Dong DU Chan School of Management University of Science and Technology of China Hefei China Abstract The aer establishes a fairness concern framework based on game theory of Nash bargaining and builds a utility system about fairness concerns On this basis it exands the newsboy model to behavior research Further it illustrates the alication of the model through numerical analysis and investigates the roerties of otimal decision of both the retailer and suly chain by a comarative static analysis Key words Nash bargaining game behavioral oerations fairness concerns newsvendor