Doxography in Plato: Is the new dialectic of the Sophist really new? Allan Wooley 2015

Doxography in Plato: Is the new dialectic of the Sophist really new? Allan Wooley 2015 The thesis of a "new dialectic 1," discussed below appears first in the late dialogues and seems to involve people, particularly pre-socratic philosophers, as absent quasiinterlocutors, whose views are criticized in their absence. This tactic, however, was not new; consider the case of Anaxagoras in the Phaedo (97b) in which Socrates criticizes his views with an allusive aside to Aristophanes' Clouds (99b). Furthermore, the "new dialect" mainly tracks Heraclitus and Parmenides and their mutually contradictory doctrines. In this paper I will trace the dispute of Heraclitus and Parmenides backwards by explicit reference or covert allusion from the "new dialectic" in the Sophist to the earliest appearance of their dispute. Moreover, I will argue that this dispute is the seed bed of Plato's two-world solution 2. ΧΕΝΟΣ. Τούς µὲν τοίνυν διακριβολογουµένους ὄντος τε πέρι καὶ µή, πάντας µὲν οὐ διεληλύθαµεν, ὅµως δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον, ἵν ἐκ πάντων ἴδωµεν ὅτι τὸ ὂν τοῦ µὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτ ἔστιν. ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. Οὐκοῦν πορεύεσθαι χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους. ΧΕ. Καὶ µὴν ἔοικέ γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον γιγαντοµαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀµφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; ΧΕ. Οἱ µὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαµβάνοντες. Τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόµενοι πάντων διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι µόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶµα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόµενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τις φήσει µὴ σῶµα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦτες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας ἄνδρας ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συχνοῖς προσέτυχον. ΧΕ. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρός αὐτοὺς ἀµφισβητοῦντες µάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀµύνονται, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώµατα εἴδη βιαζόµενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώµατα καὶ τὴν λεγοµένην ὑπ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σµικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ οὐσίας φεροµένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν µέσῳ δὲ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀµφοτέρων µάχη τις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ συνέστηκεν. Sophist 245e6-246c3 3 STRANGER: Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier to define the nature of being than that of not-being. THEAETETUS: Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also. 1 Cf. below at footnote 4 on Leslie Brown. 2 Cf. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Plato's Middle Period Metaphysic and Epistemology, section 12. The Epistemology of the Republic: The Two Worlds Doctrine (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platometaphysics/#12) and also C. Rowe, cited in Wooley (2011) 169 & n.8 3 Translations are from the Loeb series unless otherwise noted. 1

STR: And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going among them, because of their disagreement about existence. THE: How so? STR: Some of them drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says than anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own. THE: Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them. STR: Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties. The Gigantomachia continues quite a few pages, during which the opposing views are discussed in detail and examined. Lesley Brown 4 calls it part of Plato s new dialectic, considers it an innovation of Plato s late period, and defines it as the examination of views not of those participating in the conversation, as in the more familiar dialectic of the early or middle dialogues, but of named or unnamed persons whose views are discussed and criticized in their absence, often some time after their death. Plato quotes the leader of the party of the gods just before the quoted passage at 244e, namely Parmenides of Elea, founder of the Eleatic philosophy. This is the philosophic sect and the hometown of the Stranger. The members of the party of the giants are not precisely identified in the Sophist. Julia Annas 5 recognizes Lesley Brown s credentials as a developmentalist interpreter of Plato and her efforts to delineate the late period of Plato s work, as one in which he is treating with new seriousness the questions of the previous thinkers and in which he is coming to see philosophy s task as solving the traditional problems by reviewing past positions, the point from which Aristotle starts. However, Annas prefers the unitarian standpoint 6 and sees this not as a new dialectic but as an attempt to write for different audiences and not a change in method or content at different times. On the unitarian assumption that Plato had the basic lineaments of his philosophic position worked out before he had progressed in writing his dialogues, I want to try to trace back this particular battle or doctrinal contest as far as I can through the developmentalists late, middle, and early periods to see if this was indeed a constant theme in the kaleidoscope of the dialogues. 4 Brown (1998) 182; I do not discuss the other part of the new dialectic, more formal language and technique. 5 Annas (2003) 10. 6 Wooley (2011) 168. 2

In the Sophist there are several issues in contention between the two camps: first, is Being at rest or in motion, and next is it one whole or many parts? The same issues come up in the Theaetetus with the same two camps: ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ µάλ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, ὡς ἄρα ἓν µὲν αὐτὸ καθ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ ἐὰν ὡς µέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σµικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, σύµπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς µηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς µήτε ὁποιουοῦν ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαµεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες ἔστι µὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. Καὶ περὶ τούτου ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρµενίδου συµφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωµῳδίας µὲν Ἐπίχαρµος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅµηρος, ὃς εἰπῶν Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ µητέρα Τηθύν πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως Theaetetus 152d2-e8 I will tell you and it is not a bad description, either, that nothing is one and invariable, and you could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to anything, but if you call it large it will also appear to be small, and light if you call it heavy, and everything else in the same way, since nothing whatever is one, either a particular thing or of a particular quality; but it is out of movement and motion and mixture with one another that all those things become which we wrongly say are wrongly, because nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And on this subject all the philosophers, except Parmenides, may be marshaled in one line Protagoras and Heraclitus and Empedocles and the chief poets in the two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus in comedy, and in tragedy, Homer, who in the line Oceanus the origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother has said that all things are the offspring of flow and motion. And much further into the dialogue the same contention between the same two camps arises again: ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ δὴ πρόβληµα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαµεν παρὰ µὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων µετὰ ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτοµένων τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ῥεύµατα ὄντα τυθχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἕστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων ἅτε σοφωτέρων ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυµένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτόµοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν µάθwσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἠλιθίως οἰόµενοι τὰ µὲν e(στάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, µαθόντες δὲ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιµῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόµην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνoµ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρµενίδαι ἐναντιούµενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διισχυρίζονται, ὡς e(/ν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ e(/στηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται. tούτοις οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόµεθα; kατὰ σµικρὸν γὰρ προιόντες λελήθαµεν ἀµφοτέρων εἰς τὸ µέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν µή πῃ ἀµυνόµενοι διαφύγωµεν, δίκην δώσοµεν w(/σπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις διὰ γραµµῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ ἀµφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἕλκωνται εἰς τἀναντία. dοκεῖ οὖν µοι τοὺς ἑτέρους πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ οὕσπερ ὡρµήσαµεν, τοὺς 3

ῥέοντας, καὶ ἐὰν µέν τι φαίνωνται λέγοντες, συνέλξοµεν µετ αὐτῶν ἡµᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν πειρώµενοι ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται ἀληθέστερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόµεqα παρ αὐτοὺς ἀπ αὖ τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀµφότεροι δ ἂν φανῶσι µηδὲν µέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόµεθα ἡγούµενοι ἡµᾶς µὲν τὶ λe/geιν φαύλους ὄντας, παµπαλαίους δὲ καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιµακότες. ὅρα οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προιέναι κίνδυνον. Theaetetus 180c7-181b5 Now as for the problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their meaning from the multitude by their poetry, that the origin of all things is Oceanus and Tethys, flowing streams, and that nothing is at rest; and likewise from the moderns, who, since they are wiser, declare their meaning openly, in order that even cobblers may hear and know their wisdom and may cease from the silly belief that some things are at rest and others in motion, and, after learning that everything is in motion, may honor their teachers? But, Theodorus, I almost forgot that others teach the opposite of this, So that it is motionless, then name of which is the All, and all the other doctrines maintained by Melissus and Parmenides and the rest, in opposition to all these; they maintain that everything is one and is stationary within itself, having no place in which to move. What shall we do with all these people, my friend? For, advancing little by little, we have unwittingly fallen between the two parties, and, unless we protect ourselves and escape somehow, we shall pay the penalty, like those in the palaestra, who in playing on the line are caught by both sides and dragged in opposite directions. I think, then, we had better examine first the one party, those whom we originally set out to join, the flowing ones, and if we find their arguments sound, we will help them to pull us over, trying thus to escape the others; but if we find that the partisans of the whole seem to have truer doctrines, we will take refuge with them from those who would move what is motionless. But if we find that neither party has anything reasonable to say, we shall be ridiculous if we think that we, who are of no account, can say anything worth while after having rejected the doctrines of very ancient and very wise men, Therefore, Theodorus, see whether it is desirable to go forward into so great a danger. These two passages from the Theaetetus are encapsulated in a recessed panel structure beginning with a discussion about defining knowledge and then about Socrates midwifery and then the first doxographic passage, then consideration of Protagoras homo mensura, and in the middle the apparent digression about a philosopher in a courtroom like a fish out of water. And then we climb back out of the recess panel: homo mensura, our second doxographic passage, Socrates midwifery, and finally a second definition of knowledge 7. Socrates, Theodorus, and Theaetetus continue their discussion but do not clearly or explicitly choose one side over the other nor do they solve the riddle of the opposing doctrines. That is left for the Sophist, if it is indeed later than the Theaetetus. More about that later; for now we should continue to excavate the possibly 7 White (1976) 159-60 who points out the difficulty of understanding the organization of the various themes in this part of the Theaetetus. He also stresses how the Protagorean theme connects this dialogue to the Cratylus. 4

earlier layers of Plato s dialogues in an order picked for its convenience: Parmenides, Cratylus, Phaedrus, Republic, and so on 8. Μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρµενίδη, ὅτι.. σὺ µὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήµασιν ἓν φῂς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκµήρια παρέχῃ καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ... Ναί, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, ὦ Σώκρατες. Σὺ δ οu}ν τὴν ἀλh/θειαν τοῦ γράµµατος οὐ πανταχοῦ ᾔσθησαι... ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράµµα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταὐτὰ καὶ πλείw, τοῦτο βουλόµενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν h( ὔπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά e)/στιν ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἴκανῶς ἐπεξίοι. Parmenides 128a3-d I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that.. you, indeed, in your poems, say that the all is one, and you furnish proofs of this in fine and excellent fashion; Yes, Socrates, said Zeno, but you have not perceived all aspects of the truth about my writings... Now this treatise opposes the advocates of the many and gives them back their ridicule with interest, for its purpose is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one. Parmenides is obviously the advocate of the hypothesis that the All is one, which Zeno defends against the advocates of the Many, who are probably the followers of Heraclitus. A little later Socrates goes on, including other issues from the dispute found in the Sophist and Theaetetus: ἑὰν δέ τις ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρῶτον µὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ αὑτὰ τὰ εἴδη, οἷον ὁµοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνοµοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πα/ντα τὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα ἐν e(αυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάµενα συγκeράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίµην ἂν ἔγωγ, ἔφη, θαυµαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων. Parmenides 129d6-e4 If, however, as 9 I was saying just now, he first distinguishes the abstract ideas, such as likeness and unlikeness, multitude and unity, rest and motion, and the like, and then shows that they can be mingled and separated, I should, he said, be filled with amazement, Zeno. Next we will turn to a dialogue that mainly features Heraclitus, the Cratylus: 8 The order is convenient and not based on stylometry or some developmental scheme, although on the basis of stylometry Brandwood (1992) 114-115 puts all but the Cratylus more or less in this order, and Kahn (1996) 47-48 lists the order as Cratylus (end of group I), Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides, Theaetetus (group II). White (1976) 148 n.1 argues, as noted above, for the late composition of the Cratylus just prior to the Theaetetus and after the Phaedrus. As Kahn (2003) 46 points out stylometry is independent of developmental or unitarian schemes of interpretation and does not coincide with the socalled developmental stages of Plato s philosophic development. 9 Reading ὃ with Simplicius instead of ὦν with mss B & T: some one of those whom I just mentioned 5

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἷον καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὃ ἡµεῖς «οὐσίαν» 10 καλοῦµεν, εἰσὶν οἳ «ἐσσίαν» καlοῦσιν, οἳ δ αὖ «w)σίαν.» πρῶτον µὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνοµα τούτων ἡ τῶν πραγµάτων οὐσία «Ἑστία» καλεῖσθαι ἔχει λόγον, καὶ ὅτι γe αὖ ἡµεῖς τὸ τῆς οὐσίας µετέχον «ἔστιν» φαµέν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖτο «Ἑστία» ἐοίκαµεν γὰρ καὶ ἡµεῖς τὸ παλαιὸν «ἐσσίαν» καλεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν... ὅσοι δ αὖ «ὠσίαν,» σχεδόν τι αὖ ου{τοι καθ Ἡράκλειτον ἂν ἡγοῖντο τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα καὶ µε/νειν οὐδέν τὸ οὖν αἴτιον καὶ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ὠθοῦν, ὅθεν δὴ καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτὸ «w)σίαν» ὠνοµάσθαι.... Λέγeι που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι «πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν µένει,» καὶ ποταµοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς «δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταµὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐµβαίης.» Cratylus 401c2-402a10 Soc: Take, for instance, that which we call ousia (reality, essence); some people call it essia, and still others ossia. First, then, in connexion with the second of these forms, it is reasonable that the essence of things be called Hestia; and moreover, because we ourselves say of that which partakes of reality it is (estin), the name Hestia would be correct in this connexion also; for apparently we also called ousia (reality) essia in ancient times... Those on the other hand, who say osia would agree well enough with Heracleitus that all things move and nothing remains still. So they would say the cause and ruler of things was the pushing power (othoun), wherefore it had been rightly named osia. Heracleitus says, you know, that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream. Here also Socrates claims that the poets, Homer, Hesiod, and Orpheus all agree with Heraclitus. Later the other side is described and although it remains unnamed, it is obviously Eleatic: ΣΩ. Σκοπῶµεν δὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον µὲν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνοµα, τὴν «ἐπιστήµην,» ὡς ἀµφίβολον ἐστι, καὶ µᾶλλον ἔοικε σηµαίνοntι ὄτι ἵστησιν ἡµῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγµασι τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι συµπεριφέρεται, καὶ ὀρθότερόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ νῦν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγειν µᾶλλον ἢ ἐµβάλλοντας τὸ εἶ «ἐπειστήµην,» ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐµβολὴν ποιήσασθαι ἀντὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ εἶ ἐν τῷ ἰῶτα. ἔπειτα τὸ «βέβαιον,» ὅτι βάσεώς τινός ἐστιν καὶ στάσεως µίµηµα ἀλλ οὐ φορᾶς. ἔπειτα ἡ «ἱστορία» αὐτό που σηµαίνει ὅτι ἵστησι τὸν ῥοῦν. kαὶ τὸ «πιστὸν» ἱστὰν παντάπασι σηµαίνει. ἔπειτα δὲ ἡ «µνήµη» παντί που µηνύει ὅτι µονή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀλλ οὐ φορά... οἶµαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πόλλ ἄν τις εὕροι εἰ πραγµατεύοιτο, ἐξ ὧν οἰηθείη ἂν αὖ πάλιν τὸν τὰ ὀνόµατα τιθέµενον οὐχὶ ἰόντα οὐδὲ φερόµενα ἀλλὰ µένοντα τὰ πράγµατα σηµαίνειν. Cratylus 437a2-c8 Soc: Let us first take up again the word episteme (knowledge) and see how ambiguous it is, seeming to indicate that it makes our soul stand still (histesin) at things, rather than that it is carried round with them, so it is better to speak the beginning of it as we now do than to insert the epsilon and say epeisteme; we should insert an iota rather than an 10 the double brackets << >> stand for double apostrophes " ". 6

epsilon. Then take bebaion (firm), which expresses position and rest, not motion. And historia (inquiry) means much the same, that it stops (histesi) the flow. And piston (faithful) most certainly means that which stops (histan) motion. Then again, anyone can see that mneme (memory) expresses rest (mone) in the soul, not motion... And I think we could, if we took pains, find many other words which would lead us to reverse our judgment and believe that the giver of names meant that things were not in progress or in motion, but were at rest. From this point not every references is as specific or connected as closely to the philosophic conflict, and Heraclitus or Parmenides are not named as much in that specific context. Next comes the Phaedrus: ΣΩ. Τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαµήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσµεν τέχνῃ, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅµοια καὶ ἀνόµοια, καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά, µένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόµενα; Phaedrus 261d6-8 Soc: Do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno) has such an art of speaking that the same things appear to his hearers to be alike and unalike, one and many, stationary and in motion? Here we can see that Plato is being more circumspect about explicit doxography, referring to Zeno with a riddling allusion which will become more familiar in Hellenisitic technopaegnia; the content is also more riddling here than it is the Parmenides, for instance. The next reference is even more recondite, although it is specifically to the conflict, but to the conflict presented not as an ontological or epistemological conflict, but as a ethical and psychological one based on a possible conflict of the senses and emotions versus reason, and the struggle between pleasure versus virtue, two conflicts central to the Republic's arguments: ΣΩ. προσείπωµεν δὲ αὐτῇ, µὴ καί τινα σκληρότητα ἡµῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῷ, ὅτι παλαιὰ µέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ Republic 607b3-6 SOC: And let us further say to her [poetry], lest she condemn us for harshness and rusticity, that there is from of old a quarrel between philosophy and poetry. Just before this statement (605c-d) Plato has explained the cause for the quarrel; poetry stirs up the soul with emotions, while philosophic men prided themselves in enduring with quiet calm. This theme is stated succinctly a little earlier: ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ µὲν πολλὴν µίµησιν καὶ ποικίλην ἔχει, τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν, τὸ δὲ φρόνιµόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος, παραπλήσιον ὂν ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον µιµήσασθαι οὔτε µιµουµένου εὐπετὲς καταµαθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πανhγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς θέατρα συλλεγοµένοις. 7

Republic 604e1-5 SOC: And does not the fretful part of us present many and varied occasions for imitation, while the intelligent and temperate disposition, always remaining approximately the same, is neither easy to imitate nor to be understood when imitated, especially by a nondescript mob assembled in the theatre. This theme started far back in the Republic, contrasting the steadfast unchanging rational soul with the manifold various desires, appetites, pleasures, or opinions that cause the irrational soul to wander, move about and change constantly 11. This description certainly portrays the soul governed by sensation and emotion as Heraclitean, while the soul governed by reason as Parmenidean, without, of course, so labeling or classifying them. Later on at 612a the soul is compared to the sea god Glaucus whose form is so broken and encrusted with barnacles and such that it certainly does not seem akin to the divine, and none can tell whether it is manifold of parts or one single and simple unity. Obviously the theme of One vs. Many plays a large role in the Republic as Plato works to have the parts of the state or soul cohere into one unity. In one place in the Symposium Plato lays out the doxographic conflict between Heraclitus and Parmenides, but without using their names directly 12 and using surrogates for Being or What Is (i.e. mortal body & soul vs. divine). ἡ θνητὴ φύσις ζητεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀεί τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατος. δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ µόνον, τῇ γενέσει, ὅτι ἀεὶ καταλείπει ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ,.. οὗτος µέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αu(τῷ ὅµως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος ἀεὶ γιγνόµενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς, καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ αἷµα καὶ σύµπαν τὸ σῶµα. καί µὴ ὅτι καtὰ τὸ σῶµα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἤθη, δόξαι, ἐπιθυµίαι, ἡδοναί, λῦπαι, φόβοι, τούτων ἕκαστα οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἑκα/στῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ µὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται... τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σῴζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπιὸν καὶ παλαιούµενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἶον αὐτὸ ἦν. Symposium 207d1-208b2 mortal nature ever seeks, as best it can, to be immortal. In one way only can it succeed, and that is by generation; since so it can always leave behind it a new creature in place of the old... yet though he is called the same he does not at any time possess the same properties; he is continually becoming a new person, and there are things also which he 11 E.g., 395c: guardians are to imitate only the good (men, habits, etc.) in word and deed, while men of opposite birth imitate everything, and 585c-586a: philosophic souls imitate only that which is real and is ever like itself, while the souls of the many who.. are ever devoted to feastings and that sort off thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam to and fro throughout their lives, 12 Plato does mention by name Parmenides at Symp. 178b and 195c and Heraclitus at 187a, but incidently and not in reference to their metaphysical conflict. 8

loses, as appears by his hair, his flesh, his bones, and his blood and body altogether. And observe that not only in his body but in his soul besides we find none of his manners or habits, his opinions, desires, pleasures, pains or fears, ever abiding the same in his particular self; some things grow in him, while others perish... Every mortal thing is preserved in this way; not by keeping it exactly the same forever, like the divine, but by replacing what goes off or is antiquated with something fresh. Perhaps a little before this Plato wrote the Phaedo in which he clearly combines the schema of his dialectical method of definition and the promulgation of his theory of the Forms in another of his pet projects, here in the Phaedo s second proof of immortality. This conversation is indirectly reported between Socrates and Cebes: Οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα µάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀσύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ ἄλλως καὶ µηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα; Ἔµοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἴωµεν δή, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐφ ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔµπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἤ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδοµεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καῖ ἀποκρινόµενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν, τὸ ὄν, µή ποτε µεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκaστον ὃ ἔστι, µονοειδὲς ὂν αὐτὸ καθ αὑτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαµῇ οὐδαµῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεµίαν ἐνδέχεται; Ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν], οi{ον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἱµατίων ἢ ἄλλων ὡντιnωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων [ἢ καλῶν] ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁµωνύµων; ἆρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδαµῶς κατὰ ταὐτά; Οὕτως αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ταῦτα οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν τούτων µὲν κἂν ἅψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισµῷ, ἀλλ ἔστιν ἀιδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁrατά; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Θῶµεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, τὰ µὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀιδές; Θῶµεν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ µὲν ἀιδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν µηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶµεν. Φέρε δή, ἦ δ ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡµῶν αὐτῶν τὸ µὲν σῶµά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁµοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαµὲν ἂν εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον τὸ σῶµα; Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀιδές; Οὐχ ὑπ ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη. Phaedo 78c6-79b8 9

Then it is most probable that things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the things that are changing and never the same are the composite things? Yes, I think so. Let us then, said he, turn to what we were discussing before. Is the absolute essence, which we in our dialectic process of question and answer call true being, always the same or is it liable to change? Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute existence, true being do they ever admit of any change whatsoever? Or does each absolute essence, since it is uniform and exists by itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change? It must, said Cebes, necessarily remain the same, Socrates. But how about the many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like? Are they always the same? Or are they, in direct opposition to the essences, constantly changing in themselves, unlike each other, and, so to speak, never the same? The latter, said Cebes, they are never the same. And, you can see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are always the same can be grasped only by reason, and are invisible and not to be seen? Certainly, said he, that is true. Now, said he, shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, and the other invisible? Let us assume them, said Cebes, And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing? Let us assume that also, said he. Well then, said Socrates, are we not made up of two parts, body and soul? Yes, her replied. Now to which class should we say the body is more similar and more closely akin? To the visible, he said; that is clear to everyone. And the soul? Is it visible or invisible? Invisible, to man, at least, Socrates. Here we see a fully explicit implementation of the two worlds view, but still without explicit acknowledgement of its connection to the Heraclitean-Parmenidean conflict. In the Meno we can see something at least one layer in our intellectual archeology closer to the origin of Plato's development of both method and content out of the pre-socratic Gigantomachia: ΣΩ. Πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ µίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σµῆνός τι ἀνηύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κείµενον.... Εἰ οὖν εἶπον µετὰ ταῦτα «Τοῦτο τοίνυν µοι αὐτὸ εἶπέ, ὦ Μένων ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι, τί τοῦτο φῂς εἶναι;» εἶχες δήπου ἄν τί µοι εἰπεῖν; ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν δι ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν 10

ἀποκρινόµενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀρετή ἢ οὐ µανθάνεις ὅτι λέγω; ΜΕΝ. οκῶ γέ µοι µανθάνειν Meno 72a6-d2 SOC: I seem to be in a most lucky way, Meno; for in seeking one virtue I have discovered a whole swarm of virtues there in your keeping. And if I went on to say: Well now, there is this that I want you to tell me, Meno: what do you call the quality by which they do not differ, but are all alike? You could find me an answer, I presume? MEN: I could. SOC: And likewise also with the virtues, however many and various they may be, they all have one common character whereby they are virtues, and on which one would of course be wise to keep an eye when one is giving a definite answer to the question what virtue really is. You take my meaning, do you not? MEN: My impression is that I do; The Euthyphro offers another step closer to the origin of the Socratic method from the Heraclitean and Parmenidean conflict: ΣΩ. nυνὶ δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι σε ἠρόµην πεῖρω σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν. Οὐ γάρ µε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ πρότερον ἱκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτήσαντα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ εἴη, ἀλλά µοι εἶπες ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅσιον ὂν ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπεξιὼν τῷ πατρί. ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ φῂς εἶναι o(/σια. ΕΥΘ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Μέµνησαι οὖν ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελευόµην, ἕν τι ἢ δύο µε διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ o(/sia ὅσιά ἐστιν; ἔφησθα γάρ που µιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια ἢ οὐ µνηµονεύεις; ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ταύτην τοίνυν µε αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώµενος αὐτῇ παραδείγµατι, ὂ µὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον h } w{ a)\n ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὂ δ ἂν µὴ τοιοῦτον, µὴ φῶ. Euthyphro 6c9-e6 SOC: At present try to tell more clearly what I asked you just now. For, my friend, you did not give me sufficient information before, when I asked what holiness was, but you told me that this was holy which you were now doing, prosecuting your father for murder. EUTH: Well, what I said was true, Socrates. SOC: Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, you say that many other things are holy, do you not? EUTH: Why, so they are. SOC: Now call to mind that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many holy acts, but to tell the essential aspect, by which all holy acts are holy; for you 11

said that all unholy acts were unholy and all holy acts holy by one aspect. Or don t you remember? EUTH: I remember. SOC: Tell me then what this aspect is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else does, agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy. At the end of the dialogue Plato moves from the opposition of the One and the Many to that of Rest and Motion, making a mockery of Euthyphro s name which means straightthinker. ΣΩ. Θαυµάσῃ οὖν ταῦτα λέγων ἐάν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται µὴ µένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐµὲ αἰτιάσῃ τὸν αίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολύ γε τεχνικώτερος τοῦ αιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡµῖν περιελθῶν πάλιν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἥκει;... παντὶ τρόπῳ προσσχὼν τὸν νοῦν ὅτι µάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ τὴν ὰλήθειαν οἶσθα γὰρ εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεὺς πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς... εἰπὲ οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρων, καὶ µὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἡγῇ. ΕΥΘ. Εἰς αὖθις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καί µοι ὥρα ἀπιέναι. Euthyphro 15b7-e4 SOC: Then will you be surprised, since you say this, if your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you are yourself much more skilful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started? by all means apply your mind now to the utmost and tell me the truth; for you know, if any one does, and like Proteus, you must be held until you speak... So tell me, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal your thought. EUTH: Some other time, Socrates. Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go. Although Plato does not explicitly describe Socrates as at rest or unmoving, he is the one left standing when Euthyphro rushes off. Elsewhere Plato uses the notion of the interlocutor being in motion, while Socrates is stationary in a physical and geographical sense as well as in a figurative sense about consistency in argument. In Hippias Maior 281a-b Hippias describes himself as a world traveler, and in the Hippias Minor 370e Socrates claims that Hippias is imitating Odysseus primarily in his involuntary deceptiveness, but also in his wandering (πλανᾶσθαι), a word that is used often and pointedly at the end of the dialogue. Here Plato does not point out explicitly that Socrates is a stay-at-home, and in regard to the argument Plato has Socrates claim with his customary irony that he has gone astray. It is in the Crito that we learn that Socrates was a stay-at-home; at 52b and at 53a Socrates admits that he left Athens only when required to on military campaigns. This home-bound Socrates is then contrasted in 53b ff. to Socrates the imaginary wandering exile going from city to city and ending up in Thessaly and other lawless places. 12

οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήµεις εἰ µή σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκεν, καὶ οὔτ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, ὅτι µῆ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἰσθµόν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαµόσε, εἰ µή ποι στρατευσόµενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδηµίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ ἐπιθυµία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόµων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡµεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦµεν καὶ ἡ ἡµετέρα πόλις Crito 52b2-c1 For you would never have stayed in it (Athens) more than all other Athenians if you had not been better pleased with it than they; you never went out from the city to a festival, or anywhere else, except on military service, and you never made any other journey, as other people do, and you had no wish to know any other city or other laws, but you were contented with us and our city. αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον µὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε εὐνοµοῦνται γὰρ ἀµφότεραι πολέµιος ἥξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ,.. ἀλλ ἐκ µὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἤξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος; ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, Crito 53b3-d4 And you yourself, if you go to one of the nearest cities, to Thebes or Megara for both are well governed will go as an enemy, Socrates, to their government,.. Or you will keep away from these places and go to Crito s friends in Thessaly; for there great disorder and lawlessness prevail, But this is not all that is in the Crito to connect this to the conflict of Heraclitus and Parmenides. There is this mentioned allusion to their conflict about motion and rest occurs in the second half of the Crito; in the first half we have the conflict of the One versus the Many which starts out as the Few versus the Many: ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡµῖν, ὦ µακάριε Κρίτων, ὅυτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης µέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν µᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὔτω πεπρᾶχθαι ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῇ. Crito 44c6-9 SOC: But, my dear Crito, why do we care so much for what most people think? For the most reasonable men, whose opinion is more worth considering, will think that things were done as they really will be done. ΣΩ. γυµναζόµενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς µόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν 13

ΚΡ. Ἑνὸς µόνου. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου ἀλλὰ µὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν. ΚΡ. ῆλα δή. ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυµναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ᾗ ἂν ἑνὶ δοκῇ, τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι, µᾶλλον ἢ ᾗ σύµπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις. Crito 47a13-b11 SOC: If a man is an athlete and makes that his business, does he pay attention to every man s praise and blame and opinion or to those of one man only who is a physician or a trainer? CRIT: To those of one man only. SOC: Then ought he to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man and not of the multitude? CRIT: Obviously. SOC: And must he act and exercise and eat and drink as the one man who is his director and who knows the business thinks best rather than as all the others think. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλττιστε, πάνυ ἡµῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡµᾶς, ἀλλ ὅτι ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. Crito 48a5-7 SOC: Then, most excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say of us, but what he who knows about right and wrong, the one man, and truth herself will say. ΣΩ. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισι\ταῦτα καὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς µή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ὰλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν ὁρῶντας ἀλλήλων τὰ βουλεύµατα. Crito 49d2-5 For I know that there are few who will believe or ever will believe this. Now those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another. It is important to note that this last passage connects directly with the preceding one in the context of the discussion. The contrary opinions in the previous passage are whether it is never right to do wrong or whether one should help one s friends and harm one s enemies. It is between these two groups that there is no common ground. The one opinion is that of the Many, while the other is that of the one expert and of Truth herself. 14

Of course, this is a conflict of ethical positions, not a conflict about the conception of reality as that between Heraclitus and Parmenides as outlined in Plato s later dialogues, but the opposition of One and Many before and that of Rest and Motion after might suggest that Plato wants to give this ethical dilemma the prominence of the great pre- Socratic one. But so far I have not been able to produce a smoking gun; however there might be one, if we remember that Plato was not averse to word games and cryptic allusions. Early in the dialogue (44a) Socrates relates a dream in which a beautiful and fair women robed in white meets him with good news for his future travels. His situation is somewhat reminiscent of Parmenides in his poem fragment #1 ἔνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἤµατός εἰσι κελεύθων,.. καὶ µε θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο,.. χαῖρ, ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε µοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεµπε νέεσθαι τήνδ ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστιν), ἀλλὰ θέµις τε δίκη τε. xρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ἠµὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκέος ἀτρεµὲς ἦτορ ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. DK B1.11/22/26-30 There are the gates of the paths of Night and Day,.. And the goddess greeted me kindly,.. Greetings. No ill fate has sent you to travel this road far indeed does it lie from the steps of men but right and justice. It is proper that you should learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth, and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliance. 13 His poem had two parts, the first of which dealt with truth, and the second dealt with the opinions of mortals; Parmenides claimed and argued that they were separate, incompatible, and irreconcilable, very much like the two moral positions that have no common ground in Plato, and apparently for the same reasons. Plato s reference to Truth herself as his guide at 48a7 (vide supra) may well be an allusion to Parmenides and his implicit influence. My contention would be stronger if there were also a paired reference to Heraclitus. And there might be. Shortly after the reference to Truth herself at 48c6 Socrates says that Crito should not bring up the arguments of the mob who quickly kill men and then, if they could, would resurrect them without any sense (οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῷ). This phrase recalls Aristophanes Clouds 580 and Heraclitus fragments 2 and 114 DK 14, another scholar points to the structure of the Crito with the first half as Logos, followed by the second half as Nomos, interpreted as a large allusion to Heraclitus 15. 13 translation from Kirk et al. (1983) 243 14 Pritzl (1999) 69-70. 15 Polansky (1997) 52, note 7. Also cf. Bolton (1998) 104-5 who sees this distinction of Truth and Opinion in the Timaeus as recalling the two parts of Parmenides poem. 15

To briefly recap my argument, from the time of the Crito at least Plato considered the great pre-socratic dispute between the Heracliteans and Eleatics as basic for his own thought, both in respect to developing philosophic method that led through the One and the Many to the notion of a conceptual definition which became one of the bases for the theory of Ideas, and in respect to the content of his thought, in particular his "two worlds" view as a resolution of the problem, a resolution that he first explicitly expressed perhaps in the Phaedo, but not in dialogues written before that. Apparently he was worried that without adequate preparation in propaedeutic dialogues, his resolution of the pre-socratic philosophical dilemma would not be understood well enough to be accepted and would be side-lined because of that. Accordingly, my answer to the titular question whether the new dialectic of the Sophist is really new is that it is new only in making the doxography more explicit. Pace Brown, Plato from very early on commented on the thoughts of the participants in this great pre- Socratic debate and on the debate itself through surrogates and allusion. Works Cited Annas, Julia. 2003. What are Plato s Middle Dialogues in the Middle Of? in New Perspectives in Plato, Modern and Ancient, edd. J. Annas & C. Rowe, 1-23. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bolton, Robert. 1998, Plato s Discovery of Metaphysics, In Method in Ancient Philosophy. Ed. Gentzler, Jyl. 91-111. Oxford: Claredon Press. Brandwood, Leonard. 1992. Stylometry and Chronology, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. R. Kraut, 90-120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, Lesley. 1998. Innovation and Continuity: The Battle of Gods and Giants, Sophist 245-249, in Method in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Jyl Gentzler, 181-207. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kahn, Charles. 1998. Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kahn, Charles. 2003. On Platonic Chronology, in New Perspectives in Plato, Modern and Ancient, edd. J. Annas & C. Rowe, 93-127. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Kirk, G.S.,Raven, J.E., Schofield,M.. 1983. The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Polansky, Roland. 1997, The unity of Plato's Crito, Scholia 6, 49-67. 16

Pritzl, Kurt. 1999, The Significance of Some Structural Features of Plato's Crito. In Plato and Platonism, ed JM van Ophuijsen, 60-83. Cath UofAP. White, Nicholas P. 1976. Plato on Knowledge and Reality. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Wooley, Allan. 2011. The Apology as Manifesto? Exploring the Unitarian Hypothesis. NECJ 38.3, 167-180. 17