External Governance Circumstance and Creditor GovernanceEfficiency of Chinese Listed Companies WANG Zhen- jie 1, SHEN Wei- tao 2

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1 Joumal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University Mar Vol.34 No F832.4 [ ] A [ ] External Governance Circumstance and Creditor GovernanceEfficiency of Chinese Listed Companies WANG Zhen- jie 1, SHEN Wei- tao 2 1.College of Management, Ocean University of China, Qingdao ; 2.School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen , China Abstract Using a simultaneous equations model this article analyzes the impact of external governance environment on creditor governance efficiency which provides further discussion of the reason for the systematic risk in banking markets and the agency problems of listed companies. There is overinvestment and expropriation behavior in Chinese listed companies which is induced by low creditor governance efficiency under government intervention. In the region with low government intervention, the creditor governance mechanism become more efficient in long term debt which is especially prominent in SOEs, but some listed companies makes use of short term debt to pursue overinvestment and expropriation in turn which poses a new challenge to creditor governance. Key Words creditor governance efficiency; external governance environment ; overinvestment; interest expropriation 50% 40% IPO YJC

2 Fama 1985 Myers 1989 James 1987 Jensen Meckling 1976 Myers 1977 Black Sufi 2007 Tung 2009 Roberts Sufi Nini % 1. Billett 2007 Nini %~20% 1996~

3 CEO ÁÂÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÁÇÇÁÂÃÅÆÇÈÉÇ!"Å#$%ÇÇ 2.!" Faccio 2001 )* +,-./ # Boubakri Ghouma 2010 $%& $%( 1 1. La Porta 1998 Safavian Sharma

4 CCER Wind resset 5 stata I =α 1 +α 2 ATUN +α 3 ND +α 4 SD +α 5 Cash +α 6 APD + α 7 Age+α 8 TobinQ+α 9 LR+α 10 Z ND=β 1 +β 2 ATUN+β 3 AI+β 4 APD+β 5 PDVAR+β 6 U- nique+β 7 PPE+β 8 MB+β 9 LR+β 10 Z TUN =θ 1 AI +θ 2 ND +θ 3 SD +θ 4 Age +θ 5 Cash +θ 6 EM + θ 7 RPT+θ 8 LR+θ 9 Z McCabe 1979 ND ND ND Person ND ND ND Person 4 Q Age 2006 LR Z 2001~2006 A 90% 10% RPT EM 101

5 OLS Tun McCabe 1979 APD ND PDVAR PPE MB N 赞 D=β 1 +β 2 TUN+β 3 AI+β 4 APD+β 5 PDVAR+β 6 Unique Unique +β 7 PPE+β 8 MB+β 9 LR+β 10 Z+ε 1 1 TU 赞 N=θ 1 +θ 2 AI+θ 3 ND+θ 4 SD+θ 5 AGE+θ 6 Cash+θ 7 EM+ θ t 8 RPT+θ 9 LR+θ 10 Z+ε 2 t-1 I = restricted model unrestricted model + + AI - / restricted model b ND unrestricted model a ATUN - / SD ND H 0 :j 1 =k 1 =0 F / ND TUN TUN exclusion restrictions 2004 q 2 k ATUN 12 Size a: Tobin Q Tobin Q= TobinQ Q * + * I =α 1 +α 2 ATUN +α 3 ND +α 4 SD +α 5 Cash +α 6 APD + + / Lang 1991 α 7 AGE+α 8 TobinQ+α 9 LR+α 10 Z+α 11 TU 赞 N+α 12 N 赞 D+ε CF= Cash b: + / I =α 1 +α 2 ATUN +α 3 ND +α 4 SD +α 5 Cash +α 6 APD + Age t α 7 AGE+α 8 TobinQ+α 9 LR+α 10 Z+ε [ + / APD 2 OLS ] [ + / R 2 F R-square form of the F statis- PDVAR ] tics LR / 2 2 RPT = * R F = ur-r r /q = / R / ur - RPT * - =41.06>F = F F F>F ND ATUN EM 0 1% 6% 7% 1 ND TUN 0 I PPE + / Unique / Pearson - + MB / Hausman 102

6 2 2 T Z T Mann- Whitney U SD ND I ** *** T 0.07 TUN 2.91 *** ** T AI 2.09 ** ATUN *** *** 0.06 *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 3 VS VS T Z T Z SD ND I ** ** *** TUN *** ** AI ** ** ATUN *** *** *** *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 4 1b 2b 3b ATUN AI 2b AI 1% 1b ATUN AI ATUN AI 10% 3b 1 1 1a 4 1b 2SLS 1c 2a 2b 2c 3a 3b 3c I ND TUN I ND TUN I ND TUN ATUN ** *** ND *** *** *** *** * SD TobinQ *** *** Cash ** *** ** 103

7 4 APD *** ** * Age *** *** * LR *** ** *** ** ** Z * *** ** ** *** * ** * AI * *** *** ** ** PDVAR *** Unique ** ** PPE ** *** *** MB RPT 3.73E E EM Const *** *** *** *** *** * RMSE Chi P *** Stata10.0 reg3 ** * 1% 5% 10% 5 4b 5b 6b 2 5b ATUN 10% AI 4b AI ATUN 6b ATUN 1% AI 2 4a 5 4b 2SLS 4c 5a 5b 5c 6a 6b 6c I ND TUN I ND TUN I ND TUN ATUN *** *** * *** *** ND *** SD *** *** *** *** ** ** TobinQ Cash *** *** APD ** *** ** Age * ** ** LR ** *** *** Z *** *** *** AI *** * *** PDVAR Unique *** * *** PPE *** MB *** *** RPT EM Const *** ** ** RMSE Chi P a 2a 3a 1c 2c 3c 104

8 1a 1c ND 1% SD 3 ND 2a 2c 1% SD 7 ND SD 3a 3c a 5a 6a 4c 5c 6c 4a 4c 10% ND SD 1% 9 NDt SDt ND SD ND 4 SD ND 5a 5c 1% SD 1% ND SD 1% 6a 6c Cleary

9 3 GDP GDP GDP CSMAR resset 6 Hovakimian A. G. Hovakimian G I I Richardson 2006 Richardson ROE EPS CROA TE CGS AT RT GMBI GMBP GOCF PMBI PCA 106

10 8 1 Baird, Douglas G,Robert K. Rasmussen. Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance J.University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2006,154: Billett, Matthew T, Tao- Hsien Dolly King, David C. Mauer. Growth Opportunities and the Choice of Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Covenants J.Journal of Finance,2007,62: Black, Fischer.Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market J.Journal of Financial Economics, 1975, 2: Cleary.S. The relationship between firm investment and financial status J. Journal of Finance,1999, 54: Faccio, Larry H.P. Lang and Leslie Young. Dividends and Expropriation J.American Economic Review, 2001: Jensen, M, and W. Meckling.Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure J. Journal of Financial Economics, : La Porta,R,Lopez- de- Silanes,F,Shleifer,A,Vishny,R.Law and finance J.Journal of Political Economy, : McCabe, G. M, The empirical relationship between investment and financing: a new look J. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, : Mehnaz Safavian, Siddharth Sharma, When do creditor rights work J. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2007,35: Myers, S. C. Determinants of corporate borrowing J.Journal of Financial Economics, : Narjess Boubakri,Hatem Ghouma.Control/ownership structure,creditor rights protection,and the cost of debt financing: International evidence J.Journal of Banking & Finance 2010,34: Nini, Greg, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi. Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy J.Journal of Financial Economics, 2009,92: Nini Greg, David C. Smith, Amir Sufi. Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance,and Firm Value R. working paper, Roberts, Michael R, Amir Sufi. Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements J.Journal of Financial Economics,2009, 93: Sufi, Amir. Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans J.Journal of Finance,2007, 62: Tung, Frederick,Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance J.UCLA Law Review,2009, 57: J J NLOAN = - / SLOAN = - / 19. J : : J J : J : J

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