( ) ,,, , Krugman (1993), (Henderson Becker,1998), (Lin et al. 1996),

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1 : ( ) :,, ( ) ( ),,,,,,,, :,, ;,, Krugman (1993),, ( ), (Henderson Becker,1998),,,,,,,,,,,, (Lin et al. 1996),,,, , 200,,,,, 80,, , 3 64

2 2003 6,,,,,,,,,,,, (,2001),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, : (1),,,,,,,, ; (2), ; (3), :,,,,,,,,,,,, 1 a, 65

3 : ( ),,,,,,,,,,, 1 a E 1,,,,,,, ( 1 b) (Cai et al. 1999),, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 2001, 10 1, 2,, 1958,,,, 66

4 2003 6,, 2,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,, (Marshall, 1890), Mills (1967), (CBD),,, CBD CBD, Henderson(1974),,,,,,,,,, : U = u i i (1),, u i = u i ( m i ) (2), :,,, : m i = m i ( f i, s i ) (3), : s. t. f i = 1 F( P, K) P 67

5 : s i = 1 S ( R) (4) P,, P, K ;, R,, 5 SΠ5 R > 0,,,,, 1, (4) : f i = F(, k) (5) k, : dm i dp = 5 m i 5 F 5 F 5 P + 5 m i 5 P, dm i ΠdP > 0,, :, dm i ΠdP,,,, (5), (6) 5 m i 5 F 5 F = 0 (6) 5 P 5 m i 5 P = 1 p 5 S 5 P - 1 P 2 S (6) 5 m i (7) (7) : 5 m i 5 P = S 5 SΠS P 2 5 PΠP m i (8) = 5 SΠS, (8) : 5 PΠP 5 m i 5 P = S P 2 ( - 1) 5 m i (9),, 5 m i > 0, > 1, (9) 0 21, (6) : dm i dp = 5 m i 5f i 5f i 5 P + 5 m i 5 P (10) : dm i dp = F ( < P 2-1) 5 m i 5f i + S ( - 1) 5 m i (11) P 2 < = 5 FΠF 5 f = PΠP ( Yang et al. 2000) 68

6 m i Πm i 5f i Πf i ; f = 5 m iπm i, (11) Πs i dm i dp = m i P [ ( < - 1) f + ( - 1) s ] = m i P [ ( < f + s ) - ( f + s ) ] (12), f + s = 1, : < f + s > 1 (13) :,,,,,,,,,,,, 11, : GPOP i, t = PGDP i, t HIER i, t T + i, t (14),GPOP i,t, PGDPP i,t - 1 GDP HIER i,t - 1,,,,,,,,,,, T, i,t ,,,,,,, GDP 1990, 50 GDP GDP 31,,,,, ( left out variables) 69

7 :,,, ,,, Islam (1995),, 5,,,,,, 1, 41 1 (14) OLS R ,, 21 % ( ),, ,,, ( mis2specification),,, ; Hausman,,, 1 : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 5 GDP (11102) 1620 (13130) 1706(12131) 1567 (6156) 1557(2191) (6156) 1194(6135) 1047 (1080) 1208 (5122) 1241(2176) (3153) (8124) (5194) (5177) (1191) (164) 1064(198) 1080(167) 1198 (1189) 1104 (156) R 2 ( Adj2R 2 ) 1208(1205) F Prob > F Hausman :11 t :, ; ; 4.,,,, 70

8 ;,,,?,, 0171 ; ( 0105),,,,,,,, , 0156,,, ;,,, ( ) ( ),,,,,,,,,,,2001 :, 12 Black, D. and Henderson, V.,1999, A Theory of Urban Growth, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 2, Cai, Fang and Dewen Wang. 1999, Sustainability of Economic Growth and Labour Contribution in China, in Journal of Economic Research, No. 10. Henderson, J. (1974) The Size and Types of Cities,American Economic Review, Vol. 64, Henderson, V. and Becker, 1998, Political Economy of City Sizes and Formation, Working Paper at Brown University. Islam, N.,1995, Growth Empirics : A panel data approach, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, Krugman, P. R.,1993, On the Number and Location of Cities. European Econ. Rev. 37 : Lin, J. University Press. Yifu, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li,1996, The China Miracle : Development Strategy and Economic Reform, Hong Kong, Chinese Marshall, A.,1890, Principles of Economics. London : Macmillan Mills, E.,1967, An Aggregative Model of Resource Allocation in a Metropolitan Area, American Economic Review, Vol. 57, Yang, Dennis and Cai Fang,2000, The Political Economy of China s Rural2Urban Divide, Center for Economic Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform Working Paper No. 62, Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research Stanford University. ( : ) ( : ) 71

9 A Research on the Equity of the Reform of Chinese Health Insurance Wu Chengpi ( Guanghua School of Management,Peking University) This Paper assesses the equity of a general mode of the reform of Chinese health insurance2weihai mode. Firstly it discusses the total inequality of access to the health system and the finance system of health insurance by calculating the Gini index, Atkinson index and Iloss which is proposed by the author. Then it studies the factors influencing the inequality by multi2factor regression. The effection of the finance system on the redistribution is also discussed. This paper finds that the Weihai mode improved the equity influenced by income, but the effection of other factors is different with each other. The equity of the financial system is improved after the reform, however the financial system enlarged the equality of income, and the change of the effection relied on the extent of risk aversion. Key Words :health insurance ; reform ; equity ; inequality JEL Classification : I180, G220,D630 Urban Expansion in Transitional China : Hierarchy of City, Financing Capacity and Migration Policy Cai Fang &Du Yang ( Institute of Population and Labor Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) The city development pattern in Chinese transition economy distinguishes both from that in market economy and from that in traditional planned economic system. Both the market forces ( such as the ability of self2financing) and gaining resources by redistribution (impacts of hierarchy) work. From our econometric analysis it can be seen that, with marketization, the eastern region has transferred to self2financing dominated pattern of city development, while the central and western cities still rely heavily on redistribution of resources. Cities relying on redistribution are more possible to block up migration, which distort the structure of urbanization at national level. Thus marketizing the social service and construction of infrastructure will speed up the changes from pattern of redistribution to self2financing pattern so as to improve the mechanism of urbanization in market economy. Key Words :development of city ;urban hierarchy ;self2financing ; Household Registration System JEL Classification :R0, P2, R23 The Rise and Fall of Tax Farming : Transaction Costs and Contractual Choices in tax Collection Ma Jun (Sun Yat2sen University) Before the 19 th and even early 20 th centuries, tax farming was the dominant mechanism the state employed to collect taxes. However,there is little in depth research on it. Currently, modified system of tax farming appeared in USA,Britain, and local government in China. Therefore,a historical study of tax farming in history is very useful. Drawing from transaction cost economics and historical sociology,this paper explores why tax farming rose and fell in the early modern period. It first compares tax farming systems in this period,and identifies five patterns of tax farming. Next,it reviews theoretical explanations about tax farming. Upon this,this paper approaches tax farming from the perspective of contractual choice,and develops a transaction cost model to examine the state s contractual choices in tax collection. Key Words :Tax Farming ;Transaction Cost ;Contractual Choices JEL Classification :N400,D230 95