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11 n n 1 n Farmers in Random Insurance Group Farmers in Random Insurance Group Insured Plots Control Plots 1st Choice Plots Insured plot Adverse Selection Moral Hazard Control plot 1st Choice Plots (a) Adverse Selection (c) Moral Hazard on 1st choice (b) Selection On Baseline Risk Non-1st Choice Plots Non-1st Choice Plots (d) Moral Hazard on non-1st choice

12 Ω=((A 1,θ 1 ),...,(A N,θ N )) j j A j θ j

13 S j [0,θ j (1 e j )] θ j (0, 1] e j [0, 1] θ =(θ j ) N j=1 =(e j ) N j=1 θ j i j LS j L<1 α j {0, 1} α =(α j ) N j=1 N j=1 α j =1 α α assigned Π(α, ) = j {A j((1 S j )+α j LS j )} C( ) C j j j j L<1 20 L = =0.32

14 E [U(Π)] = E [Π] ρ(1 τ)v ar(π) τ =1 ρ τ [0, 1] τ =1 τ =0 E [Π] ρ(1 τ)v ar(π) α, N j=1 α j =1 α j {0, 1} e j [0, 1] c(e j )=ψ j e j ψ j ψ ψ

15 C( ) = N j=1 A jψ j e j. i j ρ i α j θ j ψ j A j 0 ψ j w j + 2ρ(1 τ)a 3 jwj 2 ê j (α j,θ j,ψ j,a j, ρ, τ) = 1 3 ψ j w j 2 ρ(1 τ)a j w wj 2 j <ψ j <w j + 2ρ(1 τ)a 3 jwj 2 1 ψ j w j w j = 1 2 (1 α jl)θ j ψ ψ (w 1, ŵ 0 )) α j α α assigned ψ

16 j j u j = u j (1,θ j,ψ j,a j, ρ, τ) u j (0,θ j,ψ j,a j, ρ, τ) = 1 2 A jθ j L(1 ê 0 ρ(1 τ) j) A 2 12 jθj 2 ((1 L) 2 1)(1 ê 0 j) 2 j (1 L) 2 1 < 0 u j = 1 2 A jθ j [ (1 ê 0 j ) (1 L)(1 ê 1 j) ] ρ(1 τ) [ + A 2 12 jθj 2 (1 ê 0 j ) 2 (1 L) 2 (1 ê 1 j) 2] + A j ψ j (ê 0 j ê 1 j)

19 AG AGD D D = AGD AG = AGD AGD+AG(1 D) = +

22 (0.09) (0.18) (0.66) (0.60) (0.40) (0.39) (0.34) (0.54) (0.87) (0.65) (0.84) (0.86) (0.39) (0.60) (0.36) (0.47) (0.37) (0.49) (0.21) (0.44) (0.68) (0.64) (0.91) (0.83)

23 Plot characteristics and outcomes by reference ranking Flooding index High risk of rats st 2nd 3rd 4th or above st 2nd 3rd 4th or above High tungro risk Plot size st 2nd 3rd 4th or above st 2nd 3rd 4th or above Average share of harvest lost st 2nd 3rd 4th or above Standard deviation of share of harvest lost st 2nd 3rd 4th or above

25 Empirical Estimates of Plot Choice using Baseline Variables Flooding index (standardized) High risk of rats (binary) High risk of Tungro (binary) Plot size (standardized) Sharecropping Mortgaged In Lent for free Owned D ij = β 0 + β 1 α ij + β 2 C ij + β 4 A ij + λ i + ϵ ij

26 α C A λ i A θ ij ψ ij C ij α ij β 1 β 1 β 2 β 1 β 2

27 Main Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Results Insurance First choice All-cause Damage Typhoon/Flood Damage Pest/disease Damage Payout Per Hectare As percentage of non-insured plots (left figure) and non-first choice plots (right figure) β 1 β 2

28 21.5 =

29 D ij = β 0 + β 1 C ij + β 2 C ij Z i + β 3 A ij + λ i + η ij D ij,c ij,a ij λ i Z i Z i η ij

30 Insurance Choice by Farmer and Farm Characteristics Total Damage Typhoon/flood Damage Pest/Disease Damage First-choice First Choice X Risk Averse Percent Total Damage Typhoon/flood Damage Pest/Disease Damage First-choice First Choice X Distance Percentage points Z i

32 Impact of insurance Output Harvest value (N=1740) Harvest value - winsorized (N=1740) Fertilizer (N=1208) Inputs Fertilizer - winsorized (N=1208) Pesticides (N=1740) Pest resistant seeds (N=1299) β 1

33 O ij = β 0 + β 1 α ij + β 2 A ij + λ i + ϵ ij O ij j i α λ i p =0.04

34 O ijs = β 0 + β 1 α ijs + β 2 T is + β 3 A ijs + ω s + ϵ ijs O ijs j i s α ijs j T is j s ω s

35 Total damages (N=1732) Typhoon/flood damages (N=1732) Pest/disease damages (N=1732) Insured Plot In Insurance Group Full sample Harvest value (N=1733) Harvest value - winsorized (N=1733) Fertilizer (N=1713) Fertilizer - winsorized (N=1713) Restricted sample Harvest value (N=1303) Harvest value - winsorized (N=1303) Fertilizer (N=1286) Fertilizer - winsorized (N=1286) Standard Deviation Units β 1 β 2 T T α β 2 β 2 + β 1 β 2 β 1 β 2 β 2

36 β 2 β 2 β 2 β 1 +β 2 p =0.059 p =0.048

37 β 2

38 1A 2 jθ j A j θ j j vj = u j (α j =1) u j (α j =0)=cA j θ j c = 1L θ = 1 N 2 N j=1 θ j v j = ca j θ + caj (θ j θ) E [D j θ j ]= 1A 2 jθ j û j = A j Ê [ ] D j θj obs θ obs j Prob(C ij =1)=Λ(α 0 + α 1 Ê [D X, I =1]+α 2 A ij ) Λ C ij =1 i j α 1 > 0 ê I j j ê 0 j Ê [ D X,I =1 ] α 1

39 j {}}{ vj 1 = u j (α j =1) u j (α j =0)= 2 A jθ j (1 ê 0 ρ [ j)l (1 L) 2 1 ] A 2 }{{} 12 jθj 2 (1 ê 0 j) 2 v b + v m {}}{ 1 2 A jθ j (ê 0 j ê 1 j)l }{{} + ρ 12 A2 jθj 2 (1 L) [ 2 (1 ê 0 j) 2 (1 ê 1 j) 2] }{{} + A j ψ j (ê 0 j ê 1 j) }{{} v b v m v b = 1A 2 jθ j (1 ê 0 j)l v m = 1A 2 jθ j (ê 0 j ê 1 j)l ˆv b = A ij Ê [D X, I =0] ˆv m = A ij (Ê [D X, I =1] Ê [D X, I =0]) Λ(C ij )=α 0 + α 1ˆv b + α 2ˆv m + α 3 A ij + ϵ ij = α 0 + α 1 Ê [D X, I =0]+α 2 (Ê [D X, I =1] Ê [D X, I =0]) + α 3 A ij + ϵ ij. α 1 > 0 1θ 2 j(1 ê 0 j)=e [D I =0] α 2 > 0 ψ >0 α 2 > 0 Ê [D X, I =0] Ê [D X, I =1] D ij = β 0 + β 1 X ij + β 2 X ij 1( )+λ i + η ij X

40 λ i η ij Ê [D X, I =1] Ê [D X, I =0] θ(1 ê 0 ) α 3 A j ψ j (ê 0 j ê1 j )

43 (0.92) (1.32) (0.82) (1.17) (0.67) (0.92) (0.39) (0.92) (1.21) (0.78) (1.08) (0.63) (0.84) (2.38) (2.10) (1.82) (1.54) (1.54) (1.12) (1.12) (1.22) (1.22) (0.59)

44 (0.0093) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.0091) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026)

45 1.08 [1.04, 1.12] [1.04, 1.13] [0.99, 1.14] [1.06, 4.10] [1.08, 4.07] [0.42, 1.69] [0.39, 1.83] [0.27, 1.40] [0.27, 1.39] [0.46, 5.12] [0.45, 5.40] [3.72, 15.3] [3.71, 15.1]

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