Foreword Phaedrus, 255d: (...) ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν.

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1 Foreword In the Mirror of the Phaedrus: The title of this volume alludes to Phaedrus 255d, where Socrates says that the lover is, as it were, the mirror in which the beloved beholds himself 1. Like other passages in the corpus platonicum, Socrates words in 255d refer to the fact that mirrors enable us to see blind spots viz. things outside our normal field of vision 2. Phaedra s well-known lines from Euripides Hippolytus are also significant in this regard: it is this power of mirrors to reveal what is hidden that makes time comparable to them, and leads her to say that time puts a mirror before us as before the face of a young maiden ( προθεὶς κάτοπτρον ὥστε παρθένῳ νέᾳ χρόνος 3 ). In short, mirrors or any reflective surface provide a chance to overcome some of the natural limitations of vision. But this is not all. To be more precise, Socrates words in 255d allude to the fact that the eyes of the beholder can see other objects but remain outside the normal field of vision, so that they need a mirror or something similar to behold or see themselves 4. In other words, mirrors or any reflective surface provide a chance to see that which otherwise would remain completely out of sight and in this sense is the farthest object, namely: oneself. Now, this allusion to the Phaedrus as a mirror means that the papers in this volume share the view that the study of Plato and in particular the study of the 1 Phaedrus, 255d: (...) ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν. The translation is borrowed from R. HACKFORTH (ed.), Plato s Phaedrus, Cambridge/N.Y., Cambridge University Press, 1952, 1990, Viz. things we are otherwise unable to see. Cf. notably Alcibiades Maior, 132c7-133a8, but also Phaedo, 99d4-100a8. 3 Hippolytus, See W. S. BARRETT (ed.), Euripides Hippolytos, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964, ad loc., H. LLOYD-JONES, Rev. of Euripides Hippolytos, ed. W. S. Barrett, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 85 (1965), , 167, C. W. WILLINK, Some Problems of Text and Interpretation in the Hippolytus, The Classical Quarterly N.S. 18 (1968), 11-43, ad loc., p. 26, and C. A. E. LUSCHNIG, Time Holds the Mirror. A Study of Knowledge in Euripides Hippolytus, Leiden, Brill, 1988, 41. For time as a revealer of hidden things see, for instance, PINDAR, Olympia X, 53, SOPHOCLES, Ajax , Oedipus Tyrannus 1213, Fr. 301, 918, and EURIPIDES, Fr On the power of mirrors to reveal see notably N. HUGEDÉ, La métaphore du miroir dans les épitres de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens, Neuchâtel, Delachaux & Niestlé, 1957, 101, G. THOMSON/W. HEADLAM (ed.), The Oresteia of Aeschylus, vol. II, Amsterdam/Prague, Hakkert/Academia, 1966, ad Agam , H.-J. METTE, Spiegelbildlichkeiten, Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft NS 9 (1983), (= IDEM, Kleine Schriften, ed. A. Mette/B. Seidensticker, Frankfurt a. M., Athenäum, 1988, ), J.-P. VERNANT/F. FRONTISI-DUCROUX, Dans l oeil du miroir, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1997, 62f., 72f., 112ff., 155ff. 4 As is generally known, the Alcibiades Maior (132d5-e4) emphasizes this very fact that the eye can see itself only by contemplating its reflection: {ΣΩ.} Σκόπει καὶ σύ. εἰ ἡμῶν τῷ ὄμματι ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβουλεῦον εἶπεν ἰδὲ σαυτόν, πῶς ἂν ὑπελάβομεν τί παραινεῖν; ἆρα οὐχὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλέπειν, εἰς ὃ βλέπων ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἔμελλεν αὑτὸν ἰδεῖν; {ΑΛ.} Δῆλον. {ΣΩ.} Ἐννοῶμεν δὴ εἰς τί βλέποντες τῶν ὄντων ἐκεῖνό τε ὁρῷμεν ἅμα ἂν καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς; {ΑΛ.} Δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι εἰς κάτοπτρά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. {ΣΩ.} Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

2 10 Foreword Phaedrus can be much more than the study of one of the major philosophical works of the so-called Western Canon. And indeed the reason why these papers are collected under the heading In the Mirror of the Phaedrus is that they share the notion that Plato s Phaedrus holds a mirror or is itself a mirror: a metaphorical mirror, as it were, in which we can see blind spots viz. things outside our normal field of vision and in particular a metaphorical mirror in which we can see ourselves reflected and discover blind spots in our own awareness of self and others. Having said this, it must be added that the papers in this volume also share the view that the Phaedrus is a mirror of a very special kind. For it does not exert its reflective power and show everything it is able to reveal all at once. On the one hand, the mirror of the Phaedrus is of such a nature that it must be restored and repolished to its original lustre and reflective power. To a large extent, this has to do with the fact that it is a distant mirror. In order to use this mirror or to see oneself in it one has to cross the chasm of what Virginia Woolf once called the tremendous breach of tradition separating us from the Greeks 5. On the other hand, the Phaedrus is a very special kind of mirror because the images it is able to produce can only be seen when it is viewed from certain angles viz. when we hold it in certain positions, etc. In other words, the mirror of the Phaedrus has something of an anamorphic character: it only works under certain conditions, and requires the viewer to occupy specific vantage points to find the images the blind spots, the viewer s own reflection, etc. this mirror is able to show. To sum up, there is nothing automatic about the mirror of the Phaedrus: in order to see what it has to offer, one must exert oneself, and it is precisely this effort that is the key to everything. At the risk of mixing metaphors too clunkily, let us say that the Phaedrus offers a particularly eloquent example of that saying of Antiphanes, which as Plutarch tells us in one of his writings someone applied to Plato's thought 6. Antiphanes is reported to have said jokingly that in a certain city the weather was so bitterly cold that words froze as soon as they were spoken. They got thawed again in the summer, so that one could then hear what had been said in the winter. According to Plutarch someone compared what Plato says in his work to Antiphanes frozen words and pointed out that young men who get acquainted with Plato s thought cannot grasp its meaning, so that not until long afterwards, if ever, do most of them come to understand it. 7 5 V. WOOLF, On Not Knowing Greek, in: EADEM, The Essays of Virginia Woolf, vol. 4: to 1928, ed. A. McNeillie, London, The Hogarth Press, 1994, 38-51, PLUTARCH, Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus, in: F. C. BABBITT (ed.), Plutarch s Moralia, vol. 1, Cambridge (Mas.), Harvard University Press, 1927, repr. 1969, 79a συμβαίνει δὴ τὸ τοῦ Ἀντιφάνους, ὅ τις εἶπεν ἐπὶ τῶν Πλάτωνος συνήθων. ὁ γὰρ Ἀντιφάνης ἔλεγε παίζων ἔν τινι πόλει τὰς φωνὰς εὐθὺς λεγομένας πήγνυσθαι διὰ ψῦχος, εἶθ ὕστερον ἀνιεμένων ἀκούειν θέρους ἅ τοῦ χειμῶνος διελέχθησαν οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἔφη νέοις οὖσιν ἔτι λεχθέντων μόλις ὀψὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς αἰσθάνεσθαι γὲροντας γενομένους. For the history and use of this topos, see notably O. WEINREICH, Antiphanes und Münchhausen. Das antike Lügenmärlein von den ge-

3 Foreword 11 The comparison is apt. Plato s text is like Antiphanes frozen words that need to be thawed before they resonate in full force and can really be heard. Plato s text needs to be heated in order to become audible viz. fully intelligible (i. e., the mirror we have spoken of has to undergo something analogous to a thawing process before it works ). But the point is that it is not only a matter of time, but rather of what one does with it. On the one hand, this thawing process encompasses various elements: crossing the chasm that separates us from the Greeks, analyzing the cultural background, discussing syntactic and semantic issues, considering different methodological approaches and interprettive possibilities, investigating the philosophical ideas and concepts developed by Plato, fathoming their implications, comparing them with the phenomena they are supposed to express, following the network of connections between the different texts the corpus platonicum is composed of (and indeed between different passages that are interrelated and more often than not call each other into question), etc., etc. in the final analysis, all this rather intricate labyrinth of different possibilities is what the thawing of Plato s words is all about. In other words, Plato s text can be thawed in different ways: there are different aspects to how this thawing process should be done. And it is perfectly possible that without each and every one of them the corpus platonicum (and in particular the Phaedrus) fails to unleash the full blast of meaning it is able to convey. On the other hand, it is no exaggeration to speak of a labyrinth of different thawing possibilities. For the fact is that Plato s text never ceases to surprise us with new facets, new trailheads and unexpected challenges, new depths and details, even after many years of study. And there are always new ways of exploring it and looking into it, so that even after centuries it continues to be a seemingly inexhaustible treasure trove. At this point, one may ask the following question: if reading the corpus platonicum requires so much effort, why bother at all? After all, it is much easier to pursue other philosophical concerns that do not require all this straining activity say, to study contemporary thought. What is more, contemporary thought has to do with our own problems, and reflects what is usually termed the state of the art. The answer to this question is easy: because it is perfectly possible that what we find in the corpus platonicum (and for that matter in ancient, medieval and modern thought) provides the means for insights that are still more difficult to gain without its help. In the final analysis, to think that only contemporary frornen Worten und sein Fortleben im Abendland (Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien 220, 1942, 4), Wien, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1942, E. S. MCCARTNEY, Antiphanes Cold-Weather Story and Its Elaboration, Classical Philology 48 (1953), , H. SASAKI/H. MORIOKA, Migration of a Popular Tale: Frozen Words, Tsuda Review 25 (1980), 45-83, and F. STOK, Le 'parole gelate' da Antifane a De André, in: P. ESPOSITO (ed.), Da 'classico' a 'classico'. Paradigmi letterari tra Antico e Moderno. Atti del Convegno della CUSL (Fisciano - Salerno, 8-10 novembre 2007), Università degli studi di Salerno (Quaderni del Dipartimento di Scienze dell'antichità, 37), Pisa, Edizioni ETS, 2010,

4 12 Foreword thought can be of any interest for us today means to indulge in what 18 th century Logic used to call the prejudice of novelty (praeiudicium novitatis 8 ) a prejudice at least as old as Homer, who speaks of how the public has a penchant for the new viz. for the latest song. 9 Writing with his usual wit and acumen, Lichtenberg puts it in a nutshell when he speaks of "new glimpses through the old holes" ("Neue Blicke durch die alten Löcher"). 10 And the point is that, contrary to widespread belief, innovative and seminal views often appear in the guise of these "new glimpses through the old holes", so that, at least in some cases, what lies behind us turns out to be what lies ahead of us. As for the papers in this volume it is better to let them speak for themselves and not to force them into the rhapsodic mould of a brief outline. No abstract can do justice to a detailed analysis. So let us say only this much. First, they all have to do with the thawing process we have spoken of. They try to contribute their mite to this thawing process and approach the Phaedrus from different, complementary angles. Secondly, Lichtenberg s "new glimpses through the old holes" is what they are all about. It is also worth adding that this volume is the product of close exchange and cooperation between two research groups: the Unidade de Investigação LIF Linguagem, Interpretação, Filosofia (Language, Interpretation and Philosophy) of the University of Coimbra and the Grup de Recerca EIDOS Hermenèutica, Platonisme i Modernitat (Hermeneutics, Platonism and Modernity) of the University of Barcelona. We wish to express warm thanks to Prof. António Manuel Martins (University of Coimbra) and to Prof. Jordi Sales and Josep Montserrat (University of Barcelona) for their support. We are also very grateful to Prof. Maurizio Migliori (University of Macerata) for publishing this volume. Mário Jorge de Carvalho António de Castro Caeiro Hélder Telo 8 See for example W. SCHNEIDERS, Aufklärung und Vorurteilskritik. Studien zur Geschichte der Vorurteilstheorie, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Fromann-Holzboog, 1983, 46, 140, 154, 180, 184f., 192, 200, 211, 216, 220, 234, Odyssey I, 351-2: τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσ ἄνθρωποι, ἥ τις ἀϊόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται. 10 G. C. LICHTENBERG, Sudelbücher F 879, in: IDEM, Schriften und Briefe, ed. W. Promies, vol. I, München, Carl Hanser, 1968, 585.

5 Ana Alexandra Alves de Sousa * Pindar s ἀσχολία and Plato s σχολή From the very beginning Plato s Phaedrus has to do with σχολή namely with σχολή on the part of Socrates. Phaedrus explains that Socrates will hear Lysias speech about love if he has σχολή to listen to it. 1 Σχολή has an uncertain etymology and a dubious suffix. Chantraine suggests that the term presents the same radical as the zero degree of ἔχω, to which the aorist of this verb (σχεῖν) attests. 2 Beekes speaks of a suffix l- and a thematic vowel o-. 3 Σχολή therefore means a break in whatever we do, which is why the word is often translated as leisure. In R.370b it seems to be the opposite to πράττω, the construction of the ideal city, where the business will not wait upon the leisure of the workman. 4 This notion of time available leads us to that of time misused. People do unnecessary things, if they employ their time badly. When Socrates speaks about the need for σχολή for the sophists to explain the myths, the term has a sense of misused time. And, by declaring his shortness of σχολή, he rejects the sophists approach. 5 In fact Socrates says that his σχολή is not of the same kind: If anyone disbelieves in these, and with a rustic sort of wisdom, undertakes to explain each in accordance with probability, he will need a great deal of leisure. But I have no * Lisbon University. 1 Phdr. 227b 6-8: {ΣΩ.}Τίς οὖν δὴ ἦν ἡ διατριβή; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἱστία; {ΦΑΙ.} Πεύσῃ, εἴ σοι σχολὴ προϊόντι ἀκούειν. 2 P. CHANTRAINE, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots, Paris, Klincksieck, 1999, R. BEEKES, Etymological Dictionary of Greek, 2 vols., Leiden, Brill, 2009, R.370b 10-11: οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐθέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμένειν (...). All translations are borrowed from PLATO, Plato with an English Translation, Cambridge (Mass.)/London, Harvard University Press/W. Heinemann, : vol. 1, Euthyphron, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, trans. H. N. Fowler, 1914 (repr. 2001); vol. 2, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, transl. W. R. M. Lamb, 1924; vol. 3, Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias, trans. W. R. Lamb, 1925; vol. 4, Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias, trans. H. N. Fowler, 1939 (repr. 1996); vol. 5, Republic, Books 1-5, trans. P. Shorey, 1935 (repr. 1999); vol. 6, Republic, Books 6-10, trans. P. Shorey, 1937 (repr. 2000); vol. 7, Theaetetus, Sophist, transl. H. N. Fowler, 1928 (repr. 1996); vol. 8, Statesman, Philebus, Ion, transl. Fowler and Lamb, 1925; vol. 9, Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles, 1929; vol. 10, Laws, Books 1-6, trans. R.G. Bury, 1926 (repr. 1999); vol. 11, Laws, Books 7-12, trans. R.G. Bury, 1926 (repr. 2001); vol. 12, Charmides, Alcibiades, Hipparchus, Lovers, Theages, Minos, Epinomis, trans. W. R. Lamb, 1955 (repr. 1999). Quotations from Plato's works follow the edition by J. BURNET, Platonis opera, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1903 (repr. 1968). 5 F. SOLMSEN, Leisure and Play in Aristotle s Ideal State, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 107 (1964), , in particular 204.

6 14 Ana Alexandra Alves de Sousa leisure for them at all. 6 In Protagoras, Socrates has exactly the same state of mind towards the sophists. 7 Jesting, Socrates quotes a verse from Pindar s First Isthmian Ode. 8 He answers with the word that is the negative of the one employed by his interlocutor: the alpha privative turns ἀσχολία into the very opposite of σχολή: What? Don t you believe that I consider hearing your conversation with Lysias a greater thing even than business (sc. ἀσχολία), as Pindar says? 9 With this wordplay Socrates replies with a question which seems more an exclamatory sentence than an interrogative one. So he uses the antithetic term to say yes. The sense in this wordplay is: to have the required break to listen to Phaedrus is, to Socrates, of the greatest importance. Because it is an antonym of stopping, ἀσχολία imposes pressure that prevents Socrates, in the Protagoras, from continuing to listen to him. 10 Chaerephon, in the Gorgias, also speaks of ἀσχολία as a business, which prevents him from listening to a philosophical discussion: for my own part, however, Heaven forbid that I should ever be so busy as to give up a discussion so interesting and so conducted, because I found it more important to attend to something else. 11 Therefore hurry 12 and business are often a good option to translate ἀσχολία. But may it not be that the rush, whatever it may be, implicit in ἀσχολία is a consequence of a certain way of using σχολή? Let us have a look. There are several ways for a man to be busy, as explains Nicias, when he speaks of a young man s σχολή: It is good for them, instead of spending their time on the ordinary things to which young men usually give their hours of leisure, to spend it on this, which not only has the necessary effect of improving their bodily health. 13 To treat oneself, or even to be ill, also depends on leisure: no one has leisure to be sick and doctor himself all his 6 Phdr. 229e 2-4: (...) αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἅτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει. ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή (...). 7 Prt. 314c7-d8: δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός τις, κατήκουεν ἡμῶν, κινδυνεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἰδὼν ἡμᾶς, Ἔα, ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ καὶ ἅμα ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως ὡς οἷός τ ἦν ἐπήραξεν. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούομεν, καὶ ὃς ἐγκεκλῃμένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν, Ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκηκόατε ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ; Ἀλλ ὠγαθέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἥκομεν οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν. 8 I Phdr. 227b9-11: {ΣΩ.} Τί δέ; οὐκ ἂν οἴει με κατὰ Πίνδαρον καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα ποιήσασθαι τὸ τεήν τε καὶ Λυσίου διατριβὴν ἀκοῦσαι; 10 Prt. 335c2-7: (...) ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφότερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα ἡ συνουσία ἐγίγνετο νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοί τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ εἴην σοι παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς λόγους ἐλθεῖν γάρ ποί με δεῖ εἶμι ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον. 11 G. 458c 5-7: ( ) ἐμοὶ δ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένῳ προὐργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν. 12 V.g. Fowler s translation of Tht. 172d. 13 La. 181e 2-5: ( ) καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἄλλοθι διατρίβειν, ἐν οἷς δὴ φιλοῦσιν οἱ νέοι τὰς διατριβὰς ποιεῖσθαι ὅταν σχολὴν ἄγωσιν, ἀλλ ἐν τούτῳ, εὖ ἔχει, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον ἴσχειν ἀνάγκη (...).

7 Pindar s ἀσχολία and Plato s σχολή 15 days. 14 Many things require σχολή: Now what is fitting for a poor man who is your benefactor, and who needs leisure to exhort you? 15 And even the gods themselves need it: Well, then, if the foster children of Cronus, having all this leisure and ability to converse not only with human beings but also with beasts 16 In the Apology, Socrates links σχολή with matters of a public and private nature: And by reason of this occupation I have no leisure to attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning, or even my own 17 It is then clear that the leisure to take care of public or private matters is not a lack of occupation. In the Laws, the denominative verb σχολάζω describes something essential for attending to the community s matters ( Thus it is needful that these men also should have both the ability and the leisure to attend to public affairs 18 ). Thus man can only use time if he has the time to spare. The ἀσχολία that causes the lack of σχολή for taking care of certain matters results, therefore, from a certain way of using σχολή. Hence, the performance of public duties by the Eleven is described, in the Apology, with the expression ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι. 19 The σχολή for listening to Phaedrus is also an ἀσχολία, because only by having one can we have the other. The wordplay, with which the Phaedrus dialogue begins, presents a complexity impossible to translate. Both terms, apparently antithetic, are equivalent forms from the semantic point of view. Socrates answers Phaedrus question with an etymological antonym, used as a semantic consequence of σχολή. An occupation of time unavoidably creates unavailability for something else. Activities may require a devotion that depletes σχολή, as occurs with the Director of the Children, who, in supervising both music and gymnastics, will have but little time to spare. 20 The requirement, within the ideal city, of a specialization in each task gives an idiomatic sense to the word, when it appears with the genitive of separation. In this situation it has the sense of at leisure from : The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the right mo- 14 R. 406c 5: (...) οὐδενὶ σχολὴ διὰ βίου κάμνειν ἰατρευομένῳ. 15 Ap. 36d 4-5: ( ) τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; 16 Plt. 272b8-c1: {ΞΕ.} Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν οἱ τρόφιμοι τοῦ Κρόνου, παρούσης αὐτοῖς οὕτω πολλῆς σχολῆς καὶ δυνάμεως πρὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίοις διὰ λόγων δύνασθαι συγγίγνεσθαι. ( ) 17 Ap. 23b 7-9: (...) καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων (...). 18 Lg. 763d 4-6: (...) δεῖ δὴ καὶ τούτους δυνατούς τε εἶναι καὶ σχολάζοντας τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι(...). 19 Ap. 39e 1-3: Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῒ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἷ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. 20 Lg. 813c1-3: (...) ὃς τῶν τε περὶ μουσικὴν τῶν τε περὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐπιμελούμενος οὐ πολλὴν ἕξει σχολήν.

8 16 Ana Alexandra Alves de Sousa ment, and at leisure from other occupations. 21 This idea is stated again in R.374b-c: and similarly assigned to each and every one man one occupation, (...) at which he was to work all his days, at leisure from other pursuits 22. With the genitive the expression σχολήν ἄγειν acquires exactly the opposite sense to the already mentioned to have leisure to 23, and becomes synonymous of ἀσχολία with the genitive. This syntactical structure is used by Socrates when he speaks of Herodicos of Megara, who lived with a lack of time for the business of life. 24 And in Laws we can find it again, regarding both the life of an athlete and the life devoted to achieving excellence of the body and soul. 25 This ἀσχολία does not mean to be busy with something. In that case we would have an objective genitive. It means only to be free of other duties. The antinomy between σχολή and ἀσχολία makes sense from a linguistic point of view, since the negative word appears as the result of the other. But in re it can be the other way around. When Critias explains that people direct their attention first to their basic needs or the necessaries of life (ἀναγκαῖα) and only pay heed to other matters if they have leisure viz. σχολή 26, he is referring to a particular kind of σχολή. The ἀναγκαῖα imposed by the slavery of the body bring about several ἀσχολίαι (Phd.66b), one of which is the very opposite of philosophical reasoning and hinders human beings from engaging in it. And when it enslaves men to the material ἀσχολία has a pejorative sense. The complete lack of σχολή is expressed twice in Plato s work with the adjective ἄσχολος and once with the negative adverb: the smaller worries, such as the lust for wealth which allows a man no leisure time for anything else save his own private property 27, or a lifelong, insatiable pursuit that makes each man ἄσχολος (completely engrossed in his activities and with no leisure, or even 21 R. 370c3-5: ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾷον, ὅταν εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ. 22 R. 374b9-c2: (...) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ ὡσαύτως ἓν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς ὃ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστος καὶ ἐφ ᾧ ἔμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παριεὶς τοὺς καιροὺς καλῶς ἀπεργάσεσθαι (...). 23 E.g. Tht.154e; 172c; La.187a. 24 R. 406b 4-8: Μακρόν, ἦν δ ἐγώ, τὸν θάνατον αὑτῷ ποιήσας. παρακολουθῶν γὰρ τῷ νοσήματι θανασίμῳ ὄντι οὔτε ἰάσασθαι οἶμαι οἷός τ ἦν ἑαυτόν, ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε πάντων ἰατρευόμενος διὰ βίου ἔζη, ἀποκναιόμενος εἴ τι τῆς εἰωθυίας διαίτης ἐκβαίη, δυσθανατῶν δὲ ὑπὸ σοφίας εἰς γῆρας ἀφίκετο. 25 Lg. 807c4-d1: (...) τοῦ γὰρ πᾶσαν τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἔργων βίου ἀσχολίαν παρασκευάζοντος, τοῦ Πυθιάδος τε καὶ Ὀλυμπιάδος νίκης ὀρεγομένου, διπλασίας τε καὶ ἔτι πολλῷ πλέονος ἀσχολίας ἐστὶν γέμων ὁ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος πάντως καὶ ψυχῆς εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν βίος εἰρημένος ὀρθότατα. 26 Cri. 110a3-6: For legendary lore and the investigation of antiquity are visitants that come to cities in company with leisure, when they see that men are already furnished with the necessaries of life, and not before. ( μυθολογία γὰρ ἀναζήτησίς τε τῶν παλαιῶν μετὰ σχολῆς ἅμ ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἔρχεσθον, ὅταν ἴδητόν τισιν ἤδη τοῦ βίου τἀναγκαῖα κατεσκευασμένα, πρὶν δὲ οὔ. ). 27 Lg. 831c4-5: (...) τὴν μὲν ὑπ ἔρωτος πλούτου πάντα χρόνον ἄσχολον ποιοῦντος τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πλὴν τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων (...).

9 Pindar s ἀσχολία and Plato s σχολή 17 better, without thought) 28. This is not a danger for those who apply their thought to the true essences. 29 No matter where it appears (at the beginning of dialogues or in the middle) σχολή is essential: Be so good as to tell us as exactly as you can about all these things, if you are not too busy. 30 Phaedo replies with the denominative verb σχολάζω to show his availability. In Theages, Demodocus suggests that Socrates can feel ἀσχολία and asks him for σχολή: Socrates, I was wanting to have some private talk with you, if you had time to spare; even if there is some demand, which is not particularly important, on your time, do spare some, nevertheless, for me. 31 Socrates replies, like Phaedo, with the denominative verb. To Theaetetus Socrates says that they both have the requirements to study the true essence of thought since they have plenty of time, πάνυ πολλὴν σχολήν. 32 Further on he confirms his σχολή to Theodorus and considers it an advantage of philosophers. 33 When explaining to Laches and to Nicias that city affairs, τὰ πράγματα τῆς πόλεως, can lead to an absence of σχολή 34, he has philosophical debate in mind. The same happens when Hippias recognises the lack of σχολή for the same kind of matters. 35 A similar disposition is at stake in the Phaedrus 227b and when Socrates declares himself available for philosophical diatribe: we have plenty of time, apparently. 36 All this allows us to conclude that σχολή is a prerequisite for dialogue, because it implies something more specific that surpasses the concept of time. It is 28 Lg. 832a10-b1: ἡ διὰ βίου ἄπληστος ζήτησις. 29 Cp. R. 500b. 30 Phd. 58d 2-3: {ΕΧ.} Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὖσα. 31 Thg. 121a1-3: Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐδεόμην ἄττα σοι ἰδιολογήσασθαι, εἰ σχολή κἂν εἰ ἀσχολία δὲ μὴ πάνυ τις μεγάλη, ὅμως ἐμοῦ ἕνεκα ποίησαι σχολήν. 32 Tht. 154e7-155a6: {ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἦμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἤδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν νῦν δὲ ἅτε ἰδιῶται πρῶτον βουλησόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτὰ τί ποτ ἐστὶν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ ὁπωστιοῦν. {ΘΕΑΙ.} Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ ἂν βουλοίμην. {ΣΩ.} Καὶ μὴν ἐγώ. ὅτε δ οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἠρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανασκεψόμεθα, οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἅττα ποτ ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν; ὧν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως; {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί. 33 Tht. 172d4-e4: {ΣΩ.} Ἧι τοῖς μὲν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες ἀεὶ πάρεστι, σχολή, καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κἀκεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἀρέσῃ καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ (τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνωσκομένην ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον ( ). 34 La. 187a2: ( ) if you are not at leisure through the demands of public business (...) (...) ἂν μὴ ὑμῖν σχολὴ ᾖ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων (...). 35 Hp.Ma. 281a. 36 Phdr. 258e 6: {ΣΩ.} Σχολὴ μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε ( ).

10 18 Ana Alexandra Alves de Sousa a certain modus cogitandi. This puts σχολή in the intellectual sphere, as clearly appears in Phaedrus words: You shall hear, if you have leisure to walk along and listen. 37 The body takes care of walking and σχολή of the mind. But if we need it to listen to a philosophical dispute, is not σχολή a thinking process or a way of thinking? In the Theaetetus 187c-d we read: Socrates: Somehow I am troubled now and have often been troubled before, so that I have been much perplexed in my own reflections and in talking with others, because I cannot tell what this experience is which we human beings have, and how it comes about. Theaetetus: What experience? Socrates: That anyone has false opinions. And so I am considering and am still in doubt whether we had better let it go or examine it by another method than the one we followed a while ago. Theaetetus: Why not, Socrates, if there seems to be the least need of it? For just now, in talking about leisure, you and Theodorus said very truly that there is no hurry in discussion of this sort. 38 It seems that the choice of another way of approaching means a withdrawal from σχολή which Theaetetus finds strange. In the passage quoted above σχολή is the starting point for the philosopher's instruction. That is why Socrates says, when he speaks about the education of the ideal city s guardians, that it is necessary to educate them as if they had ample leisure. 39 These educated men need to use this σχολή in a very specific direction. In the Timaeus Socrates explains how they should do it: And it was said, I believe, that the men thus trained should never regard silver or gold or anything else as their own private property; but as auxiliaries, who in return for their guard-work receive from those whom they protect such a moderate wage as suffices temperate men, they should spend their wage in common and live together in fellowship one with another, devoting themselves unceasingly to virtue, but keeping free from all other pursuits. 40 The 37 Phdr. 227b 8: {ΦΑΙ.} Πεύσῃ, εἴ σοι σχολὴ προϊόντι ἀκούειν. 38 Tht. 187d1-4: {ΣΩ.} θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστ ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον. {ΘΕΑΙ.} τὸ ποῖον δή; {ΣΩ.} τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον. {ΘΕΑΙ.} τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ ὁπῃτιοῦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατεπείγει. 39 R. 376d9-10: Ἴθι οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές τε καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγῳ παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας. 40 Ti. 18b 1-7: ( ) τοὺς δέ γε οὕτω τραφέντας ἐλέχθη που μήτε χρυσὸν μήτε ἄργυρον μήτε ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδὲν κτῆμα ἑαυτῶν ἴδιον νομίζειν δεῖν, ἀλλ ὡς ἐπικούρους μισθὸν λαμβάνοντας τῆς φυλακῆς

11 Pindar s ἀσχολία and Plato s σχολή 19 syntax with the genitive of separation is used again to explain the guidance these men have to give to their σχολή. This passage taken from Timaeus clarifies the already quoted excerpt from the Republic about the task of the city guardians who must put away other activities in order to pursue their duty. 41 We consider that the genitive with σχολή, although without the verb ἄγω, has an identical syntactical value. Let us see how the prepositional uses of σχολή strengthen the word s meaning. The syntagm κατὰ σχολήν describes a way of writing, as we can see when Phaedrus speaks about Lysias composition: Do you suppose that I, who am a mere ordinary man, can tell from memory, in a way that is worthy of Lysias, what he, the cleverest writer of our day, composed κατὰ σχολήν and took a long time for? 42 If κατὰ σχολήν meant exactly the same as ἐν πολλῷ, it would be superfluous to say it. Lysias took a long time writing and he did it κατὰ σχολήν. With ἀναμιμνήσκω it becomes a way of remembering what was spoken, for it is a process of recalling what was said by Socrates. 43 Sometimes this exhaustive account has to be postponed: So for the present let us return to our subject, as is proper; then we will go on the trail of this other matter by and by, κατὰ σχολήν. 44 The trail shows us the meticulousness of this procedure. Furthermore an explanation made κατὰ σχολήν is closer to the truth 45 and things that are not easy to understand need to be examined κατὰ σχολήν: because there are two kinds of purification and Theaetetus fails to realize this, he thinks about studying the problem κατὰ σχολήν. 46 It is clear in the Er myth that an examination made κατὰ σχολήν could avoid the regret of a bad choice 47, and in the Laws κατὰ σχολήν serves precisely to characterize the method of choosing (ἐκλέξασθαι 48 ), and it is also used to charac- παρὰ τῶν σῳζομένων ὑπ αὐτῶν, ὅσος σώφροσιν μέτριος, ἀναλίσκειν τε δὴ κοινῇ καὶ συνδιαιτωμένους μετὰ ἀλλήλων ζῆν, ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχοντας ἀρετῆς διὰ παντός, τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἄγοντας σχολήν. 41 R. 374d8-e2: Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ ἐγώ, ὅσῳ μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργον, τοσούτῳ σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν εἴη καὶ αὖ τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον. 42 Phdr. 227d6-228a3: ( ) οἴει με, ἃ Λυσίας ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ σχολὴν συνέθηκε, δεινότατος ὢν τῶν νῦν γράφειν, ταῦτα ἰδιώτην ὄντα ἀπομνημονεύσειν ἀξίως ἐκείνου; 43 Tht. 143a1-2: ( ) ἀλλ ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότ εὐθὺς οἴκαδ ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἔγραφον ( ). 44 Plt. 263a8-b2: ( ) νῦν μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἰκός, ἐπανίωμεν πάλιν ταῦτα δὲ εἰς αὖθις κατὰ σχολὴν καθάπερ ἰχνεύοντες μέτιμεν. ( ) 45 Lg. 771c4-7: (...) ἐπὶ θάτερα γὰρ ὑγιὴς γίγνεται δυοῖν ἑστίαιν ἀπονεμηθείσαιν ὡς δ ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀληθῶς ὄντα, κατὰ σχολὴν οὐκ ἂν πολὺς ἐπιδείξειεν μῦθος. 46 Sph. 226e1-4: {ΞΕ.} Οὐκοῦν τό γε καθαρτικὸν εἶδος αὖ διπλοῦν ὂν πᾶς ἂν ἴδοι; {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί, κατὰ σχολήν γε ἴσως οὐ μὴν ἔγωγε καθορῶ νῦν. 47 R. 619c. 48 Lg. 858b2-c1: ἡμῖν δ εἰπεῖν σὺν θεῷ ἔξεστι, καθάπερ ἢ λιθολόγοις ἢ καί τινος ἑτέρας ἀρχομένοις συστάσεως, παραφορήσασθαι χύδην ἐξ ὧν ἐκλεξόμεθα τὰ πρόσφορα τῇ μελλούσῃ γενήσεσθαι συστάσει, καὶ δὴ καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν ἐκλέξασθαι. τιθῶμεν οὖν ἡμᾶς νῦν εἶναι μὴ τοὺς ἐξ

12 20 Ana Alexandra Alves de Sousa terize the way the citizens should survey (θεωρῆσαι) the doings of the outside world. 49 Another important syntagm is ἐπὶ σχολῆς. In Theaetetus, Socrates relates ἐπὶ σχολῆς to the philosophers: it describes a talk made in peace. 50 But ἐπὶ σχολῆς can also have a negative sense. In Euthyphro Socrates, who is not interested in the poets mythological stories, uses the expression to prevent his interlocutor from explaining why he believes in them and thus takes the dialogue in the way he wants. 51 And when it is used to describe the way that the defenders of Heraclitus doctrines expose their thoughts to the disciples, there is no doubt that ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζειν does not always produce good results. 52 The syntagm ἐν σχολῇ describes the education of the philosopher along with ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ. 53 The educational point of view and the link with the argumentative construction appear in Republic, when the city guardians education is discussed. 54 In the plural it describes an argumentative procedure that should please the students: Problems concerning the essential nature of the commensurable and the incommensurable. For students who are not to be absolutely worthless it is necessary to examine these and to distinguish the two kinds, and, by proposing such problems one to another, to compete ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς that is worthy of them, for this is a much more refined pastime than draughts for old men. 55 In its meanings of leisure, intellectual availability, philosophical investigation, scientific technique σχολή is the cornerstone of the state: it educates man and it prepares his mind for examining all kinds of matters and for making decisions. ἀνάγκης οἰκοδομοῦντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπὶ σχολῆς ἔτι τὰ μὲν παρατιθεμένους, τὰ δὲ συνιστάντας ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὰ μὲν ἤδη τῶν νόμων λέγειν ὡς τιθέμενα, τὰ δ ὡς παρατιθέμενα. 49 Lg. 951a4-7: (...) θεωροὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἐκπέμπειν χρεὼν τοιούσδε τινὰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας παρεμένους ἄν τινες ἐπιθυμῶσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων πράγματα θεωρῆσαι κατά τινα πλείω σχολήν, ἀπειργέτω μηδεὶς τούτους νόμος. 50 Tht. 172d. See note 33 above. 51 Euthphr. 6c8-9. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν μοι εἰς αὖθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσῃ (...). 52 Tht. 180b4-7: {ΣΩ.} Ἴσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἑώρακας, εἰρηνεύουσιν δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας οὐ γὰρ σοὶ ἑταῖροί εἰσιν. ἀλλ οἶμαι τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὑτοῖς ποιῆσαι. 53 Tht. 175d7-e2: (...) οὗτος δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς (...). 54 R. 376d. 55 Lg. 820c4-9: {ΑΘ.} Τὰ τῶν μετρητῶν τε καὶ ἀμέτρων πρὸς ἄλληλα ᾗτινι φύσει γέγονεν. ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ σκοποῦντα διαγιγνώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ παντάπασιν εἶναι φαῦλον, προβάλλοντά τε ἀλλήλοις ἀεί, διατριβὴν τῆς πεττείας πολὺ χαριεστέραν πρεσβυτῶν διατρίβοντα, φιλονικεῖν ἐν ταῖς τούτων ἀξίαισι σχολαῖς.

13 Pindar s ἀσχολία and Plato s σχολή 21 When it is linked with public affairs 56, numbers 57, laws 58, in short the state 59, σχολή leads to perfect political actions. In an ideal society citizens with plenty of σχολή have a natural ability to perform their duties successfully. 60 Σχολή is not time misused, but a way to learn and to do things properly Lg. 763d4-e3: δεῖ δὴ καὶ τούτους δυνατούς τε εἶναι καὶ σχολάζοντας τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διὸ προβαλλέσθω μὲν πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων ἀστυνόμον ὃν ἂν βούληται, διαχειροτονηθέντων δὲ καὶ ἀφικομένων εἰς ἓξ οἷς ἂν πλεῖσται γίγνωνται, τοὺς τρεῖς ἀποκληρωσάντων οἷς τούτων ἐπιμελές, δοκιμασθέντες δὲ ἀρχόντων κατὰ τοὺς τεθέντας αὐτοῖς νόμους. 57 Lg. 738a4-b3: ὁ μὲν δὴ πᾶς εἰς πάντα πάσας τομὰς εἴληχεν ὁ δὲ τῶν τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίων εἴς τε πόλεμον καὶ ὅσα κατ εἰρήνην πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ κοινωνήματα, εἰσφορῶν τε πέρι καὶ διανομῶν, οὐ πλείους μιᾶς δεουσῶν ἑξήκοντα δύναιτ ἂν τέμνεσθαι τομῶν, συνεχεῖς δὲ ἀπὸ μιᾶς μέχρι τῶν δέκα. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν δεῖ βεβαίως λαβεῖν, οἷς ἂν ὁ νόμος προστάττῃ λαμβάνειν (...). 58 Lg. 781d9-e3: {ΑΘ.} Ἀκούωμεν δή. θαυμάσητε δὲ μηδὲν ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἄνωθέν ποθεν ἐπιχειρεῖν δόξω σχολῆς γὰρ ἀπολαύομεν καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ κατεπεῖγον τὸ μὴ πάντῃ πάντως σκοπεῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους. 59 Lg. 828d7-8: ( ) these persons must believe that no other State exists which can compare with ours in respect of the degree in which it possesses leisure and control over the necessities of life - (...) ὡς ἔσθ ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις οἵαν οὐκ ἄν τις ἑτέραν εὕροι τῶν νῦν περὶ χρόνου σχολῆς καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξουσίας (...). 60 See notably Lg. 832c7-d7: (...) ταῦτ οὖν ἐστι τὰ δύο πάντων μὲν σμικροῦ διαφερόντως αἴτια, τούτων δ οὖν ὄντως διαφέρει. τὸ δὲ τῆς νῦν πολιτείας, ἣν νομοθετούμενοι λέγομεν, ἐκπέφευγεν ἀμφότερα σχολήν τε γὰρ ἄγει που μεγίστην, ἐλεύθεροί τε ἀπ ἀλλήλων εἰσί, φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστ ἄν, οἶμαι, γίγνοιντ ἂν ἐκ τούτων τῶν νόμων, ὥστ εἰκότως ἅμα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις πολιτείας μόνη δέξαιτ ἂν τῶν νῦν τὴν διαπερανθεῖσαν παιδείαν τε ἅμα καὶ παιδιὰν πολεμικήν, ἀποτελεσθεῖσαν ὀρθῶς τῷ λόγῳ. See also 855d4-d8: (...) ἔστω δὴ φανερὰ μὲν ἡ ψῆφος τιθεμένη, πρὸ τούτου δὲ κατὰ τὸ στόμα τοῦ διώκοντός τε καὶ φεύγοντος ὁ δικαστὴς ἑξῆς ἡμῖν ἐγγύτατα κατὰ πρέσβιν ἱζέσθω, πάντες δ οἱ πολῖται, ὅσοιπερ ἂν ἄγωσι σχολήν, ἐπήκοοι ἔστωσαν σπουδῇ τῶν τοιούτων δικῶν. (...) 61 For further discussion, see notably A. KOEPLIN, The Telos of Citizen Life: Music and Philosophy in Aristotle s Ideal Polis, in Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 26, 1, 2009, ; D. MICALELLA, Organizzazione degli spazi urbani e politica. Il posto della scholé nella città ideale di Aristotele, Ancient Society 38, 2008, 23-28; M. PAKALUK, Aristotle s Ethics, in A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, ed. M. L. Gill - P. Pellegrin, Oxford, 2006.

14

15 Samuel Oliveira * Τυφῶν and ἄτυφος μοῖρα: Socrates Anthropological Either/Or in the Phaedrus (229e- 230a) For João, Friendship, thankfulness and sense of loss remain. «δοιὰς γὰρ ζωῆς μοίρας λάχες ἣν μὲν ἀμαυράν ἠελίων δισσῶν, ἣν δ ἀθανάτοις ἰσόμοιον ζῶντί τε καὶ φθιμένωι φθίμενος δ ἐπὶ πολλὸν ἀγήρως.» 1 1. Up to Typhon. Socrates first either/or The purpose of this paper is not to analyse the various questions surrounding the figure of Typhon 2 or to look at all the many interpretations made in the ancient world of this mythological character. 3 Nor is it our purpose to investigate * PhD student at the New University of Lisbon (F.C.S.H.: Faculty of Social and Human Sciences); collaborating member of the Research Unit L.I.F. Language, Interpretation & Philosophy (Universidade de Coimbra); research fellow of the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (F.C.T.). 1 Plutarchi de Homero librorum pars, in T. W. ALLEN (ed.), Homeri opera, V, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961 (1912), I, 58, p. 242; see also M. L. WEST (ed.), Homeric Hymns Homeric Apocrypha Lives of Homer, Cambridge/London, Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 408: «For you have two allotted lives: one that is dimmed for your twin suns, the other matching the immortals one for life, one for death; and in death you shall not age.» 2 He has various names: Τυφῶν, Τυφώς, Τυφωεύς, Τυφάων. 3 For further discussion of the Typhon myth and its interpretation see notably I. BAGLIONI, L'Aspetto Acosmico e Primordiale di Typhon nella Teogonia, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 1 (2010), pp ; A. BALLABRIGA, Le dernier adversaire de Zeus. Le mythe de Typhon dans l'épopée grecque archaïque, Revue de l'histoire des religions 207 (1990), pp. 3-30; F. BLAISE, L'épisode de Typhée dans la Théogonie d'hésiode (vv ): La stabilization du monde, Revue des études grecques 105 (1992), pp ; A. BONNAFÉ, Poésie, nature et sacré: Homère, Hésiode et le sentiment grec de la nature, Lyon, Maison de l'orient, 1984; W. CHRIST, Der Aetna in der griechischen Poesie, Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse, 1888, pp ; F. DORNSEIFF, Die archaische Mythenerzählung. Folgerungen aus dem homerischen Apollonhymnos, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1933, pp. 17ff.; IDEM, Kleine Schriften, vol. I, Antike und alter Orient: Interpretationen, Leipzig, Koehler & Amelang, 1956, pp ; J. E. FONTENROSE, Python. A Study of Delphic Myth and its Origins, Berkeley/LA, London, University of California Press, 1980 (1959); IDEM, Typhon among the Arimoi, in L. WALLACH (ed.), The Classical Tradition. Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of H. Caplan, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1966, pp ; J. G. GRIFFITHS, The Flight of the Gods before Typhon: an Unrecognized Myth?, Hermes 88 (1960), pp ; W. HANSEN, The Theft of the Thunderweapon. A Greek Myth in its International Context,

16 24 Samuel Oliveira what is contrasted with Typhon (and the semantic field associated with this mythological figure), namely the concepts of ἄτυφον, ἀτυφία, etc. Our purpose is to highlight some of the main problems posed by the extract between 229e and 230a, while pointing out that what is represented there is not restricted to this single passage but has repercussions in the rest of the Phaedrus, in particular in Lysias speech, in Socrates first speech and in the Palinode. 4 To understand the problems posed by 229e-230a it is necessary to go back a bit. Socrates and Phaedrus discuss the Boreas and Oreithyia myth. And Phaedrus asks Socrates if he believes in this mythical narrative («μυθολόγημα»). 5 Socrates replies that, if he did not believe it, like the σοφοί, he would not be exceptional (he would not be so out of place: ἄτοπος). 6 And if this was the case 7 he could provide a rationalist explanation or one making use of subtleties ( σοφιζόμενος φάναι ), of that same myth. 8 Socrates then says that such explanations are graceful viz. attractive («χαρίεντα») 9 ; they are, however, those of a man who is extremely viz. exceedingly clever («λίαν δεινοῦ»), laborious Classica et Medievalia 46 (1995), pp. 5-24, in particular 13ff.; R. HOLLAND, Mythographische Beitrage I. Der Typhoeuskampf, Philologus 59/N.S. 13 (1900), pp ; K. KERÉNYI, Die Mythologie der Griechen, I: Die Götter- und Menschheitsgeschichten, München, DTV, (1951), pp ; A. MOREAU, Eschyle: La violence et le chaos, Paris, Les Belles-Lettres, 1985, pp. 147ff.; A. von MESS, Der Typhonmythus bei Pindar und Aeschylus, Rheinisches Museum 56 (1901), pp ; V. PUNTONI, Typhoeus nella Teogonia esiodea, memoria presentata il 19 giugno 1913 alla Classe di Scienze Morali della R. Accad. delle Scienze dell'ist. di Bologna, Bologna, Gamberini e Parmeggiani, 1913; S. SAID, Les combats de Zeus et le problème des interpolations dans la Théogonie d'hésiode, Révue des études grecques 90 (1977), pp ; M. L. SANCASSANO, Il serpente e le sue immagini: il motivo del serpente nella poesia greca dall'iliade all'orestea, Como, Ed. New Press, 1997; J. SCHMIDT, Typhoeus, Typhon, in W. H. ROSCHER (ed.), Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie, Leipzig, Teubner, 1924, pp ; R. SCHMIEL, Nonnus Typhonomachy: An Analysis of the Structure of Dionysiaca II, Rheinisches Museum 135 (1992), pp ; H. SCHWABL, Zur Theogonie des Hesiod, Gymnasium 62 (1955), pp ; IDEM, Zu Hesiods Typhonomachie, Hermes 90 (1962), pp ; G. SEIPPEL, Der Typhonmythos, Diss. Greifswald, Greifswald, Dallmeyer, 1939; S. D. SKULSKY, ΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΠΕΙΡΑΤΑ ΣΥΝΤΑΝΥΣΑΙΣ, Language and Meaning in Pythian I, Classical Philology 70 (1975), pp. 8-31; M. C. STOKES, Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies, Phronesis (1962), pp. 1-37, in particular 33ff.; J. TEIPEL, Typhoei fabula qualis usque ad Pindari et Aeschyli aetatem fuerit, Diss. Münster, 1922; U. von WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF (ed.), Euripides Herakles, Berlin, Weidmann, (1959), ad 1272, pp. 467f.; F. WORMS, Der Typhoeus-Kampf in Hesiods Theogonie, Hermes 81 (1953), pp We shall be basing ourselves on the Greek text established by J. BURNET, Platonis Opera, vol. II, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967 (1901). 5 Cf. Phaedrus, 229c4-5: «(...) ἀλλ εἰπὲ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες, σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθῃ ἀληθὲς εἶναι;» 6 Cf. ibidem, 229c6-7: «Ἀλλ εἰ ἀπιστοίην, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴην (...).» 7 «Εἶτα». As regards the meaning of «εἶτα» in 229c7, see W. J. VERDENIUS, Notes on Plato s Phaedrus, Mnemosyne, Ser. 4, 8 (1955), pp , in particular Cf. Phaedrus, 229c7-d2: «(...) εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίην αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσαν ὦσαι, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀνάρπαστον γεγονέναι ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου λέγεται γὰρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν ἀλλ οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἡρπάσθη.» 9 Cf. ibidem, 229d2-3: «(...) ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι (...).»

17 Socrates Anthropological Either/Or in the Phaedrus (229e-230a) 25 («ἐπιπόνου») and not entirely fortunate («οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς»), because he would also need to restore or rectify («ἐπανορθοῦσθαι») the form or appearance («τὸ εἶδος») of the Centaurs and of the Chimera, plus that of the Gorgons and Pegasus and then of all the multitudes of strange beings and monsters of a portentous nature. 10 He moreover asserts that, should someone incredulous about these things try to convert each of them into a mere likelihood («κατὰ τὸ εἰκός»), they would require much leisure («πολλῆς σχολῆς»). 11 It is regarding this («πρὸς αὐτά») that Socrates says there is no σχολή at all («οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή» 12 ) and not in general, as if it was a question of the peremptory assertion that, purely and simply, there is no σχολή, whatever it is related to. In other words, Socrates has no σχολή for this particular kind of occupation. All this is not only stated, but there is a concern to justify it, to identify a cause or something responsible («τὸ αἴτιον»). 13 This αἴτιον is expressed in the following terms: «οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν» 14 («I am still not capable, in accordance with the Delphic inscription, of knowing myself» 15 ). Socrates, however, does not stop here, but also launches a clarification of what has been said: «γελοῖον δή μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν.» 16 («for it seems ridiculous (γελοῖον) to me, given that I am still ignorant of this [with regard to γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν], to investigate alien things (σκοπεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια)»). «It is for this that» continues Socrates «putting aside (χαίρειν ἐάσας) these things (sc. τὰ ἀλλότρια), and accepting what is commonly believed about them 17, like I was 10 Cf. ibidem, 229d3-e2: «(...) λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός, κατ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ αὖθις τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας, καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων (...).» 11 Cf. ibidem, 229e2-4: «(...) αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἅτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει.» 12 Cf. ibidem, 229e4: «(...) ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή» 13 Cf. ibidem, 229e4-5: «(...) τὸ δὲ αἴτιον, ὦ φίλε, τούτου τόδε. (...).» 14 Cf. ibidem, 229e «Knowing myself» («γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν») links the reference to the Delphic inscription γνῶθι σαυτόν ( know yourself ) to the questions we are looking at here (and which we are going to discuss further and in more detail). Some aspects of the meaning of this inscription will be considered later in the appropriate context. 16 Cf. ibidem, 229e6-230a1. 17 Accepting what is commonly believed about them is an attempt to translate «πειθόμενος τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν». In his commentary on Euripides, Electra, v. 234, Denniston writes the following with regard to νομίζειν ( ) νόμον : «One can get no nearer to it in English than uses the usages». For the meaning of νομίζειν see notably J. D. DENNISTON (ed.), Euripides Electra, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998 (1939), ad 234; W. FAHR, Θεοὺς νομίζειν. Zum Problem der Anfänge des Atheismus bei den Griechen, Hildesheim, Olms, 1969, pp. 20f. and passim; F. HEINIMANN, Nomos und Physis. Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, (1945), pp. 49, 73ff., 83, 85, 121, 123; P. HUART, Le vocabulaire de l'analyse psychologique dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 1968, pp. 263ff.; M. MONTUORI, Socrate. Fisiologia di un mito, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, (1974), pp. 142, 196, 287, 334ff.; E. de STRYCKER/S. R. SLINGS (eds.), Plato s Apology. A

18 26 Samuel Oliveira just saying, I want to investigate not them (σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα) but myself (ἐμαυτόν), εἴτε τι θηρίον ὂν τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἁπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον.» 18 With regard to Socrates view on the mythological matters mentioned by him, several aspects should be borne in mind. First, if we have understood correctly, «τὰ ἀλλότρια» does not only refer to a particular set of myths and mythological characters, as if what was at stake was the disqualification of these and those myths and of these and those mythological characters. What Socrates terms τὰ ἀλλότρια also seems to refer to two ways of understanding and relating to myths and mythological characters. Secondly, Socrates words suggest that these two ways of understanding and relating to myths and mythological characters are flawed and should be rejected the reason being that they are ἀλλότρια. Now, the first way of understanding and relating to myths Socrates has in mind is what might be called a rationalist or scientific explanation of myths and mythological characters. Socrates ascribes this view to people he calls «οἱ σοφοί». 19 But there seems to be an ironic ring to his words. 20 This ironic and critical undertone is unmistakably evident in the expression «σοφιζόμενος Literary & Philosophical Study with a Running Commentary, Leiden, Brill, 1994, pp. 86f.; J. TΑΤΕ, Greek for 'Atheism', Classical Review 50 (1936), pp As regards the meaning of the expression πειθόμενος τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν in this passage, see, for example: G. EIGLER (ed.), Platon: Werke, vol. V, German Translation by F. Schleiermacher and D. Kurz, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, (1981), p. 13 («annehmend, was darüber allgemein geglaubt wird»); H. N. FOWLER (ed.), Plato: Euthyphro Apology Crito Phaedo Phaedrus, vol. I, Loeb Classical Library, London/Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001 (1914), p. 423 («accepting the customary belief about them»); R. HACKFORTH (ed.), Plato s Phaedrus, Cambridge/New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990 (1952), p. 24 («[I] accept the current beliefs about them»); E. HEITSCH, Platon: Phaidros, Translation and Commentary (Platon: Werke; 3, 4), Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1993, p. 13 («[ich] folge für sie der allgemeinen Meinung»); L. ROBIN (ed.), Platon: Œuvres Complètes, vol. IV, 3: Phèdre, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1983 (1933), p. 6 («à leur sujet, je m en rapporte à la tradition»); C. J. ROWE (ed.), Plato: Phaedrus, Warminster, Aris & Phillips, (1986), p. 25 («believing what is commonly thought about them»); for «πειθόμενος τῷ νομιζομένῳ», W. H. THOMPSON (ed.), The Phaedrus of Plato, With English Notes and Dissertations, London, Whittaker & Co., 1868, p. 8 («acquiescing in the popular belief»); and also, for «τῷ νομιζομένῳ», H. YUNIS (ed.), Plato: Phaedrus, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 94 («the conventional practice»). 18 Cf. Phaedrus, 230a1-6: «(...) ὅθεν δὴ χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίον ὂν τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἁπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον.» 19 Cf. ibidem, 229c6: «Ἀλλ εἰ ἀπιστοίην, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί (...).» 20 Regarding the ironical sense of «οἱ σοφοί» in 229c6, see v. g. C. J. ROWE (ed.), op. cit., p Regarding the reductive character of the position of the σοφοί, the significance and fragility entailed in the expression τῷ νομιζομένῳ, and also the link between these questions and the «σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ ἐμαυτόν», cf., for example, C. L. GRISWOLD, Self-Knowledge in Plato s Phaedrus, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1986, pp and C. J. ROWE (ed.), op. cit., pp

19 Socrates Anthropological Either/Or in the Phaedrus (229e-230a) 27 φαίην» (229c7) and especially in «ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος» (229e3). 21 In other words, Socrates distances himself from this rationalist approach. This means that, in spite of all the superior features it apparently contains, the explanation by the σοφοί (and the σοφία they allegedly bear) nevertheless includes something not cultivated, coarse, boorish or rude in short, something ἄγροικον. 22 On the other hand, however, this does not mean that Socrates is willing to follow the more common path taken by οἱ πολλοί. The fact that he distances himself from the rationalist approach might suggest that he shares the common opinion about myths, mythological characters, etc. And his words seem to confirm this for he says that it is better to accept what is commonly believed. 23 But this is not so. There is something perfunctory about Socrates modest acquiescence to common views. On closer inspection it turns out that his acceptance of τὸ νομιζόμενον viz. the common views of the πόλις is just a way of turning his back on them of not having to deal with them and not having to concern himself with this kind of matters. In other words, Socrates does not side with οἱ πολλοί. In the final analysis, he too turns away from τὸ νομιζόμενον 21 Cf. Phaedrus, 229c6ff.: «Ἀλλ εἰ ἀπιστοίην, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴην, εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίην αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσαν ὦσαι (...).»; 229e2-3: «(...) αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἅτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος (...).» 22 For the expression «ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος» used in 229e3, cf. v. g. F. AST, Platonis Phaedrus, Leipzig, Schwickert, 1810, pp and I. BEKKER, Platonis scripta græce omnia, vol. I, London, Priestley, 1826, p. 13. On the etymology, see, for example, P. CHANTRAINE, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots, vol. I, Paris, Éditions Klincksieck, 1968, p. 15 and H. FRISK, Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, vol. I, Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1960, p. 16. In his commentary on Plato s Apology, J. BURNET (ed.), Plato s Euthyphro Apology of Socrates and Crito, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964 (1924), ad 32d2 writes the following: «In Plato ἀγροικία generally implies disregard of euphemism, an unpleasant way of calling a spade a spade and using expressions which might offend an urbane taste». Ἄγροικος, ον conveys the idea of something blunt, crude, arrogant, harsh, bold, exaggerated and coarse, rude, brutally worded, etc., but also of something boorish, vulgar, etc. See notably J. ADAM (ed.), The Republic of Plato, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009 (1902), ad 361e; L. CAMPBELL (ed.), The Theaetetus of Plato, With a Revised Text and English Notes, New York, Arno Press, 1973 (1861), ad 174d; E. M. COPE/J. E. SANDYS (eds.), The Rhetoric of Aristotle, vol. 2, Hildesheim/N.Y., 1970 (1877), p. 213; J. DIGGLE (ed.), Theophrast Characters, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 208f.; E. R. DODDS (ed.), Plato s Gorgias. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959, ad 462e6, 508e7-509a1; K. J. DOVER, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 112 ff.; IDEM (ed.), Plato Symposium, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, ad 194c2; IDEM, Greek and the Greeks. Collected Papers, vol. I: Language, Poetry, Drama, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 242f.; V. EHRENBERG, The People of Aristophanes. A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy, rev. and enl., Oxford, Basil Blackwell, (1943), pp. 73 ff.; G. LODGE (ed.), Plato: Gorgias, Boston/London, Ginn & Company, 1896 (1991), ad 461c, 462e; O. RIBECK, Agroikos. Eine ethologische Studie, Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Classe der Königlichen Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 23 (1888), pp. 1-68; J. H. H. SCHMIDT, Synonymik der griechischen Sprache, vol. III, Leipzig, Teubner, 1879, pp. 72 ff.; W. J. M. STARKIE (ed.), The Wasps of Aristophanes, London, Macmillan, 1897, ad v. 1320; E. de STRYCKER/R. SLINGS (eds.), Plato s Apology, op. cit., ad 32d2; J. TAILLARDAT, Les images d Aristophane. Études de langue et de style, Paris, Klincksieck, 1962, 6, pp. 12f. 23 Cf. Phaedrus, 230a2: «(...) πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν (...).»

20 28 Samuel Oliveira what happens is that his turning away from the common views of the πόλις follows a different path from that of οἱ σοφοί. That is, Socrates suggests a third way between οἱ σοφοί and οἱ πολλοί. For him, τὸ νομιζόμενον means a deviation from something more central it is flawed because it is ἀλλότριον. So, the reason why he is willing to accept the common view viz. τὸ νομιζόμενον about all these mythological matters is that he could not care less about them. All these assertions are not clear at first sight and even have a confused, incoherent and arbitrary feel to them. What is implied in the attribution of «τὰ ἀλλότρια» to the myths and mythological characters mentioned as examples? What is the reason for using this designation and what does it involve? What is the significance of the reference to the Delphic inscription γνῶθι σαυτόν and how is this related to the other aspects? For what reason is the nonconsideration of the γνῶθι σαυτόν (or the primacy of τὰ ἀλλότρια) associated with something ridiculous (γελοῖον)? And again: what does all this have to do with the figure of Typhon? Among the many and various mythological beings mentioned, Typhon appears to be the only surviving one, to the extent that, not only is he not relegated to a τὰ ἀλλότρια position, but as Socrates points out 24 there is the possibility of him corresponding to what I myself am. 25 What is the significance of this? What aspects are involved in the character of Typhon, and what is the meaning of his contraposition vis-à-vis something opposite (sc. which can be qualified with the opposite predicates)? An attempt to reply to these questions involves, in the first place, a more precise focusing on τὰ ἀλλότρια and the distinction, which this term introduces, between what is ἀλλότριον and its opposite. The demarcation between τὰ ἀλλότρια (sc. οὐ σκοπεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια) and the self (sc. σκοπεῖν ἐμαυτόν) gives rise to a first opposition a first fundamental either/or moment. What Socrates depicts corresponds, on the one hand, to a dividing up of the spheres of the σκοπεῖν, the result of which is the creation of a) a field of belonging (i.e. the horizon of what belongs to me or regards me which is, we can say, οἰκεῖον) and b) a field of non-belonging (i.e. the horizon of what does not regard me or is ἀλλότριον). The whole realm of possible σκοπεῖν (all possible objects of σκοπεῖν) is divided into these two spheres. Let us look into this matter a little further. First, it must be borne in mind that the initial question concerning the interpretation of myths becomes the question of what is οἰκεῖον and what is ἀλλότριον. Mythological questions can be disregarded because they belong to one of these two realms of possible objects of σκοπεῖν i.e. insofar as they are 24 Cf. ibidem, 230a3-5: «(...) σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίον ὂν τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον (...).» 25 It makes sense to talk about me, of each one of us, precisely because the σκοπεῖν ἐμαυτόν (and the reference to Typhon that this σκοπεῖν ἐμαυτόν triggers) is not an exercise restricted to Socrates, which regards him exclusively, but is, on the contrary, a possibility each one of us has.