James Buchanan. Buchanan

Transcript

1 James Buchanan Buchanan

2 Buchanan Tinbergen

3 GDP Okada Sakakibara Suga

4 Buchanan Buchanan Bergson Samuelson Tinbergen Buchanan Buchanan

5 Buchanan Buchanan Buchanan Buchanan and Tullock

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7 constitution Tiebout Oates Alesina and Spolaore

8 veils of uncertainty Caplan

9 European Union EU GDP

10 GDP World Bank, World Development Indicators, Quick Query, Exports of goods and services of GDP World, http : //ddp ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpqq/ member.do?method getmembers / / http : // nations/ / /

11 Vaubel Frey p.

12 spontaneous order self enforcing power Hayek,,,,,,,,

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14 ,,,,,,,,

15 Okada

16 Vanberg and Congleton Axelrod,,,,,,,,, Axelrod Tit for Tat Vanberg and Congleton

17 Vanberg and Congleton Opportunist Naive Moralist Tit for Tat Prudent Moralist Vanberg and Congleton

18 Axelrod Vanberg and Congleton, p., Figure.

19 Buchanan and Faith Internal Exit Dewatripont and Roland Hirschman Buchanan and Faith Internal Exit Tiebout External Exit Buchanan and Faith Buchanan and Faith Graziosi Graziosi

20 ii EU Oates

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22 Buchanan and Tullock Rawls veil of ignorance Rawls Okada

23 Vanberg and Congleton Rawls Rawls Sandel Rawls Rawls Sandel

24 Rawls NGO Dupuy Rawls Dupuy Rawls Rawls Rawls national glonacal

25 Rawls Buchanan Collier ESCO Energy Service Company Buchanan

26 Caplan Wittman Caplan Caplan Caplan Wittman Caplan Caplan

27 Collier United Nations

28 GDP Alesina, Alberto and Spolaore, Enrico The Size of Nations, Cambridge : The MIT Press. Brennan, Geoffrey and Buchanan, James M. The Reason of Rules : Constitutional Political Economy, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Buchanan, James M. Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol., No., pp.. pp. NO GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade WTO World Trade Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IMF Stiglitz IMF

29 Buchanan, James M. What Should Economists Do? Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXX, No., pp.. pp. Buchanan, James M. Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative : The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism, Cheltenham : Edward Elgar. Buchanan, James M. Economics from the Outside in : Better Than Plowing and Beyond, College Station : Texas A&M University Press. Buchanan, James and Faith, Roger Secession and the Limits of Taxation : Toward a Theory of Internal Exit, American Economic Review, Vol., No., pp.. Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon The Calculus of Consent : Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press. Caplan, Bryan The Myth of the Rational Voter : Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton : Princeton University Press. BP Collier, Paul The Bottom Billion : Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, New York : Oxford University Press. BP Collier, Paul Wars, Guns, and Votes : Democracy in Dangerous Places, New York : HarperCollins BP Dewatripont, Mathias and Roland, Gérard Transition as a process of large scale institutional change, in Kreps, David M. and Wallis, Kenneth F. eds. Advances in economics and econometrics : theary and applications, Seventh World Congress Volume II, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, Chapter, pp.. Dupuy, Jean Pierre Le Sacrifice et l Envie : Le libéralisme aux prises avec la justice sociale, Paris : Calmann Lévy. Frey, Bruno S. International Political Economics, Oxford : Blackwell.

30 Frey, Bruno S. The public choice of international organization, in Mueller, Dueller C. ed. Perspectives on Public Choice : A Handbook, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, Chapter, pp. pp. Graziosi, Gregoire Rota The theory of Internal Exit, a comment on Buchanan and Faith, Economics Bulletin, Vol., Issue, pp.. Hirschman, Albert Exit, Voice, and Loyalty : Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge : Harvard University Press. Oates, Wallace Fiscal Federalism, New York : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Okada, Akira The possibility of cooperation in an n person prisoners dilemma with institutional arrangements, Public Choice, Vol., No., pp.. Okada, Akira and Sakakibara, Kenichi and Suga, Koichi The dynamic transformation of political systems through social contract : a game theoretic approach, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol., No., pp.. Okui, Katsuyoshi Is Government really Leviathan? : Investigating the way of looking at government analyzed by the public choice theory, Otemon Economic Studies, Vol., pp. Okui, Katsuyoshi Toward a Theory of a Constitution with More Enforcing Power, Otemon Economic Studies, Vol., pp. Okui, Katsuyoshi Causality between Political Freedom and Economic Freedom, in Aktan, Coskun Can ed. Economics in a Changing World : Papers on Economic Growth, Social and Human Capital, Trade, Public Finance and Public Choice. Volume 3 : Selected Proceedings of the First International Conference on Business, Management and Economics, Yasar University, pp.. Rawls, John A Theory of Justice, Cambridge : Harvard University

31 Press. Rawls, John The Law of Peoples, Cambridge : Harvard University Press Sandel, Michael J. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice Second Edition Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and Its Discontents, New York : Norton. Tiebout, Charles M. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy, Vol., No., pp.. Tollison, Robert D. and Congleton, Roger D. eds. The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking, Aldershot : Edward Elgar. Vanberg, Viktor J. and Congleton, Roger D. Rationality, Morality, and Exit, American Political Science Review, Vol., No., pp.. Vaubel, Roland International Organization, in Rowley, Charles K. and Schneider, Friedrich eds. The Encyclopedia of Public Choice Vol., Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp.. Wittman, Donald The Myth of Democratic Failure : Why Political Institutions Are Efficient, Chicago : University of Chicago Press. World Bank, World Development Indicators, http : //ddp ext.worldbank. org/ / / pp. IMF

32 pp. XXXII pp. XXXVI pp. No., pp. pp. pp. pp. http: // charter japanese/ / / http : // nations/ / / / pp.